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In recent years, an increasing number of personalised services that require users to
disclose personal information have appeared on the Web (e.g. social networks, govern-
mental sites, on-line selling sites). By disclosing their personal information, users are
given access to a wide range of new functionality and benets. However, there exists a
risk that their personal information is misused.
To strike a balance between the advantages of personal information disclosure and pro-
tection of information, governments have created legal frameworks, such as the Data
Protection Act, Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA) or Safe
Harbor, which place restrictions on how organisations can process personal information.
By auditing the way in which organisations used personal data, it is possible to de-
termine whether they process personal information in accordance with the appropriate
frameworks.
The traditional way of auditing collects evidence in a manual way. This evidence is
later analysed to assess the degree of compliance to a predened legal framework. These
manual assessments are long, since large amounts of data need to be analysed, and they
are unreliable, since there is no guarantee that all data is correctly analysed. As several
cases of data leaks and exposures of private data have proven, traditional audits are also
prone to intentional and unintentional errors derived from human intervention.
Therefore, this thesis proposes a provenance-based approach to auditing the use of per-
sonal information by securely gathering and analysing electronic evidence related to the
processing of personal information. This approach makes three contributions to the
state of art.
The rst contribution is the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture that denes a set
of communication protocols to make existing systems provenance-aware. These proto-
cols specify which provenance information should be gathered to verify the compliance
with the Data Protection Act. Moreover, we derive a set of Auditing Requirements by
analysing a Data Protection Act case study and demonstrate that provenance can be
used as electronic evidence of past processing.iv
The second contribution is the Compliance Framework, which is a provenance-based
auditing framework for automatically auditing the compliance with the Data Protec-
tion Act's principles. This framework consist of a provenance graph representation
(Processing View), a novel graph-based rule representation expressing processing rules
(Usage Rules Denition) and a novel set of algorithms that automatically verify whether
information was processed according to the Auditing Requirements by comparing the
Processing View against the Usage Rules Denition.
The third contribution is the Secure Provenance-based Auditing Architecture that en-
sures any malicious alteration on provenance during the entire provenance life cycle of
recording, storage, querying and analysis can be detected. This architecture, which relies
on cryptographic techniques, guarantees the correctness of the audit results.Contents
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Introduction
Recent years have seen an exponential growth of not only storage and computing power,
but also of the speed at which data is transmitted. For the rst time in history, these
technological advances have made possible the personalisation of services on a large
scale1. These services are tailored to the specic needs of the recipient, and are capable
of creating value where homogeneous services fall short.
For instance, in business, companies can collect information about customers' shopping
and travelling habits, as well as their opinions and preferences about particular products.
Particularly, the business sector has beneted from the collection of this information to
improve and expand existing services, as well as to create new ones.
Similarly, for governments, the benets of personalised services are also evident: they
increase eectiveness, reduce cost and increase satisfaction. For example, governments
increasingly oer on-line services that simplify the way in which citizens pay their taxes,
apply for pensions and benets, track their children's educational progress and check
their medical records [58, 59]. Moreover, the availability of detailed medical information
can aid national health institutions to detect an epidemic and take necessary measures
in a timely fashion. In terms of medical research, the availability of these records en-
ables researchers to identify trends in disease growth, and may potentially speed up the
development of cures.
In both the private and public sector, the development of these new personalised ser-
vices highly depends on the availability of detailed personal information. The continual
improvements to information processing techniques make the use and modication of
this personal information happen at an increasingly faster pace. The benets of these
technological advances are evident and the opportunities are innumerable.
However, these advances also come with great risks. While the proper use of personal
information can lead to many benets, its misuse can result in great harm. For example,
1For example, Amazon recommendation service or iGoogle customised Google page
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most people are willing to share their medical records with their doctor. However, they
are likely to be less content if it turns out their family doctor also uses these records to
determine hiring policies. Similarly, on a smaller scale and perhaps more familiar, the
misuse of email addresses can lead to the receipt of unwanted email.
To prevent misuse, it is important to ensure that this information does not fall into the
wrong hands, and that data is used according to the purposes for which it was disclosed.
Two solutions have been proposed in an attempt to address these issues.
The rst solution addresses the rst part of the problem, i.e. allowing access to infor-
mation only to whom it was disclosed. This led to the development of access control
and information retrieval techniques that protect sensitive information. However, there
are two potential diculties associated with this solution. First, while access control is
a reliable method of restricting access to information, it does not specify who should
receive those access rights, nor does it ensure the proper use of information to authorised
users. Second, as Weitzner et al. [146] have pointed out, access control alone cannot
properly solve the problem of correct use of personal information on the Web, where in-
formation is widely and publicly available from dierent sources. In some cases, personal
information that was initially restricted can be inferred by aggregating dierent pieces
of publicly available information [133]. With new technologies, such as Linked Data [26],
it has become easier to aggregate, automatically correlate and infer data across multiple
sources of information. By so doing, sensitive data can be disclosed that was properly
protected by access control.
The second solution was oered by governments, which decided to legislate the way in
which organisations are allowed to manage personal information. For example, the UK
saw the approval of the Data Protection Act (DPA) [7], which is the implementation of
an EU directive [5] that protects personal information in both the private and public
sectors. Similarly, the US government created the US Safe Harbor [8], which protects
information transferred for commercial purposes between the US and the EU, and the
Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA) [6] to protect information
managed by health institutions. The main problem with this solution is one of enforce-
ment: how can one make sure that the multitude of decentralised and open information
systems used by a multitude of people are processing data in compliance with these
legislative frameworks.
In light of this problem, both the DPA and the US Safe Harbor dene procedures for
investigating and resolving complaints from individuals who suspect that their personal
data is being misused. Audits are currently the main method to implement these pro-
cedures. In detail, an audit is an evaluation of an organization or system to ascertain
whether personal data is stored and processed according to the principles of the applica-
ble legislation. For example, in this context, audits focus on whether personal data was
processed according to the purpose for which it was collected. An audit is performedChapter 1 Introduction 3
by a qualied third party known as auditor, who issues a report on the results of the
audit. This process is long, as it relies heavily on manual collection and analysis of large
amounts of data from dierent sources, and needs to follow many rules and regulations.
Thus, there is no guarantee that all data is properly analysed, and as such, the nal
conclusions are based on samples rather than the whole set of available data. More-
over, because this is an inherently manual process, these audits are prone to intentional
and unintentional errors and omissions. The consequences of the ineectiveness (of the
threat) of these audits are perhaps best illustrated by the highly publicised cases of
information misuse (data leaks and exposures of personal data) [116, 109, 108] and the
review of dierent legislation [12, 13].
Thus, both access control and legislation fall short of solving the problem of protecting
personal information. As a result, users who give out their personal information have
no guarantees that it is used properly, nor do they know how this information is used
and by whom|information processing remains non-transparent.
1.1 Provenance: Making Information Processing Trans-
parent
It is this lack of transparency that is the main weakness of legislation, or rather systems
implementing this legislation. Without knowing how information was processed, it is
impossible to determine whether this processing was in compliance with the law, and to
take appropriate measures in case of non-compliance.
To address this shortcoming, auditors need the ability to determine which processes were
involved in managing personal information, to analyse these processes, and to make or-
ganisations accept responsibility for these processes. This ability is called information
accountability. Information accountability gives users insight into the way their infor-
mation was used. Moreover, it allows users and society in general to decide|by means
of automatic audits|whether information is used appropriately, i.e. in compliance with
the corresponding data protection framework.
In order to perform automatic audits, it is necessary to make information processing
transparent. This means that the way in which personal information is created, modied
and stored should be made explicit. By doing this, an equivalent audit process is carried
out to the evidence collection performed by auditors when carrying out manual audits.
However, in contrast to manual audits, automatic audits require evidence in electronic
machine-readable form.
In computational systems, this electronic evidence that documents the events performed
by applications at execution time is also referred to as provenance. In more detail, prove-
nance consists of the causal dependencies between data and events explaining what4 Chapter 1 Introduction
contributed to a result in a specic state [64]. As such, it not only represents data
derivations but also processes derivations, i.e. which processes were involved in the cre-
ation of a piece of data. For that reason, it is regarded as a very promising means of
providing information accountability [146] in open and distributed systems (such as the
Internet). Thus, if the provenance of data is available, processing becomes transparent
since the provenance of data can be audited to verify that information was used properly.
In order to achieve this, systems need to record provenance about processing of personal
information, store this provenance in a so-called Provenance Store, make it available
by oering query functionality, and allow auditors (a role that might be fullled by a
component in the system itself) to analyse it. Due to the open and distributed nature
of these systems, these steps involve communication between multiple components over
potentially unsecured networks. Consequently, without additional means of protection,
there are multiple ways in which provenance might be altered, tampered with, or fall into
the hands of untrusted parties. More specically, several attacks can be performed in
an attempt to break one of the four basic security properties: condentiality, integrity,
authentication and non-repudiation. For example, a condentiality attack might aim
to get unauthorised possession of the provenance of personal information; an integrity
attack involves the alteration of provenance in an attempt to cover up misuse of personal
information; an authentication attack aims to record provenance in the name of others;
and a non-repudiation attack aims to deny the use of personal information, by attempt-
ing to refute the creation of the corresponding provenance. If any of these attacks are
successful, they can undermine the reliability and trustworthiness of provenance, making
it unsuitable for use in audits.
As in any information system, provenance information must be available when needed,
a property referred to as availability. However, unlike the aforementioned properties,
ensuring the availability of provenance does not require provenance specic techniques;
existing techniques to protect systems from attacks that target their availability can
be readily implemented in systems that store provenance. Therefore, we consider the
availability property beyond the scope of this thesis.
1.2 Securing Provenance
Against this background, we identify the need for securing provenance. This is one of
the central problems we address in this thesis. As mentioned above, a crucial issue in
the development of transparent systems is the security of the collected provenance. If
this provenance has not been collected and stored in a secure way, results can be altered
by malicious parties, and the integrity of the results obtained from audits cannot be
ensured.Chapter 1 Introduction 5
To address this problem, in this thesis we develop a novel secure architecture that
protects not only provenance but also the related application data during its collection,
storage, communication, query and analysis phases. By considering the entire life cycle
of provenance and application data, this architecture is designed to minimise the risk
of undetected alterations of provenance by (malicious) actors (for example, in order to
hide improper alterations to data), which would result in incorrect or corrupt audits.
In addition, using the provenance captured by this secure architecture, we develop a novel
set of algorithms that automatically verify the compliance of data processing against
a set of processing rules that specify which operations can be performed on personal
data. In this thesis, we derive these rules from the Data Protection Act. Now, to
perform automatic verication, the algorithms need both provenance and the processing
rules in machine-readable format. To do this, the former is intuitively represented as a
Provenance Graph, which captures the causal dependencies between data and processes.
The latter is also represented as a graph, called a Usage Rules Denition graph, which
captures the relations between the data classes that can be used, and the allowable
operations that can be performed on that data.
1.3 Thesis Statement and Contributions
Thus, our solution to the problem of auditing processing of personal information in IT
systems can be summarised as follows:
By securing provenance we ensure the reliability of audits and enable
auditors to verify and analyse whether personal information was processed
in compliance with a set of processing rules.
In more detail, the contributions made in this thesis are as follows:
1. Our rst contribution is the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture, which con-
sists of a set of protocols designed to augment existing systems to make them
provenance-aware, i.e. enabling them to capture provenance at execution time.
Moreover, we derive a set of requirements from a case study of the Data Protec-
tion Act and demonstrate that these requirements can be veried using provenance.
Based on this case study, we identify which provenance should be gathered by the
architecture to verify these requirements. With our proposed architecture and
the corresponding protocols, the necessary provenance can be collected and visu-
ally analysed, demonstrating that provenance can be eectively used to support
information transparency.6 Chapter 1 Introduction
2. Our second contribution is the Compliance Framework which automatically veries
the requirements derived from the DPA case study. It uses a novel graph-based rep-
resentation for analysing collected provenance information and verifying whether
information was processed according to the identied requirements. Within this
representation, provenance is encoded as a so-called Provenance Graph, which cap-
tures the relations between data and the processes that acted upon it. Similarly,
the rules that indicate how personal information should be processed are repre-
sented by the Usage Rules Denition Graph, a graph that simplies the analysis
of past processing. Finally, compliance is decided by checking whether the Prove-
nance Graph matches a Usage Rules Denition Graph.
3. Our third contribution is the Secure Provenance-based Auditing Architecture that
secures the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture in order to minimise the risk
of undetected alteration of provenance (for example, by malicious actors) during
the stages of creation, storage, querying and analysis. This architecture, which
relies on cryptographic techniques, ensures the trustworthiness of the evidence on
which audits are based. By securing provenance, we guarantee that the entire sys-
tem (i.e. provenance and application data) exhibits the properties of condentiality,
integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. These security characteristics are
formalised and veried using an automatic model checker.
These contributions have led to the publication of the following papers:
 Aldeco-P erez, R. and Moreau, L. (2010). Securing Provenance-based Audits. In D.
L. McGuinness., J. R. Michaelis and L. Moreau (Eds.), International Provenance
and Annotation Workshop (IPAW 2010) (LNCS 6378, pp. 148-164). Troy, NY:
Springer-Verlag.
 Aldeco-P erez, R. and Moreau, L. (2010). A Provenance-based Compliance Frame-
work. In A. J. Berre, A. G omez-P erez, K. Tutschku and D. Fensel (Eds.), Future
Internet Symposium (FIS 2010) (LNCS 6369, pp. 128-137). Berlin, Germany:
Springer-Verlag.
 Aldeco-P erez, R. and Moreau, L. (2009). Information Accountability supported
by a Provenance-based Compliance Framework (Poster). UK e-Science All Hands
Meeting 2009. Oxford, UK.
 Aldeco-P erez, R. and Moreau, L. (2008). Provenance-based Auditing of Private
Data Use. International Academic Research Conference, Visions of Computer
Science (BSC 2008) (pp. 141-152). London, UK: BCS.Chapter 1 Introduction 7
1.4 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 presents an overview of related work. First, we overview the state of the art
in provenance, analyse the strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches, and identify
the techniques we adopt in our work. Then, we discuss existing approaches for auditing
IT systems, and argue that they are unsuitable for open and distributed systems. After
that, we discuss the four security characteristics of condentiality, integrity, authentica-
tion and non-repudiation and give an overview of existing techniques that ensure these
characteristics hold. Finally, we focus on legislation frameworks for data protection, and
explain the necessary conditions for compliance.
In Chapter 3, we study the Data Protection Act and derive a set of Auditing Require-
ments that specify the conditions for data processing to be in compliance. With this
goal in mind, we also present a practical scenario and identify the protocols that involve
the exchange of personal information.
In Chapter 4, we develop the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture. This architec-
ture is based on a provenance-aware version of the protocols presented in Chapter 3,
augmented with additional components to support automatic audits. Then, we identify
which provenance needs to be captured in order to automatically verify the Auditing
Requirements stated in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 5, we develop the Compliance Framework, which is capable of automati-
cally verifying the Auditing Requirements described in Chapter 3, using the provenance
captured by the architecture from Chapter 4. This framework consists of three compo-
nents. The rst component is a graph based representation of the provenance captured
in Chapter 4. The second component is a graph based representation of the processing
rules, that state how personal information should be processed. These processing rules
are derived from the Auditing Requirements. The third component is a set of algo-
rithms for automatically verifying whether data processing was in compliance with the
processing rules.
Chapter 6 discusses the steps that need to be taken to make the Provenance-based
Auditing Architecture secure. Here, we explain how to guarantee condentiality, in-
tegrity, authenticity and non-repudiation in each of the stages of the provenance life
cycle: recording, storage, querying and analysis. This is rst achieved by securing the
provenance graphs, and second, by formalising the architecture protocols using UML.
Later, the protocols are veried with an automatic model checker. The result of this
chapter is the Secure Provenance-based Auditing Architecture.8 Chapter 1 Introduction
In Chapter 7, we present a methodical analysis of the security of systems designed
according to the Secure Provenance-based Auditing Architecture. This analysis is car-
ried out by using Attack Trees, which examine the security of a system under realistic
conditions by analysing threats and their corresponding countermeasures.
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the contribution of this thesis, outlines future work and
oers some concluding remarks.Chapter 2
Related Work
In Chapter 1, we discussed the benets and risks involved in disclosing personal infor-
mation. While the proper use of personal information has created value in the form
of new services, its misuse can lead to harm. In an attempt to address this problem,
governments have proposed legislation to restrict the ways in which personal informa-
tion can be used. However, legislation merely transforms the original problem into a
problem of enforcement. We argued that information accountability | making organ-
isations responsible for proper management of personal information | is an essential
step towards successful enforcement. To do this, it is necessary to make information
processing transparent, making it possible to conduct audits to verify whether this in-
formation processing was in compliance with the applicable laws. This transparency
can be achieved by documenting the operations that were applied to data, which con-
stitutes the provenance of that data. Finally, we argued that, in order to ensure the
trustworthiness and reliability of audits, the provenance itself on which these audits are
based needs to be trustworthy and reliable. Thus, we identied the problem of securing
provenance.
Before addressing this problem and developing solutions to it, we rst give an overview
of the background of this thesis. To do this, we discuss the four areas identied in
the central problem summarised above: provenance, electronic audits, security and data
protection legislation. In this chapter, we study each of these topics in more detail,
discuss the state of the art, and identify the techniques that we adopt in our own work.
Thus, this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 presents an overview of prove-
nance approaches. Here, we discuss the dierent ways in which provenance is captured,
stored, queried and analysed. Section 2.2 presents the main approach used to audit
IT systems, audit trails. Section 2.3 formalises the concept of security by discussing
the four main properties that need to hold in secure systems. Section 2.4 presents the
most important data protection legislations, and explains their structure, concepts and
principles. Finally, Section 2.5 summarises the discussion in this chapter.
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2.1 Provenance
The word provenance is used in diverse areas, such art, archaeology and palaeontology,
for describing the history of custody of an object since its creation, including any succes-
sive changes made to it. To establish that this object has not been altered and it is not
a forgery or a reproduction, it is necessary to have documented evidence of such events.
The main purpose of this evidence is to prove that a specic object actually comes from
where it is thought to originate from, in other words, that it is authentic.
Similarly, in Information Technology, provenance makes it possible to determine the
origin of a computational result and its event history. Electronic provenance can be used
to evaluate information quality [112, 47], ascertain information attribution [77], support
reproducibility [87, 137], or as in this thesis, as audit evidence to establish information
accountability. Due to its extended use in diverse domains, dierent techniques for
capturing, storing and analysing provenance have been developed. These techniques
vary according to the specic requirements of each domain, where provenance is dened
and represented in dierent forms.
In order to present a systematic general overview of the most representative provenance
approaches, we explain the techniques and approaches used throughout its life cycle to
capture, store, query and analyse provenance. This analysis is based on the characteri-
sations presented by Simmhan et al. [128], Freire et al. [53] and Moreau [103] in their
corresponding surveys.
The aim of this analysis is to identify the necessary characteristics of provenance for
supporting audits.
2.1.1 Computer Systems Provenance Denition
In computer systems, provenance is dened in several dierent ways depending on the
domain where it is used. A generic denition is given by Simmhan et al. [128] who state
that: \data provenance is information that helps determine the derivation history of a
data product, starting from its original sources". This denition is similar to the one
found in most dictionaries in the sense that provenance helps to determine how a data
product originated. Here, a data product can be any type of data, such as les, tables,
collections, etc. However, more specialised denitions exist, which we briey discuss
below.
Buneman et al. [34] dene data provenance in database systems as \where a piece of
data came from and the process by which it arrived in the database". In that sense,
they make a distinction between why-provenance, which refers to the source data (tuples)
that inuence the existence of a query result, and where-provenance, which refers to the
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In the scientic domain, Greenwood et al. [60] dene provenance as \a kind of metadata,
recording the process of experiments for e-Science, the purpose and results of experi-
ments as well as annotations and notes about experiments by scientists". This denition
states that a type of data (metadata) is captured from a specic area (e-Science). This
metadata can be enriched by standard \annotations" indicating when an object was cre-
ated or updated, who owns it and what its format is. These annotations can be created
automatically, but also manually by users.
In a dierent context, Groth et al. [64] dene provenance as \[...] the process that led to
that piece of data". Using this denition, they argue that provenance not only represents
data derivations but also processes derivations, i.e. which processes were involved in the
creation of a piece of data. In the context of our work, this denition is attractive,
because it includes the processes that were performed on data. This is vital information
for establishing the process transparency needed for verifying that personal information
was used in accordance with the law. For this reason, this denition by Groth et al. is
the one used in this thesis.
Now that we have presented the dierent denitions of provenance, we proceed by re-
viewing the dierent existing computational approaches for managing provenance. This
review is organised according to the provenance life cycle, which is presented in Fig-
ure 2.1.
The cycle starts when provenance is captured and recorded in a storage component called
Provenance Store, in a stage we refer to as recording. The techniques used to record
provenance are discussed in Section 2.1.2. Provenance is maintained in the Provenance
Store during the storage stage. The dierent approaches used to store provenance are
described in Section 2.1.3. Provenance is made available by querying the Provenance
Store, during the query stage, which is presented in Section 2.1.4. Finally, the results
of these queries are analysed, during the analysis stage. The dierent approaches used
during this stage are studied in Section 2.1.5.
Figure 2.1: Provenance Life Cycle12 Chapter 2 Related Work
2.1.2 Recording Provenance
As Freire et al. argues, there are three dierent mechanisms used to capture provenance:
workow-based, process-based and Operating System-based [53]. The characteristics,
advantages and disadvantages of these mechanisms are discussed below.
2.1.2.1 Workow-based Systems
Workow-based Systems systematically capture provenance of complex processes, and
represent this provenance as the workow of data processes that were performed. Pro-
cesses are specied by well-dened languages allowing the system to support automa-
tion, reproducibility and result sharing. One advantage of these systems is that the
capture functionality is integrated into the workow system, and as such, provenance is
captured through system APIs. These systems normally provide simple programming
models and visual programming interfaces that allow visualisation of provenance work-
ows as graphs, which can be explored and queried. Examples of this type of system
are Kepler [29], Taverna [149] and REDUX [23].
2.1.2.2 Process-based Systems
In process-based systems, each service involved in a computational task is adapted
to capture its own provenance. This is achieved by wrapping existing services in a
provenance-aware adapter, which is capable of recording and storing the data and data-
process dependencies that constitute provenance. To obtain the complete provenance of
a piece of data, provenance information is queried by reconstructing the dependencies
that exist between services. Similar to workow-based systems, provenance information
can be visualised as graphs.
An example of this type of system is PASOA (Provenance Aware Service Oriented Ar-
chitecture) [64], which captures extra information that describes what actually occurred
at execution time. Such extra information, which is referred to as process documentation
(which we call provenance), can be seen as documented evidence of the events performed
by an application in execution time.
In order for applications to implement PASOA, they rst need to be made Provenance
Aware, by recording process documentation at execution time, in addition to performing
the task for which they were designed.
The provenance collected by PASOA consists of a set of assertions generated at execution
time, called p-assertions (Provenance Assertions), which are asserted by the components
of an application. There are three types of p-assertions that document di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Interaction P-Assertion is a description of the contents of a message by an actor
that has sent or received such a message.
Relationship P-Assertion is a description of how an actor obtained output data sent
in an interaction, by applying some function or algorithm to input data from other
interactions.
Actor State P-Assertions is a description provided by an actor about its internal
state in the context of a specic interaction.
2.1.2.3 Operating System-based Systems
Operating System-based systems capture provenance at the Operating System (OS)
level, and as such, are not aware of the specic processes executed within the system.
These systems capture data and data-process dependencies created by system calls and
le access. They rely on OS functionalities only, so there is no need for modifying
existing applications that are executed on the system. Similar to process-based systems,
they obtain provenance information through provenance queries that reconstruct the
existing dependencies between system calls and les accesses. One disadvantage of these
systems is the low level and quantity of captured provenance, which makes querying and
analysing this provenance very challenging. Examples of this type of system are PASS
[70] and ES3 [54].
Another important issue about capturing provenance is the granularity level in which it
is captured. In the next section we describe the dierent approaches used.
2.1.2.4 Granularity of Provenance
The granularity of the captured provenance depends on the specic domain and appli-
cation in which provenance is used. For example, in the databases context, provenance
is used to track tables [144], rows (Trio [147], Perm [56]) and cells [33]. In OS-based
Systems provenance is used to track provenance of les, such as PASS [70] and ES3
[54], the same as some workow-based systems such as VDS [150]. Other workow-
based systems, such as Kepler [29] and Taverna [149], track provenance of collections
and collections' elements. The main disadvantage of workow-based systems is that the
granularity of provenance is not decided according to a predened methodology. For
example, it does not take into account the analysis that should later be applied to the
provenance.
In order to obtain a more exible method, Miles et al. [100] propose a dierent vision.
They argue that the granularity of provenance can be chosen depending on the spe-
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recorded based on the questions that we want to answer using provenance information.
With that purpose, they introduce the Provenance Incorporating Methodology (PrIMe),
which is a software engineering methodology for adapting existing applications to record
provenance about their execution. PrIMe is divided into three phases: provenance ques-
tion capture and analysis, actor based decomposition and adapting the application. As
this methodology is used in this thesis (see Chapter 4), more information about it is
presented below:
Phase 1: Provenance Question Capture and Analysis In the rst phase of PrI-
Me, an analysis of the application identies the provenance related questions to be
answered about the application. Likewise, the information for which provenance
is sought is characterised as well as the answer's scope.
Phase 2: Actor Based Decomposition In the second phase of PrIMe, the applica-
tion is conceptually decomposed into a set of actors, which record process docu-
mentation. Then, their interactions are analysed to nd the relationships between
these interactions. This analysis exposes the information ow within the appli-
cation. For this purpose, PrIMe uses a graph-based representation of application
interactions. The next step is to determine which application actors are involved
in the provenance of a given data item: these actors are called knowledgeable ac-
tors. If the necessary information for answering the provenance related questions
is available from the current actors, then it is time to apply Phase 3. If not, Phase
2 has to be repeated until the correct level of granularity to answer provenance
questions is reached.
Phase 3: Adapting the Application This phase involves the modication of the ap-
plication in order to make explicit the required information items that are currently
unavailable, thereby giving the application the necessary functionality to record
process documentation, which in turn allows actors to perform queries on the
documentation in order to answer provenance questions.
Now that we have discussed techniques for recording provenance, we next focus on the
second stage of the provenance life cycle: storage.
2.1.3 Storing Provenance
There are three principal storage strategies: the no-coupling, the tight-coupling and the
loose-coupling recording strategy [57].
In the no-coupling strategy provenance is stored in a central provenance repository or
in distributed provenance repositories that are dedicated to store provenance only. The
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limited control over the execution (open systems). However, the existence of a centralised
provenance repository creates a single point of failure. If, instead, the repository is
distributed, retrieving provenance becomes more challenging as the provenance of a
single item can be distributed in various repositories.
Since, in this strategy, provenance is stored in a dierent repository from the one in
which application data is stored, there exist two ways in which the relation between
application data and its provenance is established. The rst one maintains a copy of
the original application data as part of the provenance. The second one maintains a
reference to this data. This reference is used to retrieve the original data from the
database where it is stored. Note that, to obtain the original data, the corresponding
credentials are required. Examples of systems that implement this strategy are PASOA,
Kepler and Taverna.
In the tight-coupling strategy, provenance is directly associated with the data whose
provenance is captured. Thus, provenance is attached to the original data. The main ad-
vantage of this strategy is that we do not need a query functionality, because provenance
is obtained together with the data. The disadvantage of this is the lack of protection of
provenance. When a piece of data is accessed it is possible to access and manipulate its
provenance. An example of a system where this strategy is used is discussed by Hasan
et al. [68].
Finally, in the loose-coupling strategy, provenance and data are stored in a single storage
component but logically separated. The main advantages of this strategy is that, since
provenance is contained in the same repository, accessing provenance is faster. Moreover,
provenance and application data can be protected by dierent policies, since both are
separated. However, should the database crash, not only the application data but also
its provenance is lost. Examples of systems that implement the loose-coupling strategy
include those described by [34, 32] and the OS-based systems, such as PASS.
2.1.4 Querying Provenance
The fundamental goal of provenance systems is to enable analysis of the results produced
by their systems. Therefore, provenance needs to be queried after it has been captured
and stored in a provenance store. To this end, the provenance store should be able to
respond to provenance queries. A provenance query [105] is a user-tailored query over
captured provenance aimed to obtain the provenance of a specic data item.
The intent of a provenance query is to select a set of provenance assertions (p-assertions),
which we refer to as provenance query result, that provides the provenance of a specic
piece of data. A p-assertion expresses the relation between a piece of data and a process
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to as the data item. Since not all p-assertions related to the data item are relevant to a
query result, only those that belong to a predened context called scope are returned.
In most systems, such as Taverna, PASS, PASOA, and Kepler, provenance query results
are represented by Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). These DAGs represents the way
in which a piece of data was derived by showing the dependencies between data and
processes. The nodes of such DAGs represent data items and edges represent data
derivations. Thus, by following the relationships in this DAG, it is possible to ascertain
how a data item was produced.
In an eort to standardise this widely used provenance representation, Moreau et al.
[104] developed the Open Provenance Model (OPM). OPM is a model designed to sup-
port the sharing of provenance between dierent systems. Dierent from the aforemen-
tioned DAGs, in this model, the nodes of the DAG represent not only artifacts (pieces of
data), but also processes (actions resulting in new artifacts), while the edges represent
causal dependencies between them.
2.1.5 Analysing Provenance
After provenance has been queried using one of the aforementioned methods, it can be
analysed to enforce norms in multi-agent systems, or to verify that proper procedures
were followed in experimental and business workows.
In workow systems such as VisTrails, Kepler and Taverna, the actual workow can
be compared to manually constructed rules that specify so-called acceptable workows,
which are represented as workows themselves. These systems provide visual tools for
manually comparing the actual execution of workows (which is represented as prove-
nance) with the acceptable workows [35]. Thus, these systems do not oer functionality
for automatic compliance checking.
Miles et al. [101] capture provenance of experimental workows. This provenance is
later analysed to determine the semantic validity of past experiments. They determine
whether the inputs and outputs of the operations applied in these experiments are of the
correct type. They achieve this by analysing the underlying provenance representation
(XML) against the expected types (represented as XML Schema). The main disadvan-
tage of the model used in their technique is its strong dependence on the implementation
details of XML; it is not an implementation independent theoretical model.
Curbera et al. [44] use provenance in a business context (so-called business provenance),
which provides information about how data was produced, which resources were involved
and which tasks were executed. Business provenance is captured in the form of a DAG
that is analysed to detect compliance with business process regulations. To do so,
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adhere to in their execution. Using these control points, users can detect (the cause of)
problems in business processes by manually analysing the corresponding DAGs against
the control points. The main disadvantage of this method is that, despite the availability
of provenance in electronic form, audits are essentially performed manually.
V azquez-Salceda and Alvarez-Napagao [142] use provenance to regulate the interactions
of web services in a multi-agent context. In their work, provenance is also represented
as a DAG, which provides information about the states an agent may enter into. In
this context, a norms is represented as a partial order, specifying valid sequences of
agent states. To enforce these norms, an enforcement component analyses the stored
provenance against the norms and takes actions whenever violations are observed.
In this section, we gave an overview of the state of the art in provenance, and argued
it is a promising way of making data processing transparent. As such, it can support
audits to achieve information accountability. However, currently, audits are performed
without the availability of provenance. Therefore, in the next section, we study the state
of the art in IT auditing, and explain the benets of using provenance instead.
2.2 Auditing IT Systems
An audit is an evaluation of an organization or system performed to ascertain the validity
and reliability of its information and to provide an assessment of its operations [65].
The goal of an audit is to express an opinion about the organisation or system under
evaluation, based on accepted standards, legislative frameworks, or mutual policies. An
audit is performed by a third party known as an auditor, who issues a report on the
results of the audit.
The traditional way of auditing involves a qualied auditor who assesses the degree of
compliance of a predened set of specications by collecting evidence that is analysed
later. This assessment is a human-driven process that follows procedures established by,
among others, International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) standards. These
procedures are long, as auditors have to manually analyse large amounts of data. Thus,
in the end, there is no guarantee that all data has been analysed, since the nal con-
clusions are based on samples, rather then on all available data. Moreover, because of
the human intervention, the manual audits are also prone to intentional and uninten-
tional errors and omissions. For these reasons, many researchers [65, 124, 106, 25] have
proposed to automate the auditing process so as to increase eciency and allow for
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2.2.1 Audit Trails
An audit trail, also referred to as an audit log, activity log or system log, is a chronological
series of records of computer events pertaining to operating systems, applications, or user
activity that is generated by an auditing system to monitor system activity [134].
Audit trails oer a way to track the actions of an individual in a system, thereby making
users personally accountable for their actions. Moreover, using audit trails, it becomes
possible to detect attempts of penetrating a system and gaining unauthorized access, to
assess the damage of an incident or to nd out how, when, and why such an incident
occurred [65].
Audit trail-based systems are systems that are able to collect audit trails of system
activity, which constitute evidence in an audit. These audits consist of two stages:
1. Audit Trail Collection. This process involves capturing audit trail data, which
typically contains result from activities such as transactions or communications
performed by individuals, systems, accounts or other entities [122].
2. Audit Trail Analysis. During this stage, the relevant audit trails are selected.
These audit trails are then presented to a user (auditor) who analyses them and
takes the necessary measures depending on the nature of the analysis. At this
stage, the collected data is normally reduced using specialised tools to select only
those trails that are important in the context of the goal of the audit.
In what follows, we rst analyse the dierent techniques used in the rst stage. Then in
Section 2.2.1.2, we present an overview of the techniques used in the second stage, audit
trail analysis.
2.2.1.1 Audit Trail Collection
Most audit trail-based systems collect trails at the OS level, at varying level of granularity
and in dierent formats. These properties make the audit trails tightly coupled to the
operating system in which they were created. For example, the Compartmented Mode
Workstation (CMW) [115] is an extension of the UNIX 4.2 BSD operating system with
added auditing capabilities. CMW collects data about command information and access
to objects by users in a format that is dependant on the specic routines present in the
system. Another example is the SunOS MLS System [113], which is a variant of the
SunOS 4.0 distributed operating system that includes audit trail generation capabilities.
This system denes a standard audit le format, however, this format is still tied to the
UNIX family of operating systems, since it species routines names that only appear
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names are directly referenced in the audit trails, so care must be taken to ensure these
descriptors have meaning across the components (such as terminals and databases) of a
distributed system.
In contrast, systems such as the VAX security kernel [124], a virtual machine monitor
with audit generation capabilities, not only collects audit trails based on user names but
also based on objects. In this context, object means les, devices and processes.
The main problems in these systems are interoperability, since the format of the audit
trails is dependant on the OS, and scaling the quantity of recorded information for
analysis can grow quickly. To address the rst issue, standard formats such as Bishop's
Standard Audit Trail Format [25], Normalised Audit Data Format (NADF) [106] and
Common Audit Trail Interchange Format for UNIX (svr4++) [129] have been proposed.
To address the second issue, preprocessing techniques that reduce the quantity of col-
lected trails have been developed. These techniques select a subset of trails that are
in scope of the main goal of the auditing system. For example, if the goal is intru-
sion detection the preprocessing module selects the trails that are related with a set
of suspicious activities that can lead to intrusion. Another reduction technique is to
select only the trails related to a specic object or user, for example, to track les that
are considered fundamental to system security. A dierent technique is the creation of
criteria that state which trails should be collected. Examples include the DoD Trusted
System Evaluation Criteria [1] and the Security Criteria for Distributed Systems [95],
which explicitly dene the activities and events that need to be tracked by an audit
trail-based system.
When audit trails are collected in a distributed environment, these issues are even more
problematic, as audit trails not only need to be collected locally but also transmitted
to a central location for analysis. These issues are explored in the Distributed Auditing
System (DAS) [22] and the Distributed Audit Service (DAX) [136], in which audit
entities collect audits trails locally, send them to an audit manager entity that merges
them, reduces them and, if necessary, transforms them to the chosen format.
To supplement these approaches, some systems collect audit trails of high-level events,
in addition to those related to low-level OS events. For example, these high-level events
can pertain to applications [85, 91], networks [69] or system conguration [41]. As a
result, these techniques collect large amounts of information which needs to be merged
with the OS-based audit trails in order to facilitate analysis.
Another area in which audit trails are used is databases. Here, audit trails are used to
monitor users' actions, identify malicious behaviour, maintain data quality, and improve
system performance. In this context, an audit log is a complete record of the operations
on a client table over time. These audit logs can be queried to select the necessary logs
to, for example, check the operations performed by a user on one or more tables [90].20 Chapter 2 Related Work
2.2.1.2 Audit Trail Analysis
Various tools exist for performing automatic analysis of audit trails. As previously men-
tioned, the analysis tools are applied to a set of audit trails which might be preprocessed
rst. These trails are analysed to search for patterns that are previously established by
designers. These patterns can be events that are considered suspicious, such as attempts
to access les or execute commands without proper authorisation. If one or more of such
events are found in the audit trails, the users related to them are agged as suspicious
and an auditor can manually verify what actually happened.
These suspicious events can be dened in les containing the dierent activities that
can trigger suspicious behaviour. An example is the Distributed Intrusion Detection
System (DIDS) [130], which creates a list of \notable events" that are collected from
host monitors and sent to a director component. This director component uses an expert
system to analyse the audit trails and identify suspicious activity. The expert system
denes the suspicious activities based on statistical analysis of users' behaviour. If a
user does something that he or she normally does not do, this event will be reported.
Another technique for dening behavioural patterns is state-modelling, which denes
a system intrusion as a number of dierent states, each of which has to be present in
the audit trails for it to be considered to have taken place. The work in this area can
be divided into two subclasses [21]. The rst focusses on state transitions in which the
states of an intrusion form a simple chain that has to be traversed from beginning to
end. The State Transition Analysis Tool (STAT) [73] uses this technique, where the
actions an attacker can perform to achieve a security violation are represented by state
transition diagrams. These actions are later searched for in the audit trails. If the audit
trails are matched by one of these state transition diagram, a violation is detected and
agged for review by an auditor.
The second subclass uses Petri nets, which form non-linear state transition structures.
For example, the Intrusion Detection in our Time (IDIOT) [86] uses a particular type
of Petri nets called Coloured Petri Nets (CPN). In IDIOT, security violations are seen
as sequence of actions that lead to an intruder successfully attacking the system. In
this context, each violation is represented as an instantiation of a CPN, whose states
and transitions represent relationships between suspicious events. These CPNs are then
matched against the audit trail system in search of security violations. Using this tech-
nique, the sequence in which the events occurred is very important and needs to be
carefully considered in the design of behavioural patterns and in the collection of audit
trails.
In contrast to IDIOT, the Network Anomaly Detection and Intrusion Reporter (NADIR)
[69] does not require a specic order of events in the collected audit trails. Rather,
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scenarios of user activity based on statistical analysis [74]. This is achieved by creating
summary proles of user activity that are analysed in search of the presence of suspicious
events. Even though this approach is time independent, it does not collect information
about the context in which the events happened, which can lead to false positives.
Another intrusion detection system is Snort [121], which is an open source network-
based intrusion detection system. Snort performs real-time trac analysis and packet
logging on Internet Protocol (IP) networks. Snort can be congured in three main
modes: snier, packet logger, and network intrusion detection. In packet logger mode,
Snort logs packets that later can be analysed against a rule set dened by the user.
A dierent statistical technique used in the analysis of audit trails is the creation of rules
based on the past behaviour of users. In this technique, misuse scenarios and suspicious
activities are encoded in rules that are used by an expert system to analyse the audit
trails. Systems such as the Next-generation Intrusion Detection Expert System (NIDES)
[18] use this technique that combines statistical analysis and pattern matching. NIDES
creates descriptive statistics rules based on the statistical analysis of users behaviour.
After that, the audit trails are analysed in search of the violation of the rules to ag
potential suspicious behaviour.
Now, since audit trails are sensitive to tampering and they constitute evidence of possi-
bly wrongful conduct, they need to be properly managed and secured. This is especially
important and challenging in distributed systems, where audit trails need to be trans-
mitted over possibly insecure networks. Therefore, in the next section, we address the
problem of securing audit trails.
2.2.2 Securing Audit Trails
From the perspective of security, it is important to securely collect, store and analyse
distributed audit trails. Schaen and McKenney [122] explain how security aects the
auditing process in distributed environments, and suggest which issues need to be ad-
dressed. However, no practical solution is given. In the same area, Huh and Martin [72]
discuss the problem of having trustworthy services for auditing and logging (i.e. trusted
logging). They suggest that, in distributed environments, it is possible to use remote
attestation to enforce procedures and policies in a secure and interoperable way. They
argue that logs should oer integrity and condentiality through the implementation of
access control. The logs should also be combined and analysed in a distributed fashion
to support multiple administrative domains.
Another important security issue related to audit trails is privacy. When audit logs fall
into the wrong hands, they can be used to analyse users' actions, and view personal
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privacy. A suggested solution to this problem involves the implementation of access
control that restricts user access to query results [107]. A similar privacy problem exists
in the management of provenance, which to date has not been addressed. We come back
to this issue in Chapter 8, when we discuss future work.
2.2.3 Disadvantages of Audit Trails
The focus of this thesis is the collection and analysis of electronic evidence in open and
distributed systems, with the ultimate aim of verifying that personal information was
used in compliance with the law. In this context, audit trails are less suitable, for a
number of reasons.
First of all, few audit trail systems are capable of integrating audit trails across dierent
platforms in a distributed way. The main problem here is a lack of standardisation of
audit trail formats. Some eorts have been made by creating translators, however, this
hampers systems performance.
The second problem is caused by the fact that the granularity of audit trails is too ne,
i.e. audit trails are too low-level for our purpose. As a result, a lot of information needs
to be collected, which leads to a problem of scalability. While attempts have been made
to solve this problem by ltering the events that are tracked within the system, some
researchers instead have argued that audit trails contain too little information, and more
(instead of less) information is necessary.
Thirdly, by analysing audit trails it is not evident which events where triggered by the
operating system, and which were triggered by user applications. Some researchers have
sought to address this problem by collecting application level trails. The problem of this
solution is the diculty of merging OS trails with application trails, and to subsequently
analyse the large amount of information that results.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, audit logs are evidence of \independent events"
that can be ordered by the time of their occurrence (if the corresponding time stamps
were in place). In contrast, provenance is not organised according to the creation time
but according to the relationships between data and processes that acted upon it. Thus,
where audit trails fall short in explaining how a piece of data was used and how it
originated, provenance is capable of accurately capturing this vital information, and
thereby of achieving information transparency. In light of this, provenance is more
suitable in the context of the central problem of this thesis, i.e. for determining whether
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2.3 Security
As argued in the introduction of this thesis, an important issue in the collection and
analysis of any type of digital evidence is security. This importance is evident given the
many eorts of the audit trail research community to protect electronic evidence from
being tampered. Provenance, a dierent type of electronic evidence, is no exception to
this and despite its novelty, some work towards protecting it has already been done.
In light of its importance, we present an analysis of the techniques used to protect elec-
tronic evidence. Specically, we formally dene security by introducing several prop-
erties that need to hold in order to help secure electronic evidence. Furthermore, we
give a brief overview of the techniques used in computer systems to ensure that these
properties hold.
This section is organised as follows. In Section 2.3.1 we discuss the so-called basic
security properties, and an extra property, anonymisation, that is important to preserve
privacy. Then, in Section 2.3.2 we discuss the techniques for formalising and validating
the security of a system. Specically, we discuss UMLSec, which is the approach we
adopt in this thesis for automatic validation of the protocols involving the exchange of
personal information.
2.3.1 Security Properties
In this section we dene a set of security properties which need to hold during collection,
storage and analysis of electronic evidence. Specically, the properties dened in the
ISO/IEC 7498-2 standard [3]: condentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation
and access control. These properties are specially important in open systems to ensure
secure communication and, consequently, protect the personal information that is trans-
ported. Beside these properties, we add a property that is decisive in preserving the
privacy of information, called anonymisation. Recalling from Chapter 1, the availability
property is out of the scope of this thesis and, therefore, is not described in this section.
Below, we formally dene each of these properties.
2.3.1.1 Condentiality
Denition 2.1 (Condentiality). Condentiality protects sensitive data against non-
authorised disclosures by ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized
to have access [96].
A commonly used technique for ensuring information condentiality is encryption sche-
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is transported over an insecure channel. There exist two dierent types of encryption
schemes: symmetric-key encryption [48] and public-key encryption [96]. In the former,
two parties secretly choose or secretly exchange a key, which is called symmetric key.
To ensure condentiality, the sender encrypts the sensitive information, which is subse-
quently transmitted over a (possibly) insecure network. To recover the information, the
receiver decrypts it using the same key. In the latter, both the receiver and sender party
create a key pair consisting of a private key and a public key. Here, the information
is encrypted using receiver's public key. Then, when the receiver gets the encrypted
message it can be decrypted using the receiver's private key.
2.3.1.2 Integrity
Denition 2.2 (Integrity). Data integrity is the state that exists when computerized
data has not been exposed to accidental or malicious alteration or destruction [2].
There are two forms of integrity. The rst allows us to detect accidental data modica-
tions, such as transmission errors due to the underlying network. The second allows us
to detect malicious data modications, insertions or deletions [96]. In terms of security,
the second is our main concern, since we assume open and distributed systems, in which
data is transmitted over unsecured networks.
The most commonly used technique to ensure this property is hash functions. A hash
function is a computationally ecient function that maps binary strings of arbitrary
length to binary strings of some xed length, called hash-values [96]. The hash-value
associated with a binary string is unique, so if one bit of such a string is changed, its
corresponding hash-value will be dierent. Moreover, hash functions are chosen to be
collision resistant, which means that it is very dicult to nd two dierent binary strings
whose hash values are the same. Using this property, an entity receiving a piece of data
and its corresponding hash-value is able to verify the integrity of such a piece of data
by re-calculating its hash-value and comparing it with the given one.
There exist two types of hash functions. The rst type is called \keyed hash functions",
which is also know as Message Authentication Codes (MAC), because its specic purpose
is message authentication. These functions require a secret key, and consequently, they
not only provide data integrity but also data-origin authentication, because it is assumed
that apart from the recipient, only the sender knows the secret key necessary to compute
the MAC [96]. An examples of these a keyed hash function is HMAC [24].
The second type is called \unkeyed hash functions", which are also known as Modica-
tion Detection Codes (MDC). In this type, the hash function provides a short message
digest of a (possibly large) piece of data. If the data is (maliciously) altered, the digest
of this altered data should be dierent from the original digest [96], enabling the detec-
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SHA-2 [117]. The unkeyed hash functions are also used in digital signatures schemes by
hashing long messages (using a publicly available hash function) and signing just the
created hash-value, instead of the entire message.
2.3.1.3 Authentication
Denition 2.3 (Authentication). Authentication veries the supposed identity of an
actor (software or user) and ensures that the information exchanged originated from the
correct source.
The type of authentication in Denition 2.3 is also known as Entity Authentication or
identication (as opposed to message authentication discussed above). Entity authen-
tication assures one actor that the identity of the second party involved is correct. If
the second party is authenticated to the rst one, and vice versa, the authentication is
called Mutual Entity Authentication.
Entity authentication can be implemented using password authentication or login pro-
tocols [143]. In these protocols a password, which is associated with a user, serves as
a shared secret between the user and system. The system authenticates the user by
asking the user to enter his user ID and password. The system checks that the password
matches the corresponding user ID.
Zero-knowledge identication protocols [96, 46] are also used to provide authentication.
These protocols are specically designed to allow a prover (the party who wishes to
authenticate itself) to identify itself to a verier (the party who wishes to establish the
prover's identity) by demonstrating the possession of a secret without revealing any
information whatsoever about the secret.
Another method used to support entity authentication is a challenge-response identi-
cation protocol [30, 96]. In these protocols one entity (the claimant) proves its identity
to another entity (the verier) by demonstrating knowledge of a secret. This secret is
associated with that entity only, so proof of possession of the secret identies its owner.
The demonstration is performed without revealing the secret itself to the verier. To
do so, the claimant provides a response to a time-variant challenge (such as a random
number), where the response depends on both the entity's secret and the challenge.
Exemplar protocols of this type are the Transport Layer Protocol (TLS) [27] and all its
variants (such as [19]).
The TLS protocol is a very well-known authentication protocol that is currently in use for
protecting most Internet trac that involves sensitive information (i.e. online banking
and shopping, email, etc.). Because of its importance to this thesis | we use a variant
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Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic protocol that secures Internet com-
munications by preventing eavesdropping, tampering and message forgery. TLS is a
widely-used IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) standard that allows client/server
applications to negotiate a secure connection using a handshaking procedure in which
the participants agree on various parameters for establishing the connection. In doing
so, the server authenticates itself to the client and the client and server together cre-
ate the shared session key that is used to encrypt and decrypt the data contained in
messages. The TLS protocol proceeds as follows:
 The handshake begins when a client connects to a TLS-enabled server by request-
ing a secure connection. It presents a list of supported cipher suites, which contains
the supported ciphers and hash functions. This is done in the clientHello message
shown in Figure 2.2.
 From this list, the server chooses the strongest cipher and hash function that it
supports and noties the client.
 The server identies itself using a digital certicate. The certicate usually con-
tains the server name, the trusted certicate authority (CA) that signed the cer-
ticate and the server's public encryption key. All this is achieved by sending the
serverHello message in Figure 2.2.
 When the client receives this information, it may contact the certicate authority
to conrm the validity of the server's certicate before continuing the execution of
the protocol.
 In order to generate the session key used for securing the connection, the client
encrypts a random number with the server's public key and sends the result to
the server. If the private keys is securely kept by the server, only it is able to
decrypt the message with its private key. This is achieved by the sending of the
keyExchange message in Figure 2.2.
 From the random number, both parties use the same algorithm to generate the
session key that is used for the encryption and decryption of application data.
 Finally, the server sends a nished message to indicate that the handshake phase
was been completed successfully.
Once these steps have been completed, the handshake phase terminates, and a secure
connection is established. Using this connection, all application data is protected because
it is encrypted by the sender and decrypted by the received using the created session
key until the connection closes. If any of the above steps fail, the TLS handshake fails
and no connection is established. Note that, for reasons of clarity, the description aboveChapter 2 Related Work 27
Figure 2.2: TLS Protocol
and in Figure 2.2 is presented at a high level of abstraction. For more details about this
protocol, including implementation details, we refer the reader to [27].
As suggested by researchers [43, 19], TLS is an expensive protocol, not only in terms
of the number of messages that are exchanged, but also because of the expensive cryp-
tographic operations that the server needs to perform, which can potentially become a
centralised bottleneck in the system.
For our work, these properties of TLS have two negative implications. First, entities
need to mutually authenticate each other in our system (Requirement A). Secondly, our
system gathers provenance about the protocol's execution in order to keep track of the
security protocols that are used to protect sensitive application data in our system. The
more messages are exchanged, the more provenance will have to be recorded, which
slows down the process of storing, querying, and processing provenance.
Hence, we opt for an improved and more ecient version of TLS, called the Optimised
TLS Handshake Protocol [19, 79, 71] or OTLS1. We emphasise that this choice is by
no means essential in our work, and that TLS or other variants in the TLS family
[127, 43, 126] can also be used. However, OTLS eectively addresses the aforementioned
drawbacks of TLS in the context of our proposed system.
Now, in more detail, the dierence between OTLS and TLS is that the former is more
ecient in terms of communication overhead since it requires three messages to perform
mutual client-server authentication, while the latter requires four [19]. In addition, it
reduces server side processing (without compromising security), by reversing the roles
of client and server so that the generation of the pre-master secret2 is performed by the
server instead of the client. This role reversal achieves the aforementioned reduction
1This abbreviation is not used by the authors, we use it in this thesis to distinguish OTLS from
\standard" TLS.
2The pre-master secret is a randomly generated number that will be used to generate a master secret
from which the encryption keys will be derived. This secret is also called \shared secret" as it is known
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of the number of messages of a TLS handshake to from 4 to 3 and allows the client to
perform the expensive private key operations, thereby reducing the load on the server
(as compared to TLS). In contrast, in the TLS protocol, the public key used by the client
to encrypt the shared pre-master secret is obtained from the server certicate. With
OTLS, the server chooses the pre-master secret and sends it to the client encrypted with
the client's public key. Therefore, the expensive decryption operation is performed by
the client.
Crucially, OTLS has been proven to be as secure as TLS in terms of providing security to
Internet communications by preventing eavesdropping, tampering and message forgery
[71]. Thus, the use of OTLS has the advantage of providing the same security properties
as TLS with lower overhead in terms of computation and communication.
Now, the OTLS protocol proceeds as follows (see Figure 2.3):
 The handshake begins when a client connects to a OTLS-enabled server by re-
questing a secure connection, and identies itself by presenting its certicate and
a list of supported cipher suites and hash functions.
 When the server receives this information, it may contact the certicate author-
ity to conrm the validity of the client certicate. At this point, the client has
authenticated itself to the server.
 From the list of supported functions, the server chooses the strongest cipher and
hash function it supports and noties the client. The server also identies itself
using a digital certicate, which contains the server name and the server's public
encryption key signed by the trusted certicate authority (CA). The server also
sends a server certicate containing the pre-master secret, the client's random
number and the client's public key. This certicate is signed with server's private
key and encrypted with client's public key.
 When the client receives this information, it may contact the certicate authority
to conrm the validity of the server's certicate before continuing with the protocol.
At this point, the server has authenticated itself to the client.
 The client decrypts the pre-master secret with its private key and veries the
signature by extracting the public key from the temporary certicate. Later, the
client encrypts the server's name with the pre-master secret and sends the result
to the server. Only the server is able to decrypt this using the pre-master secret.
 Finally, from the pre-master secret, both parties use the same algorithm to generate
the session key that is used for the encryption and decryption of application data.
Identical to TLS, after a successful handshake a secure connection is established, in
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connection closes. If any of the above steps fail, the OTLS handshake fails and no
connection is established.
Figure 2.3: OTLS Protocol
In sum, in our work we use OTLS instead of standard TLS, because it is more ecient
in terms of computation and communication. Specically, since OTLS requires less
messages to be exchanged, less provenance needs to be collected, processed and stored,
resulting in a better performance of our system.
We return to the OTLS protocol in Chapter 6. Here, we use it to provide mutual
authentication between the entities of our proposed architecture. In addition, we make
the necessary alterations to record provenance of its execution, in order to keep track of
the security measures that were used when processing sensitive application data.
However, before ending the discussion of authentication protocols in general, and (O)TLS
in particular, note that no matter how well designed and tested a protocol may be, a
awed implementation can cause vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities have the poten-
tial of compromising the security properties of our proposed system (or any system in
general). Specically, it has been shown by many authors [118, 140, 140] that TLS has
a number of vulnerabilities. For example:
 A design aw in the protocol could allow an attacker to successfully inject data
in an encrypted session using a man-in-the-middle attack. The problem occurs
during the renegotiation of the TLS channel, specically, when client certicates
are used [118]
 By eavesdropping messages sent over a TLS channel, it is possible to decrypt some
of the data contained in these messages (such as passwords). This vulnerability is
due to the way error handling is implemented in certain applications [140].
 In some cases, authentication tokens and cookies used in many HTTPS requests,
which uses TLS, can be recovered from the messages (encrypted) messages sent
over a TLS channel [51]. These tokens and cookies can be subsequently used to
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Needless to say, the vulnerabilities of implementation of authentication protocols need
to be taken into account when implementing our system. Practically, this means that
the libraries that implement these protocols need to be updated regularly, and that
additional monitoring systems (that, for example notify human operator of suspicious
behaviour) should be put in place. Whilst important, an in-depth discussion of these
issues is outside the scope of this thesis.
2.3.1.4 Access Control
Denition 2.4 (Access Control). Access control, which is also called Protection or
Authorisation, is a security property that protects shared resources against unauthorised
access according to some access control policy [139].
Access control mechanisms are implemented to mitigate the risks of unauthorized access
to data, resources, and systems. Some examples of these mechanisms are classic access
control techniques, such as Access Control Lists (ACLs). An ACL is the most basic form
of access control in which each resource in a system has a list associated with it that
species which entities are allowed access to it, and which actions they can perform [89].
An example of this mechanism is the Discretionary Access Control (DAC) in which the
access policies to a resource are determined by the owner of such a resource.
Another access control mechanism is the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) mecha-
nism. With this mechanism, the right of access to a resource is determined by the
relationship between the requester and the owner of the requested resource, i.e. the re-
quester's role determines whether access to a specic resource will be granted or denied
[89].
Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) is another access control method in which
the access control decisions are made based on a set of characteristics, or attributes,
associated with the requester, the environment, or the resource itself. [89].
Finally, Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is an access control mechanism determined
by systems, not owners. Users and resources have a set of security attributes associated
with them. When users request access to a resource, an authorization rule enforced by
the system examines these security attributes and decides whether access is granted [89].
Whilst access control is a vital aspect of system security, this thesis does not focus on the
implementation of access control or the verication of its presence. Rather, we assume
that one of the aforementioned techniques is correctly implemented.Chapter 2 Related Work 31
2.3.1.5 Non-Repudiation
Denition 2.5 (Non-Repudiation). Non-repudiation makes it impossible for an entity
to deny the sending or receiving of a given message [96].
The most commonly used techniques for ensuring non-repudiation are digital signature
schemes. In these schemes, the sender and the receiver of a message have a pair of keys:
one private and one public. The sender of a message signs it using its private key. As
the private key is only known by the sender, this signature can only be created by the
sender. If the receiver of the message wishes to prove a message was indeed sent by the
sender, the signature can be veried using the publicly available sender's public key.
In order to properly oer the non-repudiation property, a digital signature scheme should
have two properties. First, a signature generated from a given message and a given
private key should allow for the verication of the authenticity of that message using the
corresponding public key (trapdoor function). Secondly, it should be computationally
infeasible to generate a valid signature by a party who does not possesses the private
key (one-way function) [96].
Digital signature schemes can be classied in two types. The rst type, digital signature
schemes with appendix, requires the original message to verify the signature. This type
of signature scheme appends the message signature to the message itself. However, by
just creating a signature and adding it to the original message the signature is vulnerable
to a substitution attack, i.e. given a valid signature for a message it is easy to modify
the given signature in such a way that is valid for another known message. This type of
attack can be prevented by applying a cryptographic hash function (See Section 2.3.1.2)
to the original message before being signed. To verify the validity of a signature, the
hash-value of the message is computed rst and a new signature is calculated from
this hash-value. By comparing this new signature with the one the appended to the
message, the validity of the signature can be established. An example of this type of
digital signature is DSA [84], which is used in the FIPS-186-3 standard [16].
The second type is digital signature schemes with message recovery. This type of scheme
does not require the original message to verify the signature. Instead, the original mes-
sage is recovered from the signature itself. Therefore, the process to verify a signature
in these type of schemes is also called extraction. After the original message has been
extracted from the signature, there is no need of additional steps to establish the validity
of the message. This scheme can also be used along with a cryptographic hash function.
In such a case, the message is hashed and the obtained hash-value is signed. Then, the
corresponding hash-value can be extracted from the given signature and the authentic-
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computed hash value of the same message. This is the process that most of current ap-
plications implement [110]. Examples of this type are RSA [120] and the ISO/IEC1991
[4] signature schemes.
In practical terms, digital signatures with appendix are applied to messages of arbitrary
length, while digital signature schemes with message recovery are applied to messages
of a xed length. In order to obtain messages of a xed length, these can be hashed.
Another option is to break the message into blocks of a xed length that later can be
signed. A problem of this approach is that signature generation is relatively slow making
the signing and extraction of one message time consuming. Therefore, the preferred
method is to hash [96]. However, in formal methods as the one presented in Section
2.3.2.2, signature schemes with message recovery make use of this scheme.
Due to their evident advantages, the digital signature schemes with message recovery are
the most widely-used. Hence, in the rest of this document we use these type of schemes.
When the security characteristics of our system requires the use of a cryptographic hash
function, we use it and clearly indicate it. We come back to this in more detail in Section
2.3.2.2.
A good survey that presents detailed information about these schemes is found in [102].
2.3.1.6 Anonymisation
Anonymisation is another important property that should hold when information that
is regarded as sensitive is processed. Sensitive data can be dened as any information,
which through loss, unauthorized access, or modication could adversely aect the in-
terests of its owner. For example, information relating to race or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious beliefs, physical/mental health, trade union membership or criminal
activities. Through anonymisation, the identity of the person associated with this sen-
sitive information has to remain hidden in the result of processing, if this result is made
available to users who are unauthorised to access sensitive information.
As an initial attempt to hide individuals' identities when sensitive data is being pro-
cessed, a technique called data de-identication was proposed [138]. In this technique,
information that could be used to identify an individual is removed or replaced by
pseudo-data. Pseudo-data is an identier, which is used instead of information that can
identify an individual. For example, instead of presenting the name of an individual a
sequence number can be used.
However, data de-identication provides no guarantee of anonymity as processing results
might contain other data that can be linked to publicly available information to re-
identify individuals or to infer other sensitive information [42]. This is known as a
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order to infer hidden private information [37]. To eectively hide individuals identity,
the anomymisation property should hold:
Denition 2.6 (Anonymisation). Anonymisation ensures that sensitive personal infor-
mation can not be recovered by unauthorised users through the analysis of (publicly)
available processing results [135].
Data can be anonymised by implementing dierent techniques, such as Dierential Pri-
vacy [52], k-Anonymity [133, 75], `-Diversity [93] or Perfect Privacy [97]. These tech-
niques are mainly used to avoid disclosure of sensitive information from databases that
manage personal data.
Now that we have dened the properties that need to hold in a secure system, we now
shift our focus to techniques for ensuring that systems indeed exhibit these properties.
2.3.2 Formalising Security Properties
Security should be considered during each phase of the software development life cycle.
This way, it is possible to model and analyse the security properties of a system at the
software architecture design level. Recently, some approaches have been proposed that
support this modelling and analysis. These approaches can be classied as semi-formal,
formal and aspect-oriented. Semi-formal approaches, such as UML, use modelling lan-
guages for specication and visualisation to dene a vocabulary for annotating these
models and include information about security properties on this model. Formal ap-
proaches use formal methods (mathematical modelling techniques) to specify, develop,
and verify computer system (software and hardware) design. These methods oer a
way to verify security properties in the systems or models before its implementation.
Finally, aspect-oriented techniques approach security as being orthogonal to the appli-
cation's functionality. Using so-called aspects, i.e. parts of software that are relevant to
a particular concern, non-functional security properties can be modelled independently
from the core application code.
In this thesis, we use both semi-formal and formal methods, which, unlike aspect oriented
techniques, give us architecture design tools as well as formal methods to verify the
correctness of the model. Specically, we focus on UML and UML-sec, which combine
the development of models with their verication.
2.3.2.1 Unied Modelling Language
In the next section we present an approach to modelling security requirements using
UMLsec, which is an extension of Uni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briey discuss UML [9] itself. UML is a general-purpose modelling language that includes
a graphical notation used to create an abstract model of a system. It is one of the
most commonly used standards for specifying object-oriented software systems, and
has been adopted as the industry-standard language for visualising, constructing, and
documenting the artifacts of software systems.
UML Elements UML provides a number of diagram types as a mechanism for
entering model elements into the model. In this section, we briey introduce the relevant
UML diagrams and components that are used throughout this thesis.
Use case diagrams: are visual descriptions of a system's behaviour pertaining to a
business task or requirement, which focus on the relation between the system,
external entities, and uses cases. It shows the relations between actors, the users,
people, or other systems, and the use cases, the scenarios in which the actors
interact with the system.
Sequence Diagrams: model the communication between objects in a specic process
as a sequence of method calls. In these diagrams, the temporal relation between
the method calls is shown visually in the form of arrows that represent the exchange
of messages between objects.
Tagged Value: is an explicit way to dene properties of an element in the model.
Its notation is ftag = valueg where tag is the property name and value is the
corresponding value assigned to the tag. These values are called pseudo-attributes
of model elements because the semantics of their description are outside the scope
of UML denition.
2.3.2.2 UMLSec
UMLsec provides a formal specication of security elements that can be included in a
UML model. We will use UMLsec to include and formalise security characteristics in the
architecture presented in Chapter 5. Based on this formalisation, we can automatically
verify the security characteristics that are relevant to our work presented in Chapter 6.
In more detail, UMLsec [79] is a UML extension for the development of secure systems
that provides a formal specication of security elements in a UML model. In UMLsec,
security requirements and assumptions within the system environment are formulated
using tagged values. These can be used by an automatic model checker to determine
whether a system design meets certain security requirements. Additionally, UMLsec
denes a cryptographic notation to model cryptographic protocols and an adversary
model to model security attacks against the system. In what follows, we briey explain
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Cryptographic Notation The cryptographic notation is a formal notation used in
the sequence diagrams to model cryptographic protocols that provide specic security
properties to the system, such as those mentioned in Section 2.3.1. This notation con-
tains formal denitions for modelling cryptographic data in a UML specication, which
can later be analysed. These denitions are presented below and taken from [79].
The notation denes a set of keys, which is denoted as Keys. A key k 2 Keys can be
symmetric or asymmetric. A symmetric key is used for symmetric encryption schemes
and an asymmetric key for asymmetric encryption schemes. If k 2 Keys is an asym-
metric key, its inverse exists and is denoted as k 1. Thus, if k is used as a public key,
then k 1 is the corresponding private key. The notation also denes a set of variables
Var that contains the variable names dened in the diagrams and a set of data values
Data that contains the message names of the diagrams, including nonces3 and other
secret information. Moreover, UMLsec denes an algebra of cryptographic expressions,
denoted as Exp, which is an algebra generated from the set Data [ Var [ Keys. The
operations and properties of this algebra are presented below and taken from [79].
If A;B 2 Exp, UMLsec denes the following operations [79]:
A k B A concatenated with B (2.1)
head(A) Head of A (2.2)
tail(A) Tail of A (2.3)
fAgk A encrypted using the key k (2.4)
Deck(A) A decrypted using the key k (2.5)
Signk(A) A signed using the key k (2.6)
Extk(A) A extracted using the key k (2.7)
h(A) Hash of A (2.8)
For each A 2 Exp, we have the following properties [79]:
Deck 1(fAgk) = A For all A 2 Exp and k 2 Keys (2.9)
Extk(Signk 1(A)) = A For all A 2 Exp and k 2 Keys (2.10)
The Ext function, the inverse of the Sign operation, recovers the data that was signed,
i.e. does extraction. Thus, when the Sign operation is applied to plain, sensitive data,
the Ext function can be used to recover it. As a result, when used in isolation, the
3Nonces are time-variant parameters which serve to distinguish one protocol instance from another
to prevent replay attacks [96]. In these attacks, an adversary records the messages exchanged as part of
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Sign operator ensures non-repudiation, but does not ensure condentiality, since the
plain data can be recovered by anyone in possession of the corresponding public key.
However, if instead of the plain data, the hash value of the data is signed, the plain data
is not recoverable from the signature. Moreover, by doing so, the integrity of the data
can be ensured, since the signed hash can not be altered by a third party (i.e. anyone
not in possession the private key) without being detected. Therefore, in the remainder
of the thesis, if we only need to ensure non-repudiation of non-sensitive data (such as
the digital certicates in Figure 6.1), only the Sign and Ext operations are used. If,
however, non-repudiation and integrity of data need to be ensured, the Sign operation
is applied to the hash value of sensitive data (for example, this is done in the Data
Request, Task Request and Query Request protocols where sensitive application data is
exchanged) and verication is performed by hashing the original data and comparing it
to the result of the Ext function.
Finally, the laws regarding concatenation [79, page 37]. Note that the concatenation
operation is equivalent to the cons function used to handle lists in most programming
languages.
For all expressions E1;E2;E3 2 Exp
(E1 k E2) k E3 = E1 k (E2 k E3) (2.11)
For all E1;E2 2 Exp the operation head() is dened as:
head(E1 k E2) = E1 (2.12)
For all expressions E1;E2 2 Exp such that there exist no E;E0 with E1 = E k E0 the
operation tail is dened as:
tail(E1 k E2) = E2 (2.13)
Moreover, for each E 2 Exp, we use the following abbreviations [79]:
fst(E) = head(E) (2.14)
snd(E) = head(tail(E)) (2.15)
thd(E) = head(tail(tail(E))) (2.16)
The dened algebra assumes that it is not possible to obtain plain data values from
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encryption technique provides integrity by implementing Message Authentication Codes
(MAC), which were explained in Section 2.3.1.
Adversary The adversary model represents a network attacker that can eavesdrop,
modify or insert messages on the communication channel with malicious intentions.
This adversary model relies on an extended Dolev-Yao adversary model [50], in which
an adversary can read messages sent over the communication channel, in an attempt to
derive secret knowledge and break system security.
In the formalisation process, each sequence diagram is associated with an adversary
object that is used to verify that the modelled protocol exhibits the aforementioned
security properties. To this end, the adversary object contains three types of predened
values: secret, initial knowledge and guard. The values labelled secret are the
data items that should be protected from the attacker. The values in the set initial
knowledge denote the information known by the attacker beforehand (e.g. public keys),
and guardn represents the operations to be performed by the receiver of message n after
it has been received, but before it is processed. Finally, the simultaneous execution
of the adversary model and the sequence diagram model is undertaken to search for
possible attacks. The next section describes how this evaluation is performed.
Using the adversary model, it is possible to model attacks on a specic part of a system.
The adversary is modelled by dening the actions it can perform on each part of the
system. For example, an adversary may be capable of reading messages exchanged over
the communication links of the system, but can not read records in a database. Dierent
attacks to the system are dened in the form of abstract threats, which are the common
attacks to the information channels:
delete indicates that the adversary can delete messages from the communica-
tion channel.
read indicates that the adversary can read messages on the communication
channel.
insert indicates that the adversary can insert messages on the communication
channel.
access indicates that the adversary has access to the communication channel
or to a physical system node.
When an adversary attack takes place in an actual channel, concrete threats can be
obtained from the real vulnerabilities of such channel. For example, on an Internet con-
nection without implementation of security techniques, the adversary's concrete threats
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2.3.2.3 UMLSec Automatic Verication
To verify that the security requirements expressed in UMLsec are maintained during the
execution of a protocol, the Viki model checker can be used [80]. Viki takes as input
a UML sequence diagram and its associated adversary model, and returns the possible
attacks that can be performed by the given attacker in the modelled protocol. Viki
obtains the security requirements from the UMLsec elements and the predened values
used in sequence diagrams [80]. These requirements are formalised in First-Order Logic
and analysed with automatic theorem provers (e-SETHEO [131] and SPASS [145]) to
nd aws. If a aw is found, a Prolog engine can be used to generate the attack trace,
which can provide a system designer with valuable insights to solve it.
Using this tool, we can ensure that the modelled attacks are unsuccessful in the model.
Since, in this context, a successful attack means that the system does not exhibit one
of the security properties [125], Viki enables us to verify system security. Therefore,
in Chapters 6, we use the techniques described in this section to model and verify the
security of our Provenance-based Auditing Architecture.
2.4 Data Protection Legislation
As we mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, one of the initial attempts to pro-
tect personal information from misuse is the creation of Data Protection Legislation.
Data Protection Legislation protects individuals by making the misuse of personal in-
formation illegal. In general, it provides a set of rules that organisations should follow
when personal information is handled. Moreover, it denes procedures for verifying that
these organisations processed individuals' personal information in compliance with the
applicable legislation.
In this section we overview three important examples of Data Protection Legislation:
The Data Protection Act (Section 2.4.1), which is the UK data protection legislation
that safeguards UK citizens' personal data; Safe Harbor (Section 2.4.2), which is a US
framework that protects personal information managed for commercial purposes between
the US and the EU; and the HIPAA (Section 2.4.3), which is a legislative framework for
protecting patients' medical information.
2.4.1 Data Protection Act
The Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998 [7] provides protection for an individual's personal
information by placing restrictions on how organisations can use personal information
| including how they should acquire, store, share or dispose of it. The UK's DPA is an
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personal data as it is processed within or moved between Member States of the European
Union. The DPA introduces a new regime for the distribution of information using
computer based systems by legislating the computational processing that organisations
are allowed to perform on individuals' personal information.
2.4.1.1 Terminology
The DPA denes three entities that are involved in the processing of personal informa-
tion:
Denition 2.7 (Data Controller (DC)). A Data Controller is an individual or organisa-
tion that decides the purpose for which, and the manner in which, personal information
is to be processed.
Denition 2.8 (Data Subject (DS)). A Data Subject is an individual whose information
is held by a Data Controller.
Denition 2.9 (Data Processor (DP)). A Data Processor is an individual or organ-
isation, other than an employee or subsidiary of the Data Controller, that processes
personal data on behalf of the Data Controller.
In the DPA, the information processed by these entities is classied into two types:
Denition 2.10 (Personal Data or Personal Information). Any information related to
a living individual that can be used to identify that individual. For example, name, date
of birth, address, etc. including opinions about this individual or indications of intent
towards him or her.
Denition 2.11 (Sensitive Personal Data). A special subclass of personal data that
can only be processed under certain conditions. Examples of this type are: racial or
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs, physical and mental condition, sexual
life, oences, etc.
Both types of information could be processed under certain conditions. In the DPA, as
it can be seen in the next denition, processing means anything that can be done with
data.
Denition 2.12 (Processing). The ways of processing information include obtaining,
recording, holding or carrying out any operations, including:
 Organisation, adaptation or alteration.
 Retrieval, consultation or use.
 Disclosure, transmission or dissemination.40 Chapter 2 Related Work
 Alignment, combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.
This denition of processing is not precise enough for our purposes. For example, it does
not distinguish between the act of collecting and using data, and it does not explicitly
specify the purpose for which processing it performed. However, this is vital information
for deciding whether processing was conducted according to the DPA principles discussed
in the next section. Therefore, we make the following additional denitions:
Denition 2.13 (Purpose). A Purpose is the intention for which the data is to be
processed.
Denition 2.14 (Collected Data). A set of Collected Data is the information obtained
from Data Subjects.
Denition 2.15 (Used Data). A set of Used Data is the information used in the pro-
cessing of a result.
2.4.1.2 Principles of the Data Protection Act
The Data Protection Act consists of eight statutory principles that a Data Controller
should adhere to in order to process a Data Subject's information. Below, the principles
are presented and briey explained. In Chapter 5, we develop the Compliance Frame-
work that is capable of automatically verifying these principles using the provenance
collected by the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture described in Chapter 4.
Principle 1. Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, it
shall not be processed unless:
(a) At least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met.
(b) In the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in Schedule 3
is also met.
Principle 1 introduces the concept of purpose through Schedules 2 and 3. In this context,
purpose is the intention for which the data is to be processed. Thus, a DC should have
a purpose for processing DS's personal data. In more detail, in Schedule 2 and 3 the
DPA states the legal purposes for which a DS's information can be processed. The
former, used in case (a), species legal purposes for using personal data (Denition
2.13). Examples of legal purposes include the consent of a DS, a contract between a DC
and a DS, a legal obligation, the vital interest of a DS or functions of public interest. The
latter, which is used in case (b), species legal purposes of processing sensitive personal
data. Examples of these legal purposes are the explicit consent of a DS, to perform any
right or obligation, to protect vital interest of a DS, medical purposes, administration
of justice, etc. For more information about Schedule 2 and 3 the reader should refer to
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Principle 2. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specied and lawful
purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose
or those purposes.
If a DC requests personal information from a DS, then such information should only
be obtained with a specied and lawful purpose, which should be provided to the DS.
Furthermore, if a DC obtains information from a DS, such information can only be
processed in accordance with the stated purpose.
Principle 3. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to
the purpose or purposes for which it is processed.
This principle requires that a DC obtains from a DS only the information that is nec-
essary to perform the processes established in the initial purposes. Thus, the data
requested from a DS has to be relevant for the stated purposes. Moreover, a DC should
not request, collect or use more information than required.
Principle 4. Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.
The personal information held by a DC should be updated in a way specied by him
or her to ensure that the DC only processes correct information. Hence, a DC has to
provide the means for a DS to perform an update of his or her information.
Principle 5. Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for
longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes.
This principle requires the destruction or deletion of personal data that is no longer
necessary, i.e. when the processing established in the purpose has been accomplished.
The aim of this principle is it must be impossible to identify such an individual through
previously processed data, after the elimination of one individual's personal information.
Principle 6. Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects
under this Act.
This principle states that any process applied to personal data should be in accordance
with the Data Subject seven rights, which are presented in [7]. These rights are:
Access to personal data Data Subjects have the right to access their personal data,
which is stored by a DC, whenever the DS wants.
Prevention of processing likely to cause damage or distress The processing of
DS's information should not cause damage or distress to him or her.
Prevention of processing for direct marketing A Data Subject's personal infor-
mation cannot be used for direct marketing purposes.
Prevention of automated decision-taking A Data Subject's personal information
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Rectication, blocking, erasure, and destruction The DC needs to perform these
actions to a DS's personal information if so requested by a DS.
Compensation If the DPA is not followed by an organisation, the aected Data Sub-
ject can demand compensation.
Request for assessment Data Subjects can request an audit on the use of their per-
sonal information to verify that DCs followed the DPA principles. A report of the
audit results has to be sent to the DS involved.
Principle 7. Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against
unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or de-
struction of, or damage to, personal data.
This principle indicates that a DC should ensure an appropriate level of security for
all the processes involving the personal information of a DS. To achieve this, a DC
should implement technical and organisational measures to protect personal data against
accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, disclosure or access. These measures
are particularly important when processing involves the transmission of personal data
over a network.
Principle 8. Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the
European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of
protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of
personal data.
Principle 8 places restrictions on the transfer of personal data outside the European
Economic Area. Only the countries that full the requirements of this Act can request
personal data from Data Subjects situated in UK. For example, the United States has
implemented the Safe Harbor [8] to ensure the adequate level of protection required by
the DPA. The Safe Harbor legislation is introduced in the next section.
2.4.2 Safe Habor
The Safe Harbor [8] is a legislative framework that protects the privacy of personal infor-
mation transported between the European Union and the United States for commercial
purposes. Because of this, Safe Harbor has seven principles that are similar to the ones
discussed above. These principles require the following:
Notice Organisations should notify individuals about the purposes for which they col-
lect and use individuals' information. Organisations also should provide their
contact information about how individuals can contact them with any enquiries
or complaints. Finally, organisations should notify the individual with the types
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choices and means organisations oer for limiting the information use and disclo-
sure.
Choice If individuals' personal information is disclosed to a third party or used for
a purpose incompatible with the collection purpose, then organisations should
request individuals for authorisation. For sensitive information the same principle
applies but the request should be armative or explicit.
Onward Transfer (Transfers to Third Parties) Organisations transferring informa-
tion to a third party should apply the notice and the choice principles. Moreover,
if an organisation transfers such information to a third party that is acting as an
agent, then such agent should be subscribed to the Safe Harbor or to the European
Directive. If not, then the organisation and the agent should have a written agree-
ment requiring that the agent provides at least the same level of privacy protection
as is required by the relevant principles.
Access Individuals should have access to their personal information, which is held by
organisations, to correct, amend or delete that information where it is inaccurate.
Security Organisations should implement the necessary security measures to protect
personal information from loss, misuse and unauthorised access, disclosure, alte-
ration and destruction.
Data integrity The personal information collected by the organisations should be rel-
evant for the purpose it is to be used for. Thus, organisations might ensure that
the data collected is reliable (accurate, complete and current) for its intended use.
Enforcement To ensure compliance with the Safe Harbor principles, organisations
should
1. Implement the necessary mechanisms to investigate and resolve any individ-
ual's complaint.
2. Oer procedures for verifying that organisations have implemented the Safe
Harbor principles.
3. Implement mechanisms to remedy problems arising out of a failure to comply
with the principles.
2.4.3 HIPAA
Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 [6] is a legislative
framework aimed to improve the eciency in healthcare delivery by standardising elec-
tronic data interchange and, at the same time, protecting the condentiality and security
of such electronic health data through setting and enforcing standards.
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1. Standards for Electronic Transactions. The term Electronic Health Transactions
includes health claims, health plan eligibility, enrolment and disenrolment, pay-
ments for care and health plan, claim status, rst injury reports, coordination of
benets, and related transactions. Thus, all the health organisations should use
one format in the management of such transactions to simplify and improve the
eciency in the use of this information.
2. Unique Identiers for Providers, Employers, and Health Plans. This rule requires
hospitals, doctors, nursing homes, and other healthcare providers to obtain a
unique identier when ling electronic claims with public and private insurance
programs.
3. Security Rule. This rule requires that organisations provide a uniform level of
protection of all individuals' health information that is stored or transmitted elec-
tronically. Organisations have to implement mechanisms to ensure the conden-
tiality, integrity, and availability of all electronic protected health information in its
creation, reception or transmission. Therefore, the implemented technical mecha-
nism should protect networks, computers and other electronic devices from security
threats.
4. Privacy Rule. This rule protects the privacy of the individuals that could be
identied through their health information held by health organisation, regardless
of whether the information is, or has been, in electronic form. For this reason
organisations should [6]:
 Give patients rights to access their medical records, restrict access by others,
request changes, and to learn how they have been accessed.
 Restrict most disclosures of protected health information to the minimum
needed for healthcare treatment and business operations.
 Enable patients to decide if they will authorize disclosure of their health
information for uses other than treatment or healthcare business operations.
The frameworks discussed in this chapter demonstrate that governments have acknowl-
edged the importance of protecting personal information. Furthermore, if we compare
the DPA, Safe Harbor and HIPAA, we can see signicant similarities. All of them state
that the purpose for collecting and processing personal information needs to be stated,
and then dene legal ways in which this information can be processed. However, what is
lacking in all three of them, is an eective and concrete means of enforcing these rules.
As was noted in Chapter 1, what is missing is processing transparency, which makes
it possible for an auditor to investigate how information was managed, and determine
whether this was in compliance with the rules. In this thesis, we argue that provenance
is an e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more detail, and translate its principles into a set of Auditing Requirements|concrete
conditions for compliance with the DPA which operate directly on collected provenance.
Then, in Chapter 5 we develop algorithms for verifying these Auditing Requirements.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented an overview of related work. First, we studied the state
of the art in provenance using the provenance life cycle of recording, storage, querying
and analysis. Specically, we identied PASOA as the primary approach for recording,
storing and querying provenance. The reason for this is that PASOA is the only approach
currently in existence that records causal relations between data that can be contained
in messages, which is an essential requirement of achieving processing transparency in
open systems. We also discussed in detail the PrIMe methodology, an eective tool
for deciding which provenance needs to be collected and which level of granularity is
appropriate. This methodology is used in the development of the application presented
in Chapter 4. Moreover, in terms of the nal stage of the life cycle (analysis), we
concluded that, whilst provenance has been used for many purposes, it has not been
used for verifying whether data processing was performed in compliance with the law,
which is one of the primary objectives of this thesis.
Second, we studied audit trails, an alternative technique for collecting electronic evidence
of the use of personal information. However, the main problem with this approach is
that it records the actions that a system or user performs ordered by time. As such, it
does not record the aforementioned essential relations between data and the processes
that were applied to it. Moreover, it is a technology and domain dependent technique,
making it less suitable for use in open and distributed systems. Finally, there exists no
principled methodology for identifying which actions need to be recorded, leading to a
large amount of data, which makes the analysis particularly challenging. In light of this,
we concluded that provenance is the superior technique for our purposes.
Third, we argued the need for securing electronic evidence, provenance or otherwise.
We discussed the key requirements of security and showed the importance of being able
to verify that a system meets these requirements. To this end, we discussed UMLsec,
an approach that allows us to include, formalise and verify security properties in UML
models. Ultimately, the main reason to model security in our work is to obtain secure
audit results: if we can guarantee that the transportation and storage of information
is secure, the results obtained from an audit can be made trustworthy and reliable.
The application of UMLsec to the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture dened in
Chapter 4 is presented in Chapter 6.
Finally, we discussed three important data protection legislations, and showed that the
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legislations were created to mandate the requirements under which the processing of
personal data in computer systems must be carried out. Therefore, if an authority needs
to verify the compliance of some computational processing to a legislative framework
through audits, it is desirable to have tools that allow this authority to perform such
analysis. For this reason, in the following chapters we present an approach that can
be used to audit the processing of personal information in computational systems and
verify its compliance with the law.Chapter 3
Problem Denition
In the introduction of this thesis we highlighted the importance of verifying that personal
information was processed correctly and legally. Furthermore, we discussed various types
of legislation created by governments and public institutions to address this problem,
and specically focused on the Data Protection Act.
In this chapter, we dene the central problem we address in this thesis. In order to do
this, we analyse a case study of the Data Protection Act as a model of how legislation is
used to protect personal information. The reason for focusing on this specic legislative
framework, is that the Data Protection Act (DPA) is the main framework enforcing
information privacy in the UK. Moreover, the DPA consists of principles that are well-
specied and can therefore be made amenable to computational implementation.
Against this background, the contribution of this chapter is the identication of a set of
requirements derived from this case study. The remainder of this thesis addresses the
central challenge of automatically verifying these requirements. To accomplish this, we
identify computational security techniques and provenance as a key means of accom-
plishing this.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. First, we present an exemplar
scenario in which the use of the DPA is demonstrated, and which will serve as a running
example throughout this thesis. Then, based on the insights gained from this scenario, in
Section 3.2, we analyse the DPA notication process and identify the need for performing
audits on systems that manage personal information. Next, in Section 3.3, we identify
the key application processes that involve the processing of personal information, and,
as such, are subject to the DPA. In Section 3.4, we proceed by analysing the main
principles of the DPA (see Section 2.4.1) to derive requirements for lawful processing
of data, which can be automatically veried. Then, in Section 3.5, we argue that the
availability of provenance of data processing is necessary to achieve this. In Section 3.6
we identify the key assumptions under which our algorithms and techniques perform
this verication, and provide concluding remarks in Section 3.7.
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3.1 Exemplar Scenario
This section presents a practical scenario in which personal information is being pro-
cessed, and, as a result, to which the DPA legislation needs to be applied. In this
example, we focus on the way personal information is processed and how it can be mis-
used by the organisations that are collecting it. The scenario exposes the ways in which
personal information can be captured and misused in an on-line e-commerce applica-
tion. The scenario will later help us to derive various requirements, and is be used as a
running example in subsequent chapters.
3.1.1 On-line Sales Scenario
Consider the following scenario. Alice is trying to start a family, and has decided to
take a fertility treatment (advised by her doctor who gave her the corresponding pre-
scription). She decides to buy her treatment from an on-line pharmacy. In order to
get her treatment, she needs to register by providing her name, address, date of birth,
gender and national insurance number. At the same time, but unrelated to her attempt
to get pregnant, she applies for a job at the same pharmacy|but her application is
turned down. She suspects that the pharmacy may have accessed her ordering history
and realised that she has plans to start a family. As a result, the company has marked
her as a high risk employee because of potentially expensive maternity costs. If this is
true, the company obviously misused Alice's personal information; when she provided
her personal information to the pharmacy, she did this with the purpose of purchasing
her treatment. From the point of view of the company, the purpose is \on-line sales".
For this purpose, the pharmacy is allowed verify the existence of the medicine, charge
the amount to her card, send the medicine to her home and even create a record of the
product's sale. Each of these tasks uses a dierent set of collected data. For example,
the company can create a report of the monthly sales, which includes the medicine's
name and the quantity sold. However, such a report cannot contain the name of the
people that bought that item, since this might allow to each person to be identied and
linked to a specic medication and, therefore, to a specic medical condition.
In this case, the DPA principles should also be followed. The pharmacy should process
its clients' information for the purpose that was initially stated and not use more infor-
mation than necessary. To verify that the pharmacy is following these rules, audits on
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3.1.2 Scenario Discussion
According to the DPA legislation (presented in Section 2.4.1), in the on-line sales scenario
the pharmacy is a Data Controller and the customers, including Alice, are Data Subjects.
The Data Processor is the internal stock management department.
In this example, the Data Subjects' personal information should be processed following
the DPA principles. In order to verify whether such principles are observed, we need
to expose the way in which this information was processed, i.e. make the processing
of information transparent. When this is achieved, it becomes possible to analyse this
processing to decide whether organisations are in compliance with the DPA principles.
Such an analysis is called an audit and was described in Section 2.2.
To be in compliance with the DPA, organisations shall follow all of its principles. Each
of these principles states dierent requirements, which are derived in Section 3.4.
3.2 DPA Notication Process
The example in the previous section highlights the importance of conducting audits to
verify the compliance of information processing with the DPA principles. In the DPA
case, audits could be conducted by the Information Commissioner's Oce (ICO) [111],
which is the UK's independent public body established to protect its citizens' personal
information. The ICO has legal powers to ensure that organisations comply with the
requirements of the Data Protection Act. Some of these legal powers include:
 Conducting assessments to check that organisations are in compliance with the
Act.
 Conducting audits to assess whether organisations' processing of personal data
follows good practice.
To be able to perform such audits, it is necessary to specify which processes are allowed to
be performed on which data. This specication is later used to verify that applications
are indeed correctly and lawfully carried out using personal data. Consequently, the
DPA requires that every Data Controller that is processing personal information in
an automated form should notify the ICO of the details of such processing through
the Notication Process [7]. This process consists of the creation of a register entry
describing the processing that each Data Controller is performing. This register entry is
part of a public register of Data Controllers maintained by the ICO. The ICO's register
has a well-dened structure categorising the purposes for collecting personal data from
Data Subjects, as well as the Data Subjects of each Data Controller. Figure 3.1 shows
the general structure of a register entry and Figure 3.2 is the application of this structure50 Chapter 3 Problem De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Figure 3.1: General Structure of an ICO's register entry
to the On-line Sales Scenario. The ICO's register for an existing UK pharmacy can be
found in [88].
Each entry in the ICO's register is organised according to the purposes of a single Data
Controller. Each purpose has a description that could include specic tasks related to
it. It also includes a list of Data Subjects, Data Classes (types of personal information
that are to be processed), and Recipients (individuals or organisations with whom the
Data Controller intends or may wish to share data) applicable to the purpose. Data
Subjects, Data Classes and Recipients have a numbered classication, as is shown in the
example of Figure 3.2. The complete classication can be found in [111]. Further on,
this classication model is used to assess whether organisations processed personal data
according to the DPA.
The ICO's register can later be used in an audit to verify that the purposes, personal
information and Data Subjects that the Data Controller has declared are used according
to the DPA principles.
3.3 Processing Personal Data
By analysing the practical scenario described in Section 3.1, we can see that patterns
exist in the communication between the Data Controllers who request personal informa-
tion, and the Data Subjects who provide it. In this section, we identify and generalise
these patterns in order to model them as a computational application, which will later
form the foundation for the communication protocols we develop in the next chapter.Chapter 3 Problem De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Figure 3.2: Register entry of the On-line Sales Scenario
As the DPA states, there exist three main entities: Data Controller (Denition 2.7), Data
Subject (Denition 2.8) and Data Processor (Denition 2.9). In practice, Data Subjects
typically make initial contact with Data Controllers. However, this communication is
not modelled because it contains no personal information. As a consequence, we assume
that the Data Controller initiates the communication by requesting personal information
from Data Subjects. We can model this communication using the following workow:
1. The Data Controller sends a request for personal information to a Data Subject in-
dicating which information it requires and the purpose for which such information
is to be collected.
2. The Data Subject veries the purpose and, if the purpose is accepted, the Data
Subject sends the requested data.
3. The Data Controller receives the personal information and stores it in a local
database. At this point, the information should be processed according to the52 Chapter 3 Problem De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stated purpose. The Data Controller could perform the processing or outsource it
to a Data Processor.
4. The Data Controller sends a request for processing to a Data Processor indicating
the task to be performed and sends the information to be processed.
5. The Data Processor receives the information, performs the task and returns the
result of the processing to the Data Controller.
In step 4, in order to obtain the necessary information to perform the indicated task, the
Data Controller can grant access to the local database to the Data Processor. However,
without loss of generality, we assume that the Data Controller explicitly sends a set of
data that needs to be processed by the Data Processor. Equivalently, this data could be
a reference to a database with the necessary credentials to access to it.
In this step-by-step explanation, two dierent stages can be identied. The rst involves
a request for personal information (steps 1, 2 and 3), which we call data request. The
second involves the processing of information (steps 4 and 5), which we call task request.
Using this workow description, we design a protocol that represents the communication
between the three main entities. This protocol is presented in Figure 3.3 in which entities
are represented by squares and the communication between them by arrows, which are
labelled using the same numbering as above.
Figure 3.3: The Data Request and Task Request protocols
A dierent process that is not modelled by the protocol in Figure 3.3, but is mentioned
in the DPA, is the update process, which we call data update. In this process, the Data
Controller has already collected personal information from a Data Subject, but this
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Data Subjects inform Data Controllers of their wish using a message which contains no
personal information. Thus, again we assume that Data Controllers initiate the update
process, which is presented in Figure 3.4 and explained below.
1. The Data Controller sends a request for updating the Data Subject's personal
information.
2. The Data Subject sends the updated information to the Data Controller.
3. The Data Controller receives this information and updates the Data Subject's
personal information, which is stored in a local database.
Figure 3.4: The Data Update protocol
3.4 Requirements Analysis
Thus far, we have presented communication protocols that generalise the communication
patterns found in applications that manage personal data. To verify whether the DPA
was correctly applied in these protocols, it is necessary to analyse the DPA's principles.
In doing so, we can derive requirements that need to be satised for the processing of
personal information to be in compliance with the DPA.
In this context, this section presents a requirements analysis of the DPA's eight prin-
ciples, which were presented in Section 2.4.1.2. For each principle, we derive possibly
multiple requirements that have to be satised, in order for the principle to be followed.
3.4.1 Principle 1: Personal Data Processed Fairly and Lawfully
Principle 1 is focused on the notion that data shall be collected and processed fairly and
lawfully. Within the context of collection of information, these concepts are dened in
terms of the stated purpose. However, this purpose only has meaning in the context of
the identity of the Data Controller (DC). Thus, both the identity of the Data Controller
and the reason for collecting the information must be known beforehand. This provides
us with the rst requirement for information processing:
Requirement. A [Authentication] In the rst contact between a Data Subject (DS)
and a DC, the DC should send its identity, the set of information requested and the
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The fair and lawful concepts are also applied to the processing of data, which is es-
tablished by the initial purpose. In our case, information is processed lawfully if the
purpose by which it was processed appears in the corresponding register le. Addition-
ally, information is processed fairly if its processing is clearly understood by individuals
who provide their personal information. The verication of fair and lawful processing is
supported by Principle 2, for which we derive a corresponding requirement.
3.4.2 Principle 2: Legal Purpose
Principle 2 states that the DC may only request and process data from a DS for a legal
purpose. When DS receives a DC request, DS has to verify the request and decide
whether to send the required information. If DS decides to accept the request, then DS
is giving his or her consent to process the information only for the given purpose. Thus,
this information can only be processed according to the purpose agreed by DS. After
processing the information, an auditor can verify that the processing conducted by a
Data Processor (DP) was really that stated in the purpose. This provides us with the
following auditing requirement:
Requirement. B [Purpose Compliance] For verifying that DC and DP used DS's infor-
mation only for the stated purpose, we require an explicit description of the processing
that was applied to such information. This description has to include which processes
were applied and the purposes for which such processes were performed. This descrip-
tion can be analysed by auditors to determine whether these processes were compatible
with the stated purposes. Moreover, auditors can verify whether the DC's purposes are
legal and whether the ICO was notied.
3.4.3 Principle 3: Collection of Relevant Information
In Principle 3, the data requested from DS has to be relevant for the stated purpose; the
DC should not request, collect or use more information than strictly necessary. Hence,
when data processing is complete, an auditor should be able to verify that all the data
captured and used by DC (or by DP, in the case of an outsourced processing) was
relevant. Accordingly, we derive a new auditing requirement:
Requirement. C [Relevant Information Verication] For verifying that DC and DP
requested and used only relevant information when processing data, we require a de-
scription of the information used to derive a specic result and a description of the
information that should have been used. Then, an auditor can use both descriptions to
determine whether the information that was actually used was indeed necessary to yield
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3.4.4 Principle 4: Information Integrity
Principle 4 is focused on information integrity, which in the case of our model needs to
be guaranteed during the stages of communication and storage of information. In order
to support integrity of data transportation and data storage, we derive the following two
requirements:
Requirement. D [Integrity] The integrity of information exchanged between the DC,
DS, and DP should be maintained, as well as that of any description of the applied
processes or information used. In so doing, we can guarantee that information sent
by the main entities is not tampered with, that the descriptions represent what really
happened to the information and that any unauthorized alteration of the exchanged
information will be detected.
Requirement. E [Access Control] When the DS maintains the information in a storage
component, which is managed by DC, we require that such a component implements
access control measures to prevent undesired alterations. In so doing we can guarantee
the integrity of this information.
3.4.5 Principle 5: Identication of Individuals
According to Principle 5, when collected information has been processed (once the initial
purpose has been accomplished), it should not be possible to identify specic individuals
by means of this information or any related processing result.
Thus, information that could identify a specic individual should not be present in the
output of a process, i.e. processing results should be de-identied. De-identication
of data can be achieved by removing information that could be used to identify an
individual or by creating pseudo-data (see Section 2.3.1.6). For example, in the on-
line sales scenario from Section 3.1, in order to hide Alice's identity, her name should
not appear in an inventory. If for some reason, Alice's name needs to be present in
the inventory, a sequence number can be used instead. This way, customers cannot be
identied, but it is still possible to determine how processing results originated.
However, data de-identication provides no guarantee of anonymity, as processing results
might contain other data, such as race, birth date, sex, and post code. This data can
be linked to publicly available information to re-identify individuals [42]. To eectively
anonymise data, various techniques, such as Dierential Privacy [52], k-Anonymity [133,
75], `-Diversity [93] and Perfect Privacy [97] can be used. To support Principle 5, and
ensure personal data is not exposed, one of the previously mentioned techniques can be
employed.
In the remainder of this thesis, we use the term anonymisation to refer to both anonymi-
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i.e. to avoid the identication of individuals through their personal information. This
leads to the following requirement:
Requirement. F [Anonymity Preservation] To verify that personal information can-
not be used to identify a specic individual by a third party, we require an explicit
description of the data used to generate processing results. An auditor can later analyse
this description to check whether personal personal data was correctly anonymised. By
anonymising personal data, links to individuals can be hidden so that they cannot be
identied, while ensuring the link between data and process is maintained.
3.4.6 Principle 6: Rights of Data Subjects
According to Principle 6, personal data processing should be performed in conformity
with the rights of data subjects. These rights are listed below. For each of them, we
explain how they are already supported by the protocols from Section 3.3 or by the
requirements above.
 The rst right, access to personal data, states that a DS should have access to his
or her personal data. This data is stored by a DC in a storage component, as the
local database presented in Figure 3.3. This component should implement access
control techniques and the corresponding interfaces to grant users access to their
personal data.
 The second right, prevention of processing likely to cause damage or distress, is
part of the authorization given by DS to process its data for the purpose given
by DC. The DS decides if the process can cause some kind of damage or distress
to him or her and then decides whether or not to give consent to process the
information.
 The third and fourth rights state that personal information requested from the
DS should not be used for direct marketing or automated decision-taking. This
can be seen as a set of processes that cannot be applied to the collected data and,
therefore, be part of Requirement B.
 The fth right, rectication, blocking, erasure, and destruction, is a list of actions
that DC can perform on the information at DS's request. The rectication pro-
cess is part of the update process: DS recties the information and, in some cases,
updates it. This process is modelled in Figure 3.4. The blocking, erasure, and
destruction processes are carried out in order to avoid DS's personal information
from being used. The rst one refers to blocking access to DS's personal informa-
tion, which is maintained in a storage component. The second and third refer to
the deletion of DS's personal information from the storage component. From an
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in turn, aects the quality of the audit result. In order to solve this problem, we
assume that instead of deleting information, the techniques explained in Require-
ment F are used. In this way, DS's identity is safe and the information can still
be used to perform the necessary audits.
 The sixth right states the possibility of obtaining compensation if the rules stated
in the DPA are not followed. Whilst this is an important issue, this is not compu-
tationally veriable, and is therefore outside the scope of our work.
 The seventh right, request for assessment, mandates the ability to perform audits.
These audits are carried out by an authorized entity to verify the correctness of
the information processing and report the results. As mentioned in Section 3.2,
within the context of DPA, this entity is the ICO.
3.4.7 Principle 7: Secure Management of Personal Information
Principle 7 states that a DC has to oer technical and organizational measures for man-
aging the data of a DS. For example, this can be achieved by implementing the set of
controls comprising the best practice in information security, as dened in ISO/IEC-
17799 [11]. However, the measures dened in this ISO standard are beyond the scope of
our work. Instead, we focus on the technical measures, specically on the measures that
relate to the information security properties dened in ISO/IEC-7498-2 [3]: conden-
tiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation and access control. These properties
are oered by various security techniques that can encrypt and decrypt information,
sign messages and verify signatures. These techniques were discussed in Section 2.3.
Thus, within the context of this thesis, this principle states that auditors should be
able to verify that entities implement information security techniques that oer the ve
aforementioned properties. This is captured in the next requirement:
Requirement. G [Basic Security Characteristics Verication] For verifying that DS,
DC and DP implement security techniques in their communication, we require an explicit
description of the techniques that were applied to data. This description can be analysed
by auditors to verify that all necessary security techniques were used during information
processing.
3.4.8 Principle 8: Overseas Information Transfer
Finally, Principle 8 states that the personal information of a DS cannot be transferred
to countries not listed in the list of secure countries dened by the DPA. Thus, to verify
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Requirement. H [Information Transferred to a Secure Country] DS, DC and DP can-
not transfer personal information to a country that is not included in the list of secure
countries, which is dened in the DPA.
3.4.9 Requirements Discussion
Table 3.1 summarises the requirements we derived from the principles of the DPA. Most
of the principles are supported by a single requirement except Principle 4, which requires
two security characteristics, and Principle 6, which supports the seven rights of Data
Subjects.
Table 3.1: Requirements
In order to implement these requirements, we can classify them into two groups. The
rst group contains requirements for auditing the processing of personal data and in-
cludes Requirements B, C, F, G and H. To verify that these requirements are met, an
explicit description of this processing is required. This description can later be audited
to verify whether these requirements were implemented. For this reason, we call the re-
quirements in this group \Auditing Requirements". In Chapter 5, we develop algorithms
for automatically verifying that data processing satised these requirements.
The second group contains requirements related to security properties and includes Re-
quirements A, D, E, F and G. These require the implementation of security protocols
or cryptographic techniques, so we refer to these as \Security Requirements". These
requirements guarantee the authentication, condentiality, integrity, non-repudiation,
access control and anonymity preservation properties. The dierent ways in which these
properties can be implemented were discussed in Section 2.3. In Chapter 4, we develop
an architecture that exhibits these properties.
Note that Requirements F and G belong to both groups. The reason for this is that they
support characteristics of both groups. Requirement F is used to verify that personal
data was correctly anonymised. To do so, we require an explicit description of pastChapter 3 Problem Denition 59
processing. Hence, Requirement F is an Auditing Requirement. However, this require-
ment also states that data needs to be anonymised by implementing an anonymisation
technique, making this requirement a Security Requirement as well. This requirement
and its implementation is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Similarly, Requirement G is used to verify that DPA entities implement security tech-
niques in their communication. To do so, it also requires an explicit description of such
techniques. Thus, Requirement G is an Auditing Requirement. At the same time, the re-
quirement states that the technical means to support the implementation of such security
techniques should be provided. Thus, Requirement G is also a Security Requirement.
3.5 Provenance as a Solution
As discussed in the previous section, the Auditing Requirements need an explicit descrip-
tion of past processing. Using this description, it becomes possible to perform audits
and verify whether these requirements were met during the processing of personal infor-
mation. To obtain such a description, the provenance of data and processing needs to
be available.
The PASOA (Provenance Aware Service Oriented Architecture) model (see Section
2.1.2.2) was designed in the context of service-oriented architectures relying on individ-
ual services to record their own provenance. This model proposes to capture assertions
that encode the relationships between the represented services and data in a generic,
customizable and scalable way [63]. PASOA also incorporates a set of security proper-
ties [135], as well as a software engineering technique, called PrIMe [100], for making
applications provenance-aware.
The PASOA model oers some desirable characteristics that can be useful to support
the Auditing Requirements. These characteristics are listed below [63].
 PASOA is platform, domain and technology independent.
 The query functionality oered by this model supports multiple levels of abstrac-
tion allowing for the creation of user-tailored queries [98]. This is a crucial char-
acteristic that allows us to audit all the requirements we have derived above.
 The provenance DAG representation can be easily used to analyse past processing
against the Auditing Requirements.
By adopting this provenance model, we can process documentation as the explicit de-
scription of past processing, which is required to satisfy the Auditing Requirements.
Provenance documentation is recorded at execution time, and queried after the process-
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as a DAG, can be analysed to decide whether the application satised the Auditing Re-
quirements.
3.6 Assumptions
In order to use the provenance model in the protocols dened in Section 3.3, we need
to dene a set of assumptions under which the solutions we develop in the remainder of
this thesis operate. These assumptions are described below.
1. Provenance information cannot be deleted. We assume the provenance information
cannot be partially or totally deleted. Thus, when the provenance of a piece of
data is obtained, complete information about past executions is always available.
2. Provenance is persistent and available. We assume provenance information is per-
sistently stored in a Provenance Store component and is accessible at all times.
Consequently, provenance information is accessible when required.
3. Data and provenance are securely stored. We assume that all the Local Data-
bases, which contain application data, and the Provenance Store, which contain
provenance information, implement the necessary measures to protect the stored
information from unauthorised access by means of access control.
4. Provenance is recorded truthfully. All actors involved in the creation of provenance
record what really happened at execution time. This can be achieved by using a
secured library that automatically records the assertions that are made by actors.
5. Only relevant provenance is recorded. The actors involved in the processing of
information only record information required to verify the Auditing Requirements.
6. It should be possible to query the provenance store. We assume the provenance
store has a query functionality that can be used to retrieve the provenance of a
specic item and supports scoped-provenance queries (see Section 2.1.2.2).1
7. There exists an ontology that denes the way personal information is processed. We
assume that there exists a well-dened ontology that denes personal information
and the processes that operate on it. This ontology should be used during the
capture of provenance information, and should be used by all the entities involved.
Based on this assumption, our solutions can operate in the knowledge that entities
consistently create, query and reason about provenance.
8. Audits are performed o-line. Audits are performed after the execution of the
processes over personal information nishes. Otherwise, it is not possible to analyse
the complete processing that was performed on personal information.
1This is in contrast with some of the techniques described in 2.1.3, which do not do this.Chapter 3 Problem De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3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we formulated the central problem that we address in this thesis: the
automatic verication of correct processing of personal data. To do this, we rst intro-
duced an exemplar scenario that illustrates the application of the DPA. We analysed
this scenario to demonstrate that performing audits allows us to decide whether data
processing is in compliance with DPA principles. We also identied the key protocols
that are used by the three main entities of an application that manages personal data:
the Data Subject (DS), the Data Controller (DC) and the Data Processor (DP). Based
on these protocols and the DPA principles discussed in Section 2.4.1, we identied the
requirements for valid and lawful processing of personal information. We grouped these
requirements into Auditing Requirements (which can be veried by auditing provenance)
and Security Requirements (which require the implementation of security protocols or
cryptographic techniques). Then, we discussed the importance of provenance for auto-
matically verifying that these requirements are met. Finally, we identied the underlying
assumptions of the solutions we develop in the upcoming chapters.
More specically, in the following chapters, we address dierent aspects of the problem
formulated here. In Chapter 4, we lay the foundations by creating an architecture for
collecting the required provenance, while at the same time securing the exchange of
application data. By so doing, we satisfy Security Requirements A (Authentication)
and G (Basic Security Characteristics). Then, in Chapter 5, we develop algorithms
for automatically verifying the Auditing Requirements. In Chapter 6, we secure the
architecture from Chapter 4, including the complete life cycle of provenance|collection,
communication, storage and analysis. By doing so, we satisfy the remainder of the
Security Requirements. Finally, in Chapter 7 we methodically analyse the security of
the complete architecture and verify that we have indeed satised all requirements.Chapter 4
Provenance-Based Auditing
Architecture
In the previous chapter, we analysed the principles of the DPA and derived a correspond-
ing set of requirements. These requirements are grouped into Auditing Requirements
and Security Requirements. Ultimately, the goal of the thesis is to automatically verify
whether data processing has satised these requirements and, by so doing, determine
whether this processing was in compliance with the DPA.
In this chapter, we take the rst step towards this goal. This step involves the creation
of the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture, which is the contribution of this chapter.
This architecture captures and stores the provenance that is later used by the algorithms
we develop in the next chapter to perform automatic verication of the Auditing Re-
quirements. At the same time, this architecture secures the communication between its
main entities. By doing so, it satises Security Requirements A (Authentication) and
G (Basic Security Characteristics). In Chapter 6, we secure the remainder of the archi-
tecture (including the storage and analysis of provenance) to satisfy the other Security
Requirements.
Now, to identify which provenance needs to be captured by the Provenance-based Au-
diting Architecture, we use the PrIMe methodology (see Section 2.1.2.4). PrIMe allows
us to make this architecture provenance-aware by deciding which assertions should be
recorded during execution time. Recall from Section 2.1.2.2 that assertions document
which operations were performed on data, and are the primary way of encoding prove-
nance in the PASOA model (see Section 2.1.2.2) on which our work is based.
To capture the required provenance identied by PrIMe, we extend the Data Request
(invoked when a Data Controller requests personal data from a Data Subject) and
Task Request (invoked when a Data Controller wishes to delegate processing to a Data
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Processor) protocols (see Section 3.3). Furthermore, we dene a new protocol, Query
Request, that allows an auditor to retrieve the provenance from the architecture.
Since the role of auditor will be played by the algorithms we develop in the next chapter,
provenance needs to be machine accessible. Thus, the nal step we perform in this
chapter is to dene the provenance queries, the result of which forms the input of the
algorithms in Chapter 5. These answers take the form of provenance DAGs (see Section
2.1.4), which are particularly suitable for automatic analysis.
Thus, in more detail, we perform the following steps. First, in Section 4.1, we present
the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture. Then, in Section 4.2, we apply the PrIMe
methodology to expose the assertions that need to be recorded. Next, in Section 4.3,
we modify the Data Request and Task Request protocols to capture provenance, and
dene the Query Request protocol. Using this protocol, the algorithms in Chapter
5 can retrieve the necessary provenance. Thus, in Section 4.4, we describe how this is
achieved, by dening the necessary provenance queries. Finally, in Section 4.5 we discuss
the contributions made in this chapter in the context of existing work, and conclude in
Section 4.6.
4.1 Building the Architecture
In this section, we develop the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture. First, we de-
scribe its components in Section 4.1.1 using concepts from UML. Then, in Section 4.1.2
we explain how these components interact, i.e. how the architecture operates. Finally,
in Section 4.1.3, we secure the communication between its components.
4.1.1 Components
The architecture is based on the Data Request and Task Request protocols presented in
Section 3.3. Consequently, the entities that exist within these protocols also appear in
the architecture. However, the main dierence between these protocols and the ones that
exist in the architecture, is that the latter records provenance. Therefore, it is necessary
to include new components, which essentially make our architecture provenance-aware.
The architecture is presented as a UML use case diagram in Figure 4.1, in which the
Data Subject, the Data Controller and the Data Processor are modelled as actors. Two
new actors are introduced|the Provenance Store and the Auditor actors. Furthermore,
the Data Request and Task Request protocols are modelled as use cases. Again, we add
new use cases, which are invoked by the Auditor to verify Auditing Requirements B, C,
F, G and H (Section 3.4).
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Figure 4.1: Provenance-Based Auditing Architecture
4.1.1.1 Actors
The main actors in the architecture are:
The Data Subject actor is a software proxy representing a Data Subject that com-
municates with a Data Controller on behalf of an individual.
The Data Controller actor represents a Data Controller that collects personal infor-
mation from Data Subjects for a specic purpose.
The Data Processor actor represents a Data Processor that processes information on
behalf of a Data Controller.
The Auditor actor represents an auditor who veries whether the processing of the
Data Subject's information was performed in compliance with the auditing re-
quirements derived in Chapter 3.
The Local Database subactor represents a local database in which the Data Con-
troller stores the Data Subjects' information. We refer to this component as a
subactor to show that is part of the Data Controller actor, who manages the
information stored in it.
The Provenance Store actor represents the Provenance Store where provenance, in
the form of p-assertions (See 2.1.2.2) are stored. This provenance is generated
as a result of the interactions between Data Controllers, Data Subjects and Data
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4.1.1.2 Use Cases and Requirements
The following use cases represent the protocols and processes in which the actors par-
ticipate. These use cases are represented by blue ovals in Figure 4.1.
The Data Request / Data Update use case represents a request for personal infor-
mation or a request for updating personal information issued by a Data Controller
to a Data Subject. These use cases represent the protocols described in Figures
3.3 and 3.4.
The Task Request use case represents a request for delegating a task issued by a
Data Controller to a Data Processor. This use case represents the interaction
between the Data Controller and the Data Processor shown in Figure 3.3.
The Record use case represents the process of recording p-assertions.
The Query Request use case represents the process of querying p-assertions.
The Resolve References use case represents the process of resolving references to
objects stored in the Local Database, which contains the actual data. As men-
tioned in Section 2.1.2.2, provenance information can contain references to data
instead of a copy of the real data. If this data needs to be accessed, the Provenance
Store presents the necessary credentials to the corresponding database, accesses
the original data, and executes this use case.
The use cases presented as green ovals in Figure 4.1 represent the Auditing Requirements
described in Chapter 3. By obtaining the necessary provenance and invoking the Query
Request, auditors can verify whether actors who processed personal information were
in compliance with these requirements.
4.1.2 Component Interactions
Now that we have presented the components of the Provenance-based Auditing Archi-
tecture separately, in this section we explain how the actors interact by participating in
use cases, and by doing so, exploit the functionality of the architecture.
The Data Subject actor communicates with the Data Controller actor through the
Data Request and the Data Update use case. The Data Request use case represents
a request for personal information issued by the DC to the DS. The Data Controller
requests information from the Data Subject, which is stored by the Local Database
actor. The Data Update use case represents the updating process performed by DS: if
the Data Subject wishes to change its personal information, the updated information
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The Data Processor actor communicates with the Data Controller using the Task
Request use case, which represents a task delegated to DP by DC. The p-assertions
generated by the Data Subject, Data Controller and Data Processor actors are
recorded in the Provenance Store. This process is represented by the Record use
case. Additionally, in the Provenance Store, references to the original data (stored
in the Local Database) could be recorded instead of the information itself. Thus,
the Provenance Store has a connection to the Local Database through the Resolve
References use case. Note that if instead of a reference to data a copy to the actual
data is maintained, then this use case is not necessary.
Finally, the Auditor actor, who is responsible for verifying the compliance of the prin-
ciples mentioned in Chapter 3, participates in ve use cases: Purpose Compliance,
Relevant Information Verification, Anonymity Preservation, Basic Security
Characteristics Verification and Information Transferred to a Secure Coun-
try. These use cases correspond to the Auditing Requirements (B, C, F, G and H)
identied in Chapter 3. These requirements can be veried by querying the p-assertions
stored in the Provenance Store after information processing has nished. For this rea-
son, the Auditor is connected to the Provenance Store through the Query Request
use case.
Thus, the information ow within the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture can be
summarised in the following workows:
Recording of provenance in which components make assertions related to the actions
they perform and record them in a Provenance Store.
Storage of provenance in which assertions are persistently stored in a Provenance Store.
Querying of provenance in which process documentation is queried.
Analysis of provenance to determine whether the execution of the system is in compli-
ance with the requirements. The result of this workow is an audit report.
4.1.3 Securing the Architecture
As the analysis of the DPA principles (Section 3.4) illustrates, security is a key issue in
a provenance-aware system. Without having the necessary security protocols in place,
which prescribe how messages should be exchanged between actors, the correctness of
the information produced, recorded, stored or queried can not be ensured.
In the architecture, communications between the actors can take place over an insecure
network. This means that a third party can eavesdrop on the communications channel
or even modify the content of messages without being detected. Hence, it is necessary
to implement the security measures required by the Security Requirements (see Section68 Chapter 4 Provenance-Based Auditing Architecture
Figure 4.2: Securing the Provenance-Based Auditing Architecture. Here Actor can
be any actor dened in Section 4.1.1.
3.4.9). Moreover, the communication between the actors and the Provenance Store also
needs to be secured, in order to ensure that the same security guarantees apply to the
assertions generated by actors.
In order to support the Security Requirements, we extend the architecture with a use
case called Secure Communication (see Figure 4.2). This use case oers functional-
ity that supports the required security characteristics. This functionality includes the
authentication of entities (oered by the Authentication use case), the encryption of
messages (oered by the Encryption/Decryption use case) and the signing of messages
(oered by the Signature/Verification use case).
To establish secure communication between entities, we need to use a challenge-response
identication protocol. A protocol of this type provides security over Internet commu-
nications preventing eavesdropping, tampering or message forgery. It allows entities to
(mutually) authenticate each other through certicates and create session keys that are
used to encrypt/decrypt the data contained in messages. In so doing, the condentiality
property is guaranteed to hold for the data that is exchanged. After a secure connection
has been established, public and private keys can be created, which form the basis of
a digital signature scheme. In this scheme, each message is signed before being sent
and the signatures veried after being received. As a result, the properties of integrity,
message authentication and non-repudiation are guaranteed to hold. As explained in
assumption 3 (see Section 3.6), access control is not considered in this thesis. However,
access control can be implemented using public certicates, i.e. an entity is granted
to a resources after verifying its identity through the use of certicates. In light of
our intention to present a technology independent approach, the specic technical and
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4.2 Identifying the Required Provenance
In the previous section, we developed the Provenance-Based Auditing Architecture that
includes the Provenance Store component. This component is a key element in the
implementation of provenance auditing functionality. We also explained how to secure
the architecture by supporting the Security Requirements. The next step is to identify
which provenance needs to be collected in order to verify compliance of the Auditing
Requirements (Table 3.1).
As we discussed earlier, this provenance is encoded as p-assertions. To verify the Au-
diting Requirements, it is not necessary to record all possible assertions. Rather, we
only need to record those that document the processes that are decisive in the use of
information. Now, to decide which assertions should be recorded to verify the Auditing
Requirements, we use the PrIMe methodology (see Section 2.1.2.4). This methodology
consists of three phases:
 For each Auditing Requirement, identify which provenance-related questions need
to be answered.
 Decompose the application into a set of actors that record provenance.
 Identify which information is required to answer the provenance questions related
to the Security Requirements, but is lacking from the interactions between the
actors identied in Phase 2.
In what follows, we go through each of these phases.
4.2.1 Phase 1: Provenance Question Capture and Analysis
In rst phase of PrIMe, we must identify which provenance-related questions within the
application need to be answered. Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 show these provenance
questions, which are derived from the Auditing Requirements B, C, F, G and H. Each
table presents a provenance question and its corresponding provenance query or queries.
In each table, the data item and the scope (see Section 2.1.4) are dened to delimit the
results from the provenance query.1 Furthermore, we dene a processing step, which
transforms the result of the query into a denitive answer of the provenance question.
Before detailing each provenance-related question, we rst dene two types of data that
we use in this section. The rst type, Collected data is the information obtained from
Data Subjects as a result of the Data Request use case. Second, Used data is the
1Later on, when we represent this query result as a DAG, the data item refers to a node whose
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information used in the Task Request use case (for delegating the processing of data to
a Data Processor).
Table 4.1 summarises the provenance question related to Requirement B, Purpose
Compliance, which veries whether the results of data processing were compatible with
the purpose for which data was collected. To answer this question, we need to know
which data was used in the process, as well as the purpose for capturing the data. This
data can then be compared to the established criteria related to the purpose. Thus,
this comparison allows us to conclusively determine whether the audit requirement was
observed.
Provenance Question Was the result obtained by processing personal data com-
patible with the purpose for which it was captured?
Provenance Query What was the used data to obtain the result, and the purpose
for which the data was used?
Data item Result
Scope Requested and collected data
Processing step Compare the used data with established criteria related to
the purpose.
Table 4.1: Provenance related question for Requirement B, Purpose Compliance
Next, Table 4.2 relates to the provenance question that veries whether all personal data
captured from a DS was actually used by a process. Thus, this provenance question is
related to Requirement C, Relevant Information Verication. For answering this
provenance question, we need to know which data was used to obtain the result and
which data was collected from the DS. Then, the used data can be compared with the
collected data.
If these sets are not equal, we have two possibilities. The rst possibility is that more
personal data was collected than strictly necessary. This means there is some data that
was collected but not used. The second possibility is that more data was required than
collected. This data might be collected from other entities or might be produced by
another process performed by the same entity. The details of these cases are analysed
in Chapter 5.
Provenance Question Was all the collected data used in the processing of result?
Provenance Query What was the used data and the collected data used to obtain
result?
Data item Result
Scope Requested and collected data
Processing step Compare the used data with the collected data and highlight
the dierences.
Table 4.2: Provenance related question for Requirement C, Relevant Information
VericationChapter 4 Provenance-Based Auditing Architecture 71
Table 4.3 relates to the provenance question that checks whether personal information
was anonymised, such that a third party cannot link individuals to their personal in-
formation. This question is related to Requirement F, Anonymity Preservation. To
answer this provenance question, we need to know whether the result contains sensitive
data, i.e. information that should not be exposed in a processing result. To verify this
requirement, we assume that we have a list of data items considered sensitive (such as
ethnic origin or medical history). This list can then be compared to data items con-
tained in the result. If one or more sensitive items are found, we can conclude that the
information was not properly anonymised.
Provenance Question Were all used data and associated results properly anony-
mised?
Provenance Query What was the produced result?
Data item Result
Scope Requested and Collected Data
Processing step Verify that no sensitive items are present in the result
Table 4.3: Provenance related question of Requirement F, Anonymity Preservation
Table 4.4 presents the provenance question that checks whether messages exchanged be-
tween the entities were encrypted and signed cryptographically. This question relates to
Requirement G, Basic Security Characteristics Verication. To answer this question
we need to know which data was used to obtain the result and which security processes
were applied to this data. Then, the identied security processes can subsequently be
analysed to determine whether they ensure the properties of condentiality, integrity,
authentication and non-repudiation.
Provenance Question Was all data used to obtain the result encrypted, signed,
decrypted, veried, etc.?
Provenance Query Which data was used, and which security processes were
applied to it?
Data item Result
Scope Provenance of result with security processes
Processing step Check that data was encrypted, decrypted, veried, signed,
etc.
Table 4.4: Provenance related question of Requirement G, Basic Security Character-
istics Verication
Finally, Table 4.5 relates to the provenance question that checks whether the collected
information stayed inside countries listed as secure. This question is related to Re-
quirement H, Information Transferred to a Secure Country. To answer this question
we need to know whether collected data crossed a border. The list of countries through
which personal information transited can then be compared with the ones listed by the
DPA.
Now that we have identi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Provenance Question Was collected data only sent to \secure countries"?
Provenance Query What was the collected data and to which countries was it
sent?
Data item Collected Data
Scope Provenance of Collected Data including countries it tran-
sited through
Processing step Check if the countries appear in the secure countries list
Table 4.5: Provenance related question of Requirement H, Information Transferred
to a Secure Country
4.2.2 Phase 2: Actor Based Decomposition
In the second phase of PrIMe, actor-based decomposition, we identify the interactions
between actors and the messages they exchange. By recording the act of sending and
receiving these messages, we can capture the provenance of the data processing that
occurs within the system.
The result of this phase is the diagram shown in Figure 4.3. This gure presents a more
detailed formalisation of the Data Request and Task Request protocols from Section 3.3.
More specically, it shows the messages that are exchanged between the main entities
as well the relationships between these messages.
In this diagram, the main entities are represented by squares: the DC (Data Controller),
the DS (Data Subject) and the DP (Data Processor). For the purpose of consistency, the
labels of the messages in this diagram correspond to the ones in Figure 4.4, which shows
the result of the third phase of the PrIMe methodology.
Now, the information ows in the Data Request and Task Request protocols can be
modelled by the exchange of four messages: M4, M5, M10 and M11 (the solid arrows). In
M4, DC sends the collection purpose to DS, who responds with message M5, which contains
the requested data. These two messages are the main part of the Data Request protocol
that represents the request of personal data. Then, using message M10, DC sends a set
of data (which is a subset of the data contained in M5). This data is processed by DP,
which informs DC of the result using M11. Thus, messages M10 and M11 are part of the
Task Request protocol that formalises the process of outsourcing a job.
As mentioned earlier, Figure 4.3 also shows the relationships between these messages,
denoted by R4, R9, R10 and R11 (the dashed-arrows). The meaning of these relations is
as follows:
 Relation R4 indicates that message M5 was Acquired For the purpose conveyed in
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Figure 4.3: Phase 2 Diagram
 Relation R9 indicates that the data processing requested by message M10 was Ini-
tiated By the purpose in message M4.2
 Relation R10 indicates that the content of M10 (Process data) was Overlapped With
the data contained in M5.
 Relation R11 indicates that the content of M11 (Result) was used data in M10.
So far, we have identied the key messages exchanged in the Data Request and Task
Request protocols, as well as the relationships between these messages. Note that in
Figure 4.3 messages related to security do not appear. Thus, as it stands, these protocols
are not secure. In phase 3, we address this shortcoming.
4.2.3 Phase 3: Adapting the Application
To secure the messages and relationships identied in Phase 2, shown in Figure 4.3, we
require additional information that is currently not conveyed by the messages in this
gure. Therefore, in the third phase of PrIMe, we augment the protocols to make this
information explicit.
As an example of missing information, the diagram created in Phase 2 (Figure 4.3) does
not have explicit information about the security functions applied to data, which are
2Relationship R9 cannot be directly created between messages M4 and M10, as both messages are sent
by DC. In practice, the R9 is produced by creating an internal state related to M4 that later is used to
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required to support the Security Requirements. This information is necessary to deter-
mine whether the Basic Security requirement hold (see Table 4.4 for the corresponding
provenance question).
Now, in order to make this information available, we split each actor into a main ac-
tor and a subactor. These subactors are called Secure Communication, which make
available the security functions supported by the Secure Communication use case (see
Section 4.1.3 and Figure 4.2). Figure 4.4 shows the same protocol as Figure 4.3, but
extends it with the Secure Communication subactors.
Again, messages are represented by solid arrows and the relations between them by
dashed arrows. The local secure communication entity performs the four main security
operations described in Figure 4.2: encryption, decryption, signature and verication.
Thus, Secure Communication subactors associated with each main actor are called
DCSec, DSSec and DPSec. This diagram also includes messages related to the implemen-
tation of a challenge-response authentication protocol, which is implemented to support
Security Requirements A (Authentication) and G (Basic Security Characteristics).
As a result, in Figure 4.4, M1, M2, M3 (between DC and DS), M7 and M8, M9 (between
DC and DP) are part of the authentication protocol. The messages exchanged between
the actors and their corresponding Secure Communication subactor represent the en-
cryption, decryption, signing, and verication processes. These processes generate the
relationships veriedDecrypted to indicate the verication and decryption of a message,
and encryptedSigned to indicate the encryption and signature of a message. Note that
these messages are exchanged internally by the corresponding actor. Thus, the messages
exchanged between the pair DC{DS, and the pair DC{DP are transported over a network
(and encrypted and signed), while the messages exchanged between the actor and its
Secure Communication subactor are not (for clarity, these messages, which are related
to the encryption, decryption, signing, and verication, are not labelled).
When we compare Figure 4.4 to the protocol from phase 2 (shown in Figure 4.3), we
can see that in the communication between DC and DS, four messages are added. These
messages are M1, M2 and M3, and M6. Of these, the rst three implement an authentication
protocol. The last one acknowledges the correct receipt of the data contained in message
M5 that was part of the original protocol from phase 2.
Besides these new messages, the extended protocol also contains four new relationships:
R1, R2, and R3, and R5. The rst three of these encode relationships between the mes-
sages exchanged by an authentication protocol. The fourth, R5 encodes the relationship
between message M5 (which contains the data sent by DS to DC) and message M6, which
acknowledges the receipt of this message.
As can be seen in Figure 4.4, similar messages and relationships are introduced to extend
the protocol that exists between DP and DCChapter 4 Provenance-Based Auditing Architecture 75
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This concludes the application of the PrIMe methodology to the Data Request and Task
Request protocols we described in the previous chapter. Using PrIMe, we identied
the messages exchanged in these protocols and the relationships that exist between
these messages. In addition, we secured these protocols by introducing new Secure
Communication subactors that implement the necessary basic security functions. In the
next section, we show how provenance is recorded by creating assertions associated with
the messages and relationships identied in this section.
4.3 Recording Provenance
At this point, we have dened the messages that are exchanged between the actors,
and the relationships that exist between these messages. In this section, we show how
provenance is extracted from the protocols identied in the previous section, and stored
as p-assertions (see Section 2.1.2.2). In more detail, the provenance of the act of sending
and receiving a message is captured as an interaction p-assertion, while a relationship
is stored as a relationship p-assertion.
In more detail, note that the actual messages are not recorded in the provenance store,
but the relationship p-assertions that refer to these messages are. These relationship
p-assertions contain references to the data that was contained in the corresponding
messages. We assume that each message contains a unique identier, which is used in
relationship p-assertions to refer to messages. Thus, given a message identier, it is
possible to nd all relationship p-assertions that contain this identier, and to retrieve
a reference to the data that the original message contained. For more details on these
data references, see Section 2.1.2.2 and Section 3.5 where we explain that the PASOA
model used in this thesis is a process-based system that records and stores references to
the data and the data process dependencies that constitute provenance.
To illustrate the process of recording these assertions, we create a UML sequence diagram
for each of the use cases in the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture we dened in
Section 4.1. These sequence diagrams model the Data Request, Task Request and
Query Request communication protocols. We extend these protocols, which originally
were dened as the interaction between two actors (e.g. between Data Subject and Data
Controller, and between Data Controller and Data Processor), with the recording
of provenance by invoking the Record use case. Recall from Section 4.1.2, that this use
case enables these three main actors to store p-assertions in the Provenance Store.
In this section, our main focus is on how provenance is created and stored; securing these
protocols will be the subject of Chapter 6. Therefore, in what follows, the messages
related to the implementation of an authentication protocol and its technical details will
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First, we introduce the notation used in these diagrams. Then, we present the sequence
diagrams themselves, one for each of the aforementioned protocols.
4.3.1 Notation
Within the sequence diagrams, two types of elements are exchanged: messages and p-
assertions. Both contain application data|the data exchanged by the Data Request,
Task Request and Query Request protocols (see Section 4.1). The notation used for
this data is shown in Table 4.6.
Actor
Data DS DC DP AU
Purpose purpose purpose - -
Collected Data data data - -
Used Data - processData processData -
Task - - task1 -
Processing Result - result result -
Ack Message ok ok ok ok
pquery Item - - - item
pquery Scope - - - scope
pquery Result - - - qresult
Table 4.6: Application Data
A message is a tuple consisting of application data and a unique identier idi:
message(idi;d) (4.1)
The p-assertions can be grouped into two categories: interaction p-assertions and rela-
tionship p-assertions (See Section 2.1.2.2). The former records the act of receiving or
sending a message. Therefore, it is a tuple of the identier of the message it refers to,
and a so-called view, which is either receiver or sender:
ipa(idi;view) (4.2)
The latter records the relationship between interaction p-assertions. For example, a
relationship p-assertion can express the fact that a message was sent in response to
another. To encode this fact, relationship p-assertion contain the message identiers
idi and idj, the relationship rel between these messages, and the application data d to
which the relationship pertains.3
rpa(idi;d;rel;idj) (4.3)
3Depending on the approach used to manage application data, d can be a reference to or a copy of
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In what follows, we make the Data Request, Task Request and Query Request proto-
cols provenance-aware by recording interaction p-assertions and relationship p-assertions
dened in Equations (4.2) and (4.3).
4.3.2 Recording Provenance in the Data Request Protocol
Recall from Section 4.1.1 that the rst use case, Data Request, represents the process
in which the Data Controller requests personal information from the Data Subject.
This process is modelled in the sequence diagram presented in Figure 4.5 showing three
objects: DS, DC, and PS, which are instances of the Data Subject, Data Controller
and Provenance Store actors dened in Section 4.1.1.
The protocol modelled in this sequence diagram is the following: DC requests some
personal information from DS for a given purpose, DS checks the purpose and, if DS
accepts it, then it responds with the requested information. Then, when DC receives
this information, DC acknowledges its receipt. At the same time, both actors record the
p-assertions related to this process by communicating with PS.
4.3.2.1 Messages
In Figure 4.5, the messages exchanged between DS and DC are labelled Mi. These mes-
sages were dened in Section 4.2.3, and therefore are labelled with the same numbers as
in Figure 4.4. For clarity, we repeat the meaning of each message, and indicate which
application data they carry.
Message M4 contains purpose. With this message DC requests personal information from
DS to be used for the indicated purpose. When M4 is received, the purpose is veried
by DS, who responds with message M5 if the stated purpose is accepted. Message M5
contains data, the personal data requested. Upon receipt of this message, DC stores the
data in a local database, and acknowledges the receipt to DS by sending M6.
4.3.2.2 Interaction p-assertions
This protocol is made provenance-aware by recording interaction p-assertions construc-
ted according to Equation (4.2). These assertions are represented in the sequence di-
agram as Ii. In this diagram, assertions I7, I10 and I11 are related to messages M4,
M5 and M6 and sent by DC and stored by PS upon receipt. Turning to assertions I8, I9
and I12, these denote the act of recording interaction p-assertions related to the same
messages from the point of view of DS.Chapter 4 Provenance-Based Auditing Architecture 79
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4.3.2.3 Relationship p-assertions
The relationship p-assertions in this protocol are labelled by Ri. Using these assertions,
the sender of a message records the relationship between two interaction assertions.
Messages R3, R4 and R5 denote the act of recording relationship p-assertion of previous
messages in the Provenance Store.
Since an authentication protocol is executed before message M4 is sent (not shown in
this diagram), relation p-assertion R3 creates a relationship indicating that M4 was sent
in Response To M3, which is the last message of the authentication protocol execution
(again, this message is not shown in this diagram. See Figure 4.4). R4 indicates that
the data contained in M5 was Acquired For the purpose contained in M4. Finally, R5
indicates that M6 was sent in acknowledgement to (in Ack To) M5.
Using the extensions made in this section to the Data Request protocol, we have made
provenance available about the collection of personal information. In the next section,
we will carry out a similar process for the processing of personal information.
4.3.3 Recording Provenance in the Task Request Protocol
The Task Request use case, discussed in Section 4.1.1, represents the protocol in which
the Data Controller delegates the processing of information to the Data Processor.
This process is modelled in the sequence diagram shown in Figure 4.6 containing the
objects DP, DC, and PS, which are instances of Data Processor, Data Controller and
Provenance Store actors.
This protocol is initiated by DC, who sends personal information that DP is requested
to process. After receiving and processing this information, DP sends the result to DC.
Finally, DC acknowledges the receipt of the result.
4.3.3.1 Messages
Again, the messages in Figure 4.6 are labelled Mi. Since we dened these messages in
Section 4.2.3, they have the same labels as in Figure 4.4. For clarity, we repeat the
meaning of each message, and indicate which application data is contained in them.
Message M10 contains process data shown as processData, which is a data set of personal
information to be processed by DP. After this is received, DP processes it using function
task1 that outputs the result. The name of this function is made explicit, because
the type of processing performed on the data is essential for determining whether the
Auditing Requirements were satised. Using message M11, DP informs DC of the result
of the processing. Upon receipt of this message, DC acknowledges its receipt using M12.Chapter 4 Provenance-Based Auditing Architecture 81
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4.3.3.2 Interaction p-assertions
As in the previous protocol, the protocol for this use case is made provenance-aware by
recording interaction p-assertions. Here, assertions I13, I16 and I17 are related to the
act of sending or receiving M10, M11 and M12 by DC. Similarly, assertions I14, I15 and
I18 record the sending or receiving the same messages from the perspective of DP.
4.3.3.3 Relationship p-assertions
Relationship p-assertions R8, R9, R10, R11, R12 and R13 encode the relationships between
the messages described above. We now briey discuss each of them.
R8 indicates that M10 was sent in Response To M9, which is the last message of the
authentication protocol execution (as in Section 4.3.2, messages exchanged during exe-
cution of this protocol). R9 indicates that task1 was Initiated By the purpose contained
in M4, which is part of the Data Request protocol. R10 encodes that processData was
Overlapped With the information contained in M5, which is the information sent by the
DS in the Data Request protocol. R11 indicates that task1 used data contained in M10.
R12 indicates that result was Generated By T1. Finally, R13 encodes that M12 was sent
in acknowledgement to (in Ack To) M11.
By recording these assertions, we can capture the provenance of the processing of per-
sonal information. Thus, the modications we made to Data Request in the previous
section, combined with those made here to Task Request, reveal the provenance of the
entire life cycle of personal data. To query this provenance, we need a new protocol,
called Query Request. This protocol is developed in the next section.
4.3.4 Recording Provenance in the Query Request Protocol
Using the PrIMe methodology, we exposed the provenance in the two main communica-
tion protocols that deal with application data. These protocols were made provenance-
aware in the previous two sections. Now, once the p-assertions are stored in the prove-
nance store, an auditor should be able to access them in order to verify that data pro-
cessing was in compliance with the Auditing Requirements. This process is formalised in
the Query Request protocol. To keep track of the operations that the auditor performs,
this protocol needs to be provenance-aware as well. Without this, the auditor is not
accountable, which would constitute a major weakness of the system.
In this section, we present the sequence diagram related to this use case, which is shown
in Figure 4.7. This sequence diagram contains the objects AU and PS, which are instances
of the actors Auditor and Provenance Store. The process that is modelled by this
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(item) under certain scope (scope).The data item and scope of the relevant provenance
questions were dened in Section 4.2.1. After receiving the query, PS executes it and
returns the result (qresult) to the Auditor. Once the Auditor gets the query result, an
acknowledgement is sent to PS. The qresult can subsequently be used to verify any of
the Auditing Requirements.
4.3.4.1 Messages
In the sequence diagram presented in Figure 4.7 messages are labelled Qi. Message
Q1 contains a provenance query that includes the data item from which provenance is
sought and the scope that denes the context of the provenance query result. Message
Q2 contains the provenance query result (qresult). Finally, message Q3 contains an
acknowledgement of the correct receipt of the provenance query result.
Figure 4.7: Query Request UML Sequence Diagram
4.3.4.2 Interaction p-assertions
The interaction p-assertions corresponding to the messages dened above are labelled
IQi. Note that in the sequence diagram, interaction p-assertions generated by PS are
not shown because they are internally created and recorded by the same entity.
4.3.4.3 Relationship p-assertions
In this protocol, the Auditor creates three relationship assertion, RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3.84 Chapter 4 Provenance-Based Auditing Architecture
Assertion RQ1 indicates that Q1 was sent in Response To M3, which is the last message
of the authentication protocol execution. RQ2 indicates that qresult contained in Q2 was
query Result Of the item and scope contained in Q1. Finally, RQ3 indicates that Q3 was
sent in acknowledgement to (in Ack To) Q2.
Now that we have a mechanism for capturing and accessing provenance, we are a step
closer to answering the provenance questions stated in 4.2.1.
4.4 Answering Provenance Questions
In this section, we query the provenance captured in the protocols that we made prove-
nance-aware in the previous section. Moreover, we demonstrate that the query results
can be represented as a provenance DAG (see Section 2.1.4). Such a DAG indicates
where and how the data was used. Thus, by following the relationships in this DAG,
it is possible to ascertain how a data item was produced. Here, we perform a manual
analysis of several provenance DAGs in an initial attempt to answer the provenance
questions we dened in Section 4.2.1. In the next chapter, we automate this analysis
to achieve one of the main goals of this thesis: the automatic compliance verication of
the principles of DPA discussed in Chapter 3.
In the what follows, we present ve examples of DAGs and the analysis that is carried
out to answer the provenance questions in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. These DAGs
are based on our running example of Section 3.1.1 in which Alice buys medicine from
an on-line pharmacy.
4.4.1 Requirement B, Purpose Compliance
Purpose compliance states that data processing was carried out in accordance with
the purpose for which it was collected. The corresponding provenance question was
presented in Table 4.1. To answer this question, it is necessary to identify the data
used to obtain a processing result. In Figure 4.4 this data is called processData, and is
contained in message M10, which is sent by DC to DP. The data in processData is a subset
of the data collected by DC, i.e. not all the data that was collected is used. However, M10
can contain additional information, such as information collected from a dierent entity
than DC that is necessary for performing the processing. Note that this information
could be personal and, therefore, it should also be audited.
4.4.1.1 Querying
To answer the Purpose Compliance question, the p-assertions related to security (among
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Therefore, a provenance query results in the form of a DAG of the result of a processing
without security operations is extracted. This is achieved by performing a scoped prove-
nance query [98], in which the scope is used to include only the relevant information in a
query result. Thus, in this case, the security functions applied to the exchanged informa-
tion are excluded. To reect this, the provenance query presented in Table 4.1 contains
\result" as data item and \requested and collected data without security operations" as
scope.
To illustrate this process, we focus on the task manage stock, which creates a sales
report in the On-line Sales Scenario. The result of this process is a report which lists
the quantity sold for each product. To audit this process in the context of Alice's data,
we construct a provenance query containing Alice's order (Alice, clomid, 1) as data item
and \requested and collected data without security operations" as scope. The result of
this query is shown in Figure 4.8, which is based on the provenance recorded in Figures
4.5 and 4.6. The piece of data whose provenance is sought is shown on the right, in
this case order. Relationships through which this result was obtained are shown in bold.
The data that was used is identied in the DAG with a yellow oval.
Figure 4.8: Provenance DAG of register without security operations
The provenance query result presented in Figure 4.8 can be encoded using the logical
structure shown in Figure 4.9. In practice, this logical structure, which can be used to
represent both provenance information and provenance query results, can be stored as
an XML document [99]. For the sake of clarity, however, Figure 4.9 does not (strictly)
adhere to the specic XML schema used in [99]. Rather, it depicts the most representa-
tive elements of the provenance DAG in Figure 4.8 and the relations that exist between
them. Figure 4.9 shows the the source (sender) and sink (receiver) of each message
and its contents, and the source (cause) and sink (eect) of each relationship and its
description. For a more technical description of the logical structure used to represent
provenance, we point the reader to [61], specically Figure 3.6 in Section 3.6.3.
Note that tasks are not explicitly represented in the DAG in Figure 4.8. The reason for
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data and the relationships between data. Processes are modelled as a relationship be-
tween the input data and the output data. By so doing, it essentially does not treat
processes as rst-class citizens. This is a drawback in the PASOA model, because in
order to verify the auditing requirements, it is necessary to know which operations were
performed internally on the data by a single actor. We come back to this issue in Chapter
5, where we use the OPM model instead.
Figure 4.9: An alternative representation of the Provenance DAG in Figure 4.8
4.4.1.2 Analysis
To answer the provenance question in Table 4.1, we perform the processing step described
in this table. To do so, we identify which data was used to process Alice's order in the
DAG (yellow oval). This data includes the name, medicine's name and the quantity
sold to the Data Subject who disclosed personal information to the on-line pharmacy.Chapter 4 Provenance-Based Auditing Architecture 87
In this particular case, this data is Alice, clomid, 1. We also identify the purpose of
collection, which is \on-line sales".
This information needs to be compared with an established criterion|in this case the
ICO's Register entry related to the On-line Sales Scenario (Figure 3.2). This register
entry contains the purposes for which data is allowed to be collected and the types of
data classes (See Section 3.2) that can be captured in relation to each purpose. Thus,
we need to verify whether the on-line sales purpose is part of the declared purposes and
whether the data that was used is part of the list of Data Classes. We can see that the
on-line sales purpose is indeed present in the register entry. The list of data classes of
this purpose includes the personal details class (containing the name), and the goods or
services provided class (containing the medicines' names and the quantity sold). Based
on this, we can arm that the part of sales report that used Alice's data was obtained in
accordance to the purpose for which was captured. Thus, the order was in compliance
with Principle 2, i.e. it was processed following Requirement B.
4.4.2 Requirement C, Relevant Information Verication
To answer the provenance question in Table 4.2, it is necessary to identify two types
of data: Used Data, which was identied in the previous section, and Collected Data.
Collected data is the information sent by DS to DC in message M5 as a result of a request
made in message M4.
4.4.2.1 Querying
Again, to answer this question, the p-assertions related to security are not necessary.
Thus, the provenance query presented in Table 4.2 contains \result" as data item and
\requested and collected data without security operations" as scope.
To illustrate this process, we focus on the task that delivers the requested medicine to
the buyer's home in the On-line Sales Scenario (deliver medicine). The result of this
task could be successful delivery or failed delivery. To start the audit, we construct a
provenance query containing this result as data item and \requested and collected data
without security operations" as scope. The provenance query result of this provenance
query is presented in Figure 4.10, in which collected data is represented by a green oval.
4.4.2.2 Analysis
To perform the processing step described in Table 4.2, we need to identify the data used
to deliver Alice's medicine (used data), which is the set Alice, 25 upper st, clomid, 1
(yellow oval), and the data collected from her (collected data), which is the set Alice,88 Chapter 4 Provenance-Based Auditing Architecture
Figure 4.10: Provenance DAG of Successful delivery without security operations
25 upper st, 01-01-75, female, 123456, clomid, 1 (green oval). If we compare both sets,
we can see that more data was collected than was necessary to perform the delivery of
medicine. This means the delivery of medicine task is not in compliance with Principle
3, i.e. it does not follow Requirement C.
It is important to note that we use assumption 8 (Section 3.6) here, which states that
auditing is started after the purpose for which personal data was collected has been
fullled. If this is not the case, auditing might incorrectly conclude that data processing
was not in compliance, since some data items were not yet used. Therefore, in order to
obtain correct results, it is important that such analysis is postponed until after data
processing has terminated.
4.4.3 Requirement F, Anonymity Preservation
To determine whether the Anonymity Preservation requirement was satised, we need
to identify how the data requested from the Data Subject was used (which is contained
in M10). Then, we can verify whether the results derived from this data were properly
anonymised.
4.4.3.1 Querying
To answer the provenance question related to this requirement (presented in Table 4.3),
we can reuse the provenance query result of Requirement B (see Figure 4.8). To do
so, we identify where Alice's information was used. In this case, one of the uses of her
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4.4.3.2 Analysis
As the processing step of Table 4.3 indicates, we need to determine whether information
of a specic individual (in this case, Alice) is present in the result (the sales report).
Now, the ICO's Register entry does not contain a detailed list of data items that are
allowed to appear in a result. However, to be able to automatically verify this require-
ment, we need rules that dene which results tasks are allowed produce. In the next
chapter, we develop a formalism for dening these rules. For simplicity, in this example
we assume that there is a rule that simply states which data items are allowed to appear
in the result. In this case, this rule states that the monthly sales report can only contain
the name of the medicine and the quantity sold.
Now, in our specic scenario, Alice's name is appears in the sales report. As a result, if
another entity (such as the Human Resources Department) has access to this register, it
can deduce that Alice is taking a fertility drug. This information could be used against
her, as we explained in Section 3.1.1. Thus, we can conclude that this data processing
was not in compliance with Principle 5, i.e. it does not follow Requirement F.
4.4.4 Requirement G, Basic Security Characteristics Verication
The Basic Security Characteristics Verication requirement states that all information
that is transported should exhibit the four basic security properties: the condentiality,
integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. The corresponding provenance question
was presented in Table 4.4. Since this is a security requirement, to answer this question
the p-assertions related to security are now required. Thus, the provenance query used
here contains \result" as data item and \requested and collected data with security
operations" as scope. Even though the assertions related to security are not shown
in the corresponding sequence diagrams, we explain how the relationships depicted in
Figure 4.4 can be used to verify Requirement G.
4.4.4.1 Querying
To illustrate this process, we again focus on the manage stock task from the On-line
Sales Scenario. The result of the provenance query (see Table 4.4) in this example is
presented in Figure 4.11. In this gure, encrypted data is represented by an orange
rectangle and plain data by a blue rectangle. The encryption/signing relationship is
labelled encryptedSigned and the verication/decryption relationship is labelled veri-
edDecrypted (both shown in Figure 4.2.3). Therefore, if a provenance DAG contains
the relationships encryptedSigned and veriedDecrypted, data was transported using a
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4.4.4.2 Analysis
In Figure 4.11, the result is represented by cryptoOrder, which is the same as the one
shown in Figure 4.8, but signed and encrypted. If we traverse the graph in the gure, we
can see that cryptoRegister is the result of the encryption/signing of plainOrder, which,
in turn, is the result of processing plainName, plainMedName and plainQuantitySold.
These are results of the verication/decryption of cryptoName, cryptoMedName and
cryptoQuantitySold. That means that the result (order) and the used data (plainName,
plainMedName, plainQuantitySold) were encrypted and signed before being transported
and veried and decrypted after being received. Then, we can conrm that cryptoOrder
was processed in compliance to Principle 7, i.e. it follows Requirement G.
4.4.5 Requirement H, Information Transferred to a Secure Country
The Basic Security Characteristics Verication requirement states that information is
only transmitted through the countries listed as secure by the DPA. Again, to answer the
corresponding provenance question (Table 4.5), the p-assertions related to security are
not necessary. Thus, the provenance query related to this requirement contains \result"
as data item and \requested and collected data without security operations" as scope.
4.4.5.1 Querying
To illustrate this process, we need to focus on the task that transfers information between
systems in dierent countries, which in the On-line Sales Scenario is called transfer
information. The result of such a task could be successful transfer to country X or
failed transfer to country X. Thus, we construct a provenance query with the result of
data processing as data item.
4.4.5.2 Analysis
The result of this provenance query is presented in Figure 4.12. In this gure, we can see
that two items of personal data related to Alice were transferred to an EU country. As
can be seen in the corresponding ICO's Register entry (see Figure 3.2), the pharmacy is
allowed to transfer data only to countries inside of the European Economic Area. Thus,
in this case, Alice's personal information was transferred in compliance to Principle 8,
i.e. it follows Requirement H.
This concludes our discussion of how the provenance captured in Section 4.3 can be
used to answer the provenance questions we stated in Section 4.2. We demonstrated
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Figure 4.12: Provenance DAG of Successful transfer without security operations
was used. In an initial attempt to answer the provenance questions, we performed a
manual analysis of these DAGs. This analysis will be automated in Chapter 5.
4.5 Discussion
Existing work has proposed the use of provenance to audit the quality of information as
well as its use [114, 40, 82].
Philip et al. [114] and Chorley et al. [40] propose the idea of using provenance to create
audit reports related to Evidence-Based Policy Assessment (EBPA). They suggest using
provenance to evaluate the quality and reliability of data, the robustness of an analysis,
and the validity of ndings in an assessment. However, they do not present any analysis
that shows how to use provenance in this specic eld.
Kifor et al. [82] proposes the use of provenance in electronic healthcare record systems.
They also investigate the privacy risk aspects of introducing provenance into healthcare
systems. To decrease this risk, they propose not to store sensitive medical data in the
provenance store, but only references. By doing so, unauthorized users are unable to
link medical data to specic individuals. The described technique is already included
in our work, not only for security reasons but also for scalability. To use provenance
information for making audits is mentioned but not fully discussed. Neither do they
present audit use cases or an analysis of security characteristics.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have developed a Provenance-Based Auditing Architecture that sup-
ports audits of the processing of personal data. This architecture is based on the prin-
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systems that process personal information and, as such, have to follow the rules of a
legislative framework.
To determine which assertions need to be recorded in the Provenance Store to deter-
mine whether processing is in compliance with such a framework, we applied the PrIMe
methodology. PrIMe identies the provenance that needs to be captured in order to
verify the Auditing Requirements. We extended the Data Request and Task Request
protocols dened in Chapter 3 to record and secure this provenance, and introduced
a third one, Query Request. This protocol can be used by an auditor to retrieve the
provenance generated in the rst two protocols.
Finally, we presented a preliminary set of provenance query results, in an initial attempt
to determine whether data processing was in compliance with the Auditing Require-
ments. These query results are represented as DAGs. We also presented an intuitive
manual analysis of these DAGs to determine whether information was processed accord-
ing to these requirements. In so doing, we have shown that provenance, specically in
the form of a DAG, can facilitate audits on the processing of personal data and decide
whether such processing was done in compliance with the DPA regulatory framework.
Now that we have an architecture that captures the necessary provenance, as well as a
means to query this provenance, we can proceed to the second main contribution of this
thesis: the automatic verication of the Auditing Requirements. This the subject of the
next chapter.Chapter 5
Compliance Framework
In the previous chapter, we developed the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture that
captures and records provenance of the operations applied to personal information. In
this chapter, we use this provenance to achieve the second main contribution of this
thesis: a suite of algorithms that automatically veries whether data processing was
performed in compliance with the Auditing Requirements dened in Chapter 3.4.
To achieve this, we need to make two additional augmentations to the architecture. First,
not only provenance should be available in a machine-readable format (i.e. a provenance
DAG), but also the rules data processing needs to adhere to. These rules specify which
data can be used and the legal operations that can be applied to it. As we discussed in
Chapter 3.2, within the DPA framework these rules are described in the ICO's Register.
Thus, to allow for automatic verication of these rules, our rst step is to transform
these into a machine-readable format as well. The result is a novel representation of
processing rules using DAGs. While doing this, we will see that the ICO's Register is
incomplete: we identify requirements that need to be satised, which are not explicitly
stated in this register. We already encountered one example of this in Section 4.4 where
we attempted to manually verify compliance of Requirement F, Anonymity Preservation.
Specically, we demonstrated that an explicit description of the data types and classes
that are allowed to be present in a result were missing. Thus, in this chapter, we extend
these rules to ensure that they fully capture the intent of the DPA.
The second augmentation needs to be made in the provenance DAGs. In the previous
chapter, these DAGs expressed the data as nodes, and the processes as relations (rela-
tionship p-assertions to be more precise). However, by doing this, processes are treated
as \second-class citizens", despite the fact that they are an essential aspect of a datum's
provenance. Thus, to reect their true importance, we adopt the OPM model [104],
in which provenance is also represented as a DAG that contains specic elements to
dierentiate between artifacts (pieces of data) and processes (actions).
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After making these two modications, we develop the primary contribution of this chap-
ter: the Compliance Framework. This framework combines the novel representation of
processing rules mentioned above and a representation of provenance in the OPM model
with a suite of algorithms for automatic verication of the Auditing Requirements.
Thus, in summary, the remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. First, in Sec-
tion 5.1, we present the denitions and notation that are used throughout this chapter.
Then, in Section 5.2, we present our novel representation of processing rules. Next, in
Section 5.3, we present the provenance DAG representation of the operations applied to
personal information within the Open Provenance Model. Given this rule representa-
tion and provenance DAGs, in Section 5.4, we develop a set of algorithms that perform
the automatic verication of the Auditing Requirements. This verication is made by
comparing the processing rules against the provenance DAG representation. We illus-
trate how this verication is performed in our running example of the On-line Pharmacy
Scenario (Section 3.1). Finally, in Section 5.5 we discuss the contributions made in this
chapter in the context of existing work, and conclude in Section 5.6.
5.1 Preliminaries
Before presenting the Compliance Framework, we rst show some denitions and nota-
tion that are used throughout this chapter. Specically, we introduce the purposes (pi),
which are the goals for which a set of data was collected, the tasks (ti), which are the
processes applied to data. Furthermore, we represent collected data by DAi, processed
data by DUi, and processing results by Ri. Below, we describe these concepts in further
detail.
Let P be the universal set of purposes. Then, there are two dierent types of purposes,
Collection Purposes and Processing Purposes, which are dened as follows:
Denition 5.1 (Collection Purposes). A set of purposes for which the data is to be
collected. This set is a subset of P.
Denition 5.2 (Processing Purposes). A set of purposes for which the data is to be
processed. This set is a subset of P.
Going back to the On-line Sales Scenario, a collection purpose might be \on-line sales".
An example of a processing purpose is \creating sales reports".
Furthermore, let T be the universal set of tasks. Then, we can dene the concept of a
set of tasks as:
Denition 5.3 (Set of Tasks). A set of tasks is a set of operations that were applied
to data. This set is de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T = ft1;t2;:::;tng
where n > 0 and T  T .
Then, a data type is dened as a formal description of a set of values and the basic
operations that can be applied on them. Example of data types are \string", \integer"
and \boolean". A data class is an attribute of an object with constraints for being a
member of the class. Examples of classes are \name", \address" and \gender". Finally,
a data instance is dened as an occurrence of an object with a data type which belongs
to a certain class. For example, \Alice" is an instance of the data type \string" and
belongs to the class \name".
Next, if we consider Types as a set containing all data types, Instances as a multiset
containing all data instances and Classes as a set containing all data classes, we can
express the following:
Denition 5.4 (Requested Data Classes). Requested Data Classes are a set composed
of ordered pairs (x;y), where x is a data class and y is the data type of such a class,
representing the data classes that are requested from a user. This set is dened as
follows:
CQ = f(class1;type1);(class2;type2);:::;(classn;typen)g
where n > 0, classi 2 Classes and typei 2 Types for 1  i  n
Denition 5.5 (Used Data Classes). Used Data Classes are a set containing ordered
pairs (x;y), where x is a data class and y is the data type of such a class, representing
the data classes that are used to perform a task. This set is dened as follows,
CU = f(class1;type1);(class2;type2);:::;(classn;typen)g
where n > 0, classi 2 Classes and typei 2 Types for 1  i  n
Denition 5.6 (Generated Data Classes). Generated Data Classes are a set composed
of ordered pairs (x;y), where x is a data class and y is the data type of such a class,
representing the data classes that are the result of a processing. This set is dened as
follows,
CG = f(class1;type1);(class2;type2);:::;(classn;typen)g
where n > 0, and for 1  i  n, classi 2 Classes and typei 2 Types
In practice, the names of the tasks, the names of the data classes and the data types
correspond to the names of the processes, the names of the data attributes and the data98 Chapter 5 Compliance Framework
types used at execution time, respectively. These names are created by system designers
and should be made explicit when a system is made provenance aware. The entity who
creates the processing rules should also be notied of these names, so it can use these
in the corresponding processing rules.
The three previous denitions are used to dene the processing rules. Since these rules
are created at design time, they refer to data classes and data types, not actual data.
In contrast, the three denitions that follow describe the actual data.
Denition 5.7 (Collected Data Instances). Collected Data Instances are a multiset of
data instances that are collected for Collection Purpose p (Denition 5.1). Collected
Data Instances is a multiset, because instances can occur multiple times. For example
the integer `25' can occur as an age as well as a quantity. This set is dened as follows,
D
p
A = fdA1;dA2;:::;dAng
where n > 0, DC  Instances and p 2 P.
Denition 5.8 (Generated Data Instances). Generated Data Instances are a multiset
of data instances are the result of a processing, and also known as processing results.
This set is dened as follows:
R = fr1;r2;:::;rng
where n > 0 and R  Instances.
Denition 5.9 (Used Data Instances). Used Data Instances are a multiset of data
instances that are used to perform a task, and are also known as input data. This
multiset can contain sets of collected data instances (Denition 5.7) or sets of generated
data instances (Denition 5.8), and is dened as follows:
DU = fdU1;dU2;:::;dUng
where n > 0 and DU  Instances.
The multisets of data instances dened above contain collected or used instances of
data. These instances have a class and type. Thus, it is possible to associate the
elements of Instances with a class, which is an element of Classes, and with a type, which
is an element of Types. As a result, an element e of a multiset of data instances is dened
as e  (d;cl;ty), where d 2 Instances, cl 2 Classes and ty 2 Types. We dene the accessors
as instance(e) = d, class(e) = cl and type(e) = ty.
Generated Data Instances contain results of processing which can be reused by dierent
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of Collected Data Instances and Generated Data Instances, or just Collected Data In-
stances. Later, in Section 5.4.1.3, we use this distinction to determine whether Generated
Data Instances were correctly reused.
Finally, there exist relationships between the sets and multisets from Denitions 5.4, 5.5,
5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9. For example, such a relationship can represent that a multiset of
Collected Data Instances was acquired for set of Collection Purposes. These relationships
are identied by labels. If Rel is the universal set of relationship labels, then we derive
the next denition.
Denition 5.10 (Relationship Labels). Relationship labels identify relationships be-
tween elements of data processing. This set is dened as follows,
Rel = fl1;l2;:::;lng
where n > 0 and Rel  Rel .
Using these denitions, we now present each component of the Compliance Framework in
more detail. First, we focus on the Usage Rules Denition component, which represents
the rules within our framework.
5.2 Usage Rules Denition
The Usage Rules Denition (URD) is a novel graph-based representation of a set of
rules that can be veried within our Compliance Framework. These rules express which
operations an application is allowed to perform on personal information, and are derived
from the ICO's Register (see Section 3.2). In more detail, rules within the URD specify
the conditions under which processing is valid over a set of data classes.
To represent the URD, we formally dene the concept of a rule inspired by the ICO's
Register, which contains the purposes for collection and the data classes to collect. Each
rule represents the way in which a set of requested data classes (CQ) can be used, i.e.
which tasks can use a certain set of data classes to accomplish which purpose (p). To
make this component and its corresponding analysis stage more ne-grained, we add
some additional elements. These are: tasks to be performed (t) to accomplish purposes,
data classes to be used (CU) and data classes to be generated (CG) by such tasks. The
rule denition is presented below:
Denition 5.11 (Processing Rule).
Rule =


p;C0
Q;CUi;ti;CGi

where p 2 P, C0
Q  CQ, CUi  CU,ti  T , CGi  CG100 Chapter 5 Compliance Framework
This rule expresses that, within the context of a collection purpose p, certain data classes
and types can be requested. The requested set of data classes and types (C0
Q) is then
divided into sets of used data classes (CUi) that are used by the corresponding tasks ti
to produce the corresponding set of generated data classes (CGi).
By including tasks, used data and generated data classes elements, these rules express in
a more detailed way how information should be processed, compared to the rules in the
ICO's Register. This enables the framework to verify the Auditing Requirements. For
example, in the On-line Sales Scenario, we can dene a processing rule for the \manage
stock" task. This rule indicates that the set of personal information CQ is collected
based on the purpose \on-line sales". Then, CU, which is a subset of CQ, can be used
by the task \manage stock" to obtain the set CG.
manageStock = h
p = fon-line salesg;
CQ = f(name;string);(address;string);
(medicineName;string);(quantity;integer)g;
CU = f(medicineName;string);(quantity;integer)g;
t = fmanage stockg;
CG = f(medicineName;string);(quantity;integer)gi
By exposing the tasks' names, the data classes and the data types that each Data
Controller is allowed to use in the processing of data, the analysis of provenance query
results (such as the ones presented in Section 4.4) can be simplied. The URD combines
multiple of these processing rules into a single formalism.
In more detail, the Usage Rules Denition is a set of processing rules represented by
an edge-labelled directed acyclic graph (DAG) called G  that is depicted in Figure 5.1.
In this gure, the elements of G  are represented by special symbols: purposes are
represented by double-line rounded rectangles, tasks by squares, set of data classes by
ovals and the set of generated data classes by bold-line ovals. These components are
connected by labelled arrows indicating the relationships that exist among them. The
labels of relationships are actions, which are stated in the present tense, since they
express the fact that these actions are expected to always happen. More formally the
Usage Rules Denition Graph G  is dened as:
Denition 5.12 (Usage Rules Denition Graph). Let us consider a set of purposes P , a
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data classes CG , and a set of relationship's names Rel  = fisAcquiredfor;overlapsWith;
isInitiatedBy;uses;isGeneratedByg.
A Usage Rules Denition Graph G  = (V ;E ;Rel ) is then a directed acyclic graph,
where V   P [CQ  [CU  [T [CG ;E   (CQ  P isAcquiredfor)[(CU  CQ  
overlapsWith)[(T CU  uses)[(T P isInitiatedBy)[(CG  T isGeneratedBy).
G  contains a set of purposes (P ) which users' data (represented as sets of requested
data classes CQ) is acquired for. Sets of used data classes (CU) overlap with a set
of requested data, i.e. the requested data is divided in subsets of used data. Thus, a
set of tasks (T ) uses sets of used data classes to generate results, which we call sets
of generated data classes. This way, each task can only use and produce the indicated
set of data classes. Finally, to accomplish the initially stated purpose, tasks (T ) are
initiated by such a purpose.
Figure 5.1: Usage Rules Denition Graph G 
The URD can contain more than one purpose. Each purpose has a set of data associated
with it that is requested in order to achieve it. The set of requested data is divided into
multiple subsets, each of which is used by a task to produce a result. It is important
to note that the union of all the used data sets should be equal to the requested data
set, i.e. all the data that is requested should be used (Requirement C, see Section 3.4.3),
although, more be requested than needed. Also note that an element of the set of
requested data classes can be used in more than one set of used data classes. Below, the102 Chapter 5 Compliance Framework
Usage Rules Denition Graph edges (representing relations between data and tasks) are
formally dened.
Let G  = (V ;E ;Rel ) be a Usage Rules Denition Graph, CG be a set of generated
data classes, t be a task in T , CUi be a set of used data classes, CQ be a set of requested
data classes, and p be a purpose in P .
Denition 5.13 (Result is generated by Task). A set of generated data classes CG is
generated by task t 2 T  if there exists (CG;t;isGeneratedBy) 2 E .
Denition 5.14 (Task uses Used Data Classes). Task t uses a set of used data classes
CU 2 CU  if there exists (t;CU;uses) 2 E .
Denition 5.15 (Task is initiated by Purpose). Task t is initiated by purpose p 2 P 
if there exists (t;p;isInitiatedBy) 2 E .
Denition 5.16 (Used Data overlaps with Requested Data). A set of Used Data Classes
CU overlaps with a set of requested data classes CQ 2 CQ  if there exists (CU;CQ
overlapsWith) 2 E .
Denition 5.17 (Requested Data is acquired for Purpose). A set of requested data
classes CQ is acquired for Purpose p 2 P  if there exists (CQ;p;isAcquiredFor) 2 E .
In summary, by following the arrows in Figure 5.1, Denition 5.13 indicates that a set
of generated data classes CG is generated by a task t; Denition 5.15 indicates that a
task t is initiated by a purpose p; Denition 5.14 indicates that a task t uses the set
of data classes CUi; Denition 5.16 indicates that set of used data classes CUi overlaps
with a set of requested data classes CQ and Denition 5.17 indicates that the set of
requested data classes CQ is acquired for a set of purposes P. As the Usage Rules
Denition Graph denes how the data should be used (which is done at design time), it
only contains sets of data classes not actual data.
Now that we have dened the nodes (data classes and tasks) and the edges (the relation-
ships dened in Denitions 5.13 to 5.17), we now dene what constitutes a valid Usage
Rules Denition Graph.
Property 1 (Well-Formed Usage Rules Denition Graph). Let G  be a Usage Rules
Denition Graph. G  is a Well-Formed Usage Rules Denition Graph if and only if
a) For any CG  CG  there exist one and only one t 2 T , such that, CG is generated
by t.
b) For any t 2 T  there exists one and only one p 2 P  and one and only one CUi  CU ,
such that t is initiated by purpose p and t uses a set of data classes CUi.
c) For any CUi  CU , there exist one and only one CQ  CQ  such that CUi overlaps
with a set of data classes CQ and
S
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d) For any CQ  CQ  there exist one and only one p 2 P  such that CQ is acquired for
a purposes p.
Property 1 indicates that a well-formed Usage Rule Denition Graph can contain more
than one set of generated data classes CG, which are generated by one and only one task
t. Such a task is initiated by one and only one purpose p and uses one and only one
set of data classes CUi. Each CUi is overlapped by one and only one CQ. At the same
time, all the elements that are collected should be used, therefore, the union of all the
CUi should be equal to CQ (Property 1.c). Finally, CQ is acquired for one and only one
purpose p.
It is important to note that the algorithms we develop in Section 5.4 are only guaranteed
to produce correct results on well-formed Usage Rule Denition Graphs.
To illustrate the URD, we present an example. For continuity, this example is based on
our running example of the On-line Sales Scenario, which was presented in Section 3.1.1.
Throughout this chapter, we use the Compliance Framework to verify whether Alice's
personal information was used by the pharmacy in accordance to the usage rules. In
this analysis, we focus on two tasks deliver medicine and manage stock that are part
of the main purpose: on-line sales. Figure 5.2 presents the Usage Rules Denition
related to the \on-line sales" purpose. As previously described, this component contains
data classes and their corresponding data types. Figure 5.2 shows that to accomplish the
on-line sales purpose the pharmacy collects the name of a person, address, medicine's
name, and its quantity. To conduct the deliver medicine task the pharmacy needs
the name of a person, address, the medicine's name to be delivered and its quantity,
and for the manage stock task it just needs the medicine's name and its quantity. Both
tasks are initiated by the same initial purpose, on-line sales, and produce a delivery
state and a sales report, respectively.
Next, we present the second component of the Compliance Framework, the Processing
View. In contrast to the Usage Rule Denition, the Processing View represents the
actual operations performed on personal data.
5.3 Processing View
In the previous section, we created the Usage Rules Denition, a novel representation
of rules that species which operations are allowed to be performed on personal data.
To verify whether data processing was in compliance with the Auditing Requirements,
we also need to know the operations were actually performed, and on which data. In
the previous chapter, we represented the latter as nodes, and the former as edges in
provenance DAGs. However, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, this does
not do justice to the importance of the operations, since these form an important part104 Chapter 5 Compliance Framework
Figure 5.2: On-line Sales Example - Usage Rules Denition
of the provenance of data. Furthermore, upgrading operations from edges to nodes
simplies the verication process we perform in the next section. In light of this, we
choose to represent provenance using the Open Provenance Model [104]. By doing so,
we develop the second component of the Compliance Framework, the Processing View.
In more detail, the Processing View represents a provenance graph captured at execution
time that contains information concerning past processing of the Data Subject's data.
The Processing View is an edge-labelled directed acyclic graph called GW that is very
similar to the provenance graphs presented in Section 4.4. However, in contrast to these
provenance graphs, the Processing View explicitly represents the task that was executed
to obtain a result (as a node in the graph instead of an edge, i.e. relationship).
The Processing View presented in Figure 5.3 represents the life cycle of general data
processing. In this view, nodes represent sets of data instances and the operations per-
formed on them, and edges represent relations that exist between sets of data instances
and operations (usage or result), or between two sets data instances (e.g. subset of).
In Figure 5.3, the labels of the relationships are presented in past tense expressing theChapter 5 Compliance Framework 105
fact that these actions happened in the past. Accordingly, the life cycle began when an
application requested a multiset of data from a user declaring the purpose for which such
a set was acquired (collection purpose). After checking the application purpose, the
user sent the requested multiset of data instances (collected data instances). The goal of
the application was to achieve the collection purpose. As a consequence, a task was ini-
tiated by the related processing purpose. Such a task used a multiset of data instances
that overlapped with a multiset of used data instances. Note that the task could
have used the previous collected multiset of data instances or a subset of it. Later, the
task was executed with the used data instances as input and generated results. These
results could have been reused in the execution of a new task to appear as collected data
instances.
For the sake of clarity, Figure 5.3 shows a single multiset of data instances collected
from a single entity (DA). However, in real applications more than one multiset of data
instances can be collected from dierent entities generating a graph that contains all
these sets of data instances. This issue is discussed in detail in Section 5.4.1.
In Figure 5.3, the nodes of the Processing View are represented by special symbols:
purposes are represented by double-line ovals, tasks by squares, multisets of collected
data instances by ovals and multisets of processed data instances by bold-line ovals.
These elements are connected by labelled arrows with the name of the relationships that
exist between them.
Using these denitions, the Processing View Graph GW can be dened as:
Denition 5.18 (Processing View Graph). Let us consider a set of purposes PW, a
set of tasks TW, a multiset of collected data instances DAW, a multiset of used data
instances DUW, a multiset of results RW and a set of relationship's names RelW =
fwasInitiatedBy;used;overlappedWith;wasGeneratedBy;wasAcquiredFor;containedg.
A Processing View Graph GW = (VW;EW;RelW) is a directed acyclic graph, where
VW  PW [ TW [ DAW [ DUW [ RW, EW  (RW  TW  wasGeneratedBy) [ (TW 
PW wasInitiatedBy)[(TW DUW used)[(DAW DCW overlappedWith)[(DUW 
RW  overlappedWith) [ (DAW  PW  wasAcquiredFor).
Using all the concepts developed above, the edges (representing relations between data
instances and processes, and among data instances themselves) of a Processing View
Graph can now be formally dened. These edges mirror those dened in Section 5.2.
Let GW be a Processing View Graph, R be a multiset of results in RW, t be a task in
TW, DUi be a multiset of used data instances, and DA be a multiset of collected data
instances.
Denition 5.19 (Result was generated by Task). R was generated by task t 2 TW if
there exists (R;t;wasGeneratedBy) 2 EW.106 Chapter 5 Compliance Framework
Figure 5.3: Processing View Graph GW
Denition 5.20 (Task was initiated by Purpose). Task t was initiated by purpose
p 2 PW if there exists (t;p;wasInitiatedBy) 2 EW.
Denition 5.21 (Task used Used Data). Task t used a multiset of used data instances
DUi 2 DUW if there exists (t;DU;used) 2 EW.
Denition 5.22 (Used Data overlapped with Collected Data). A multiset of used data
instances DUi overlapped with a subset of collected data instances DA 2 DAW if there
exists (DUi;DA;overlappedWith) 2 EW.
Denition 5.23 (Used Data overlapped with a subset of Results). A multiset of used
data instances DUi overlapped with a subset of generated data instances R0 2 RW if
there exists (DUi;R0;overlappedWith) 2 EW
1.
1The relationship overlappedWith is used in Denition 5.23 to indicate that one or more elements of
DUi can appear one or more times in R
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Denition 5.24 (Collected Data was acquired for Purpose). A multiset of collected
data instances DA was acquired for a set of purposes P 2 PW if there exists (DA;P;
wasAcquiredFor) 2 EW.
In summary, by following the arrows in Figure 5.3, Denition 5.19 indicates that a
multiset of results R was generated by a task t; Denition 5.20 indicates that a task t
was initiated by a purpose p; Denition 5.21 indicates that a task t used the multiset
of data instances DUi in its execution; Denition 5.22 indicates that multiset of used data
instances DUi overlapped with a subset of collected data instances DA and Denition
5.23 indicates that the multiset of used data instances DUi overlapped with a subset
of generated data instances R0. Finally, Denition 5.24 indicates that the multiset of
data instances DA was acquired for accomplishing a set of purposes P.
Similar to Section 5.2, we can use these denitions to dene the property of well-
formedness of a Processing View Graph:
Property 2 (Well-Formed Processing View Graph). Let GW be a Processing View
Graph. GW is a Well-Formed Processing View Graph if and only if,
a) For any R 2 RW there exist one and only one ti 2 TW, such that, R was generated
by t.
b) For any t 2 TW there exists one and only one p 2 PW and one and only one DUi 2
DUW, such that, t was initiated by purpose p and t used a multiset of data instances
DUi.
c) For any DUi 2 DUW there exist one or more DA 2 DAW and one or more R0 2 RW,
such that, DUi overlapped with a subset of collected data instances DA and DUi
overlapped with a subset of generated data instances R0.
d) For any DA 2 DAW there exist one or more p 2 PW, such that, DA was acquired for
a purpose p.
Property 2 indicates that a well-formed Processing View Graph can contain more than
one collection purpose pi for which a multiset of data instances is captured. The multiset
of collected data (DA) is divided in dierent subsets (DUi), each of which is used by one
and only one task t to produce one and only one set of results R. Tasks are initiated by
one purpose that is contained in the set of collection purposes. Note that elements of
the multiset of collected data can be used in more than one multiset of used data. It is
also important to mention that results can be reused and, therefore, be part of multisets
of used data.
It is important to note that the algorithms we develop in Section 5.4 are only guaranteed
to produce correct results on well-formed Processing View Graphs.108 Chapter 5 Compliance Framework
To illustrate the operation of this framework component, Figure 5.4 presents the Pro-
cessing View related to the processing of Alice's personal information. There, we can
see that Alice's personal information was collected for the on-line sales purpose. The
set of data that was collected from her contains name, address, medicine's name and
quantity. This data is subsequently used by two tasks: deliver medicine and manage
stock, which use a subset of the collected information. As explained previously, the
Processing View contains instances of data together with their class and type. This can
be seen in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: On-line Sales Example - Processing View
Next, we present the nal component of the Compliance Framework, the Verication
Algorithms. These algorithms analyse the Processing View to verify the compliance of
the information processing with the Usage Rules Denition.
5.4 Verication Algorithms
Now that we have the Usage Rules Denition (a machine readable representation of
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data was used), we can develop algorithms to automatically verify that processing was
performed in accordance with the Auditing Requirements.
These algorithms compare past processing, described in the Processing View, against the
expected processing, represented by the Usage Rules Denition. To do this, provenance
query results related to each audit requirement are extracted from the Processing View
in the form of a subgraph. These subgraphs are obtained using the corresponding
provenance queries explained in the tables presented in Section 4.2. Then, the data and
the relationships of such these subgraphs are compared with the Usage Rules Denition.
If these match we can conclude that the Auditing Requirements were satised.
In this section, we shall discuss each of these algorithms in turn. Specically, for each
Auditing Requirement described in Section 3.4, we develop one or more verication
algorithms. Thus this Section is divided as follows:
 Section 5.4.1 discusses Requirement B: Purpose Compliance.
 Section 5.4.2 discusses Requirement C: Relevant Information Verication.
 Section 5.4.3 discusses Requirement F: Anonymity Preservation.
 Section 5.4.4 discusses Requirement G: Basic Security Characteristics Verication
 Section 5.4.5 discusses Requirement H: Information Transferred to a Secure Coun-
try.
5.4.1 Requirement B: Purpose Compliance
This requirement states that when performing a task, only the data that is strictly
necessary to accomplish its initial stated purpose can be used. The verication of this
requirement involves checking whether the correct class and type of data was used,
whether data was used to accomplish the stated valid purposes and, if data is reused,
whether processing was performed according to the stated purposes. From this, we
derive three subrequirements which will be discussed in upcoming subsections: Used
Data Compliance (B1), Purposes Validation (B2) and Reusing Results (B3). In what
follows, we develop algorithms for verifying each subrequirement individually.
5.4.1.1 Subrequirement B1: Used Data Compliance
To verify the rst subrequirement, Used Data Compliance, we need to check that the
class and type of data used match those specied by the task, and that the purpose
for which the task was initiated was correct. We also verify that the purpose and the
task occur in the corresponding Usage Rules Denition. To do this, we focus on the110 Chapter 5 Compliance Framework
provenance of the result, which is a subgraph of the Processing View Graph, containing
the ancestors of the node that represents the processing result. Specically, we focus on
the task that generated this result, the data this task used and the purpose for which
the task was initiated. This subgraph, denoted with the symbol B1 is called the Used
Data Compliance Subgraph. This subgraph is dened below.
Denition 5.25 (Used Data Compliance Subgraph, B1(GW;ti)). A Used Data Com-
pliance Subgraph is a subgraph of a well-formed Processing View Graph GW for task
ti 2 GW, such that:
VB1 = fpi;DUi;tig
EB1 = f(ti;pi;wasInitiatedBy);(ti;DUi;used)g
where pi 2 PW;ti 2 TW;DUi 2 DUW
EB1  EW; and 0 < i  n:
The general structure of a Used Data Compliance Subgraph B1(GW;ti) is presented in
Figure 5.5. This structure encodes that a task ti used a multiset of Used Data Instances
DUi, and was initiated by the purpose pi. Based on this, we can derive the following
property of B1:
Figure 5.5: Subgraph B1 of GW
Property 3 (Well-Formed Set of Tasks). Let T be set of tasks. T is well-formed in B1
if, for all t 2 T Property 2.b holds.
At this point, we have extracted the required provenance information from the Pro-
cessing View Graph in the form of the subgraph B1. Now, we need to verify that the
information processing was performed in accordance with the Usage Rules Denition
Graph G , i.e. we need to compare the nodes and the relationships' names of B1 against
the ones stated in G .
By analysing B1 against G , we can see that the set of nodes VB1 contains instances of
data, while the set of nodes V  of G  contains classes and types of data. Similarly, the
set of edges, EB1 contains relationships expressed in the past tense whilst E  contains
relationships expressed in the present tense (see De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The class and type of each instance created at execution time are collected at the same
time as the provenance information and obtained using the accessors class and type.
Thus, for each used data item present in VB1 it is necessary to compare its class and
type against the ones that appear in V . This comparison is straightforward in the case
of purposes and tasks.
For the edges, we dene the function match(past;present) that given a relationship's
name in past tense (contained in B1) and another one in present tense (the one that
should be present in G ) returns true if both names are equivalent or false if not.
All the characteristics that B1 needs to exhibit to be in compliance with the Used Data
Compliance subrequirement are summarised in the next property.
Property 4 (Data Processed According to a Valid Purpose). Let B1 be the subgraph
dened in Denition 5.25, G  be a Usage Rules Denition Graph, CUj 2 G  a set of
used data classes, pj 2 G  a purpose and tj 2 G  a task. DUi 2 B1 was processed by
ti 2 B1 according to a valid purpose pi 2 B1 if
a) pi = pj,
b) ti = tj,
c) if for all x 2 DUi, there exists one and only one pair (cl;ty) 2 CUj such that class(x) =
cl and type(x) = ty and,
d) if for all x 2 RelB1, there exists one and only one y 2 Rel  such that match(x;y) =
true.
Therefore, if Property 4 holds in subgraph B1 of a Usage Rules Denition Graph G ,
we state that the processing result was obtained in compliance with the Used Data
Compliance subrequirement. Algorithm 1 presents the verication process of Property
4.
The following example illustrates how the Used Data Compliance Subrequirement can
be veried in the On-line Sales Scenario.
Example 5.1 (Used Data Compliance Subrequirement Example). First, we extract
the subgraph B1(GW;t1) from the Processing View, which is related to the deliver
medicine task, and is shown at the right of Figure 5.6. The left panel of the same gure
shows the portion of the Usage Rules denition that contains the rules related to the
deliver medicine task.
Using Algorithm 1, we check whether data was processed according to a valid purpose. We
can see that the purpose and the task contained in B1 and G  are the same. Therefore,
the purpose and the task are valid. Then, we check the labels of the edges. We can see
that all the past tense labels contained in B1 have their present tense equivalent in G .112 Chapter 5 Compliance Framework
Algorithm 1 Data Processed According to a Valid Purpose
Input: G  = fV ;E ;Rel g;B1(GW;ti) = fVB1;EB1;RelB1g
Output: 1 if graph B1 is in compliance with the Used Data Compliance subrequire-
ment or -1, -2, -3, -4 if it is not.
pi 2 VB1;ti 2 VB1;DUi 2 VB1;CUj 2 V 
if pi 2 V  then
if ti 2 V  then
for each x 2 RelB1 and y 2 Rel  do
if not(match(x;y)) then
return -1 . Label not matched
end if
end for
for each x 2 DUi do
if (class(x);type(x)) = 2 CUj then
return -2 . Type not matched
end if
end for
else
return -3 . Not registered task
end if
else
return -4 . Not registered purpose
end if
return 1 . Compliance
Finally, we check that the classes and types of instances of the used data set contained
in B1 correspond to the classes and types present in G .
G  contains the set ((name, string), (address, string), (medicine, string),
(quantity, integer)), each element of which matches with the class and type of the
instances contained in B1. Therefore, we can conclude the data contained in DUi was
processed by the deliver medicine task according to purpose p1 and in compliance with
the Used Data Compliance Subrequirement.
In the case of the manage stock task, we extract the subgraph B1(GW;t2), which is
presented in Figure 5.7. In that subgraph, the purpose and the task are valid, as well as
the labels of the edges. The Usage Rules Denition shows that the task manage stock
should use the set (medicine, string), (quantity, integer). However, the Pro-
cessing View depicts that this task used an extra element: (name, string). Therefore,
the processing presented in Figure 5.7 does not satisfy the Used Data Compliance Sub-
requirement since it is using more data than stated in the processing rules.
5.4.1.2 Subrequirement B2: Purposes Validation
The second subrequirement of the Purpose Compliance Requirement is Purposes Val-
idation, which states that the processing purposes of a set of data were in accordanceChapter 5 Compliance Framework 113
Figure 5.6: Used Data Compliance Verication Example: Task 1
Figure 5.7: Used Data Compliance Verication Example: Task 2
with the collection purposes.
To verify this requirement, we start by extracting a subgraph from a Processing View
Graph, which contains a set of tasks related to one set of collected data. Specically,
we focus on the purposes from which such tasks were initiated and the purposes from
which the collected data was acquired. This is expressed as a subgraph B2, which is
called Purposes Validation subgraph, and is dened as:
Denition 5.26 (Purposes Validation Subgraph, B2(GW;ti)). Given a task ti, a Pur-
poses Validation Subgraph is a subgraph of a well-formed Processing View Graph GW,114 Chapter 5 Compliance Framework
such that:
VB2 = fpi;DA;DUi;ti;p0
ig
EB2 = f(ti;p0
i;wasInitiatedBy);(ti;DUi;used);(DUi;DA;overlappedWith);
(DA;pi;wasAcquiredFor)g
where pi;p0
i 2 PW;ti 2 TW;DUi 2 DW;DA 2 DW;
EB2  EW and 0 < i  n
The general structure of the Purposes Validation Subgraph B2(GW;ti) is presented in
Figure 5.8, which shows the provenance graph of all the tasks performed over one set
of collected data. In this graph, the execution of a task ti was initiated by a purpose
p0
i using the data DU. At the same time, the set of Used Data DU is a subset of the
Collected Data DA that was acquired for the purpose pi.
Here, we are analysing the purposes related to the collection and processing of one set
of data. However, more than one set of data can be collected from dierent entities.
Therefore, in the verication of this subrequirement, all the sets of collected data should
be checked. For clarity, in what follows we focus on a single set.
Before we introduce the verication algorithm, we rst dene the well-formedness prop-
erty that needs to hold in order for the algorithm to produce meaningful results.
Property 5 (Well-formed Multiset of Collected Data). Let DA be a multiset of collected
data. DA is well-formed in B2 if, for any DA, Property 2.d holds.
In addition to Property 5, subgraph B2 also exhibits Property 3, because B2 contains
a well-formed set of tasks T, since for any t 2 T was initiated by purpose p0. Such a p0
is a Processing Purpose. Thus, as can be seen in Figure 5.8, the set P0 containing all
purposes p0
i is the set of Processing Purposes (Denition 5.2). According to Property 5,
if B2 contains a well-formed multiset of collected data DA, this data was acquired for
purposes p1;p2;:::;pn, which are Collection Purposes. Hence, the set P containing all pi
is the set of Collection Purposes (Denition 5.1).
After both sets of purposes have been extracted, it is possible to check whether there
exist some relations between them. Here, we dene this relation as the subset operation,
as can be seen in the next property.
Property 6 (Collection and processing justied by the same purposes). Let P0 be
the set of Processing Purposes in B2 and P be the set of Collection Purposes in B2.
Collection and processing are justied by the same purpose if P0  P
Finally, it is necessary to check that both sets contain valid purposes, i.e. they are
contained in the Usage Rules Denition Graph. Therefore, we derive the next property:Chapter 5 Compliance Framework 115
Figure 5.8: Subgraph B2 of GW
Property 7 (Validity of processing and collection purposes). Let V  be the nodes of
the Usage Rules Denition Graph G , let P0 be the set of processing purposes and P
be the set of collection purposes extracted from B2. The set of processing purposes and
the set of collection purposes are valid if:
P0  V  and P  V 
Therefore, when Properties 6 and 7 hold in subgraph B2 of a Usage Rules Denition
Graph G , we can say that subgraph B2 is in compliance with the Purposes Validation
subrequirement. The comparison process explained above is formalised in Algorithm 2.
The following example illustrates the process of verifying the Purposes Validation Sub-
requirement in the On-line Sales Scenario.116 Chapter 5 Compliance Framework
Algorithm 2 Purposes Validation
Input: G  = fV ;E ;Rel g;B2(GW;ti) = fVB2;EB2;RelB2g
Output: 1 if B2 is in compliance with the Purposes Validation Subrequirement, -2 or
-1 otherwise.
P0 contains all processing purposes p0
iin B2
P contains all the collection purposes pi in B2
if P0  P then
if P0  V  ^ P  V  then
return 1 . Compliance
else
return -1 . Not registered purpose
end if
else
return -2 . Not compatible purpose
end if
Example 5.2 (Purposes Validation Subrequirement Example). First, we extract from
the Processing View the subgraph B2(Gw;ti) (where 1  i  2), which is presented in
Figure 5.9. According to Algorithm 2, we need to check that the Processing Purposes
are contained in the Collection Purposes. In this example all the purposes are the same:
on-line sales. Thus, we just need to check that this purpose is in the Usage Rules
Denition. As the purpose is indeed contained in the Usage Rules Denition, we can
say that the multiset of collected data DA was used by the deliver medicine and the
manage stock tasks in compliance with the Purposes Validation Subrequirement.
Now, suppose that besides the tasks described previously, the on-line pharmacy also cross
references customer information with personal data from job applicants. This search is
conducted by the task search job applicants that returns true if the name and date
of birth of a customer match with the name and date of birth of a job applicant. As
Figure 5.10 shows, this task is initiated by the purpose job application, which is not
related to the collection purpose (on-line sales) and the purpose stated in the Usage
Rules Denition (also, on-line sales). The reason is that Alice disclosed her infor-
mation to accomplish the on-line sales purpose not the job application purpose.
Thus, we can conclude that the search job applicants task is not in compliance with
the Purposes Validation Subrequirement.
5.4.1.3 Subrequirement B3: Reusing Data
The subrequirements in Sections 5.4.1.1 and 5.4.1.2 are used to verify the purposes
related to data that was collected and processed by the same entity. However, an entity
may use data generated by tasks executed by other entities. This data is referred to
as reused data, which has its own processing purpose related to the task that produced
it. To be in compliance with Requirement B, this processing purpose should be inChapter 5 Compliance Framework 117
Figure 5.9: Purposes Validation Example 1
accordance to the purposes for which data was reused. This requirement is formalised
in Subrequirement B3: Reusing Data.
To verify this subrequirement, we rst need to identify reused data. This data resulted
from a task executed by a dierent data controller than the one that uses it. Specically,
we focus on the task that generated reused data and the purpose from which such a task
was initiated. For the sake of clarity, we focus on one reused result contained in one
multiset of used data. Nevertheless, all the used data multisets related with one entity
that contain reused data should be checked. The relations between Reused Data, the118 Chapter 5 Compliance Framework
Figure 5.10: Purposes Validation Example 2
tasks that processed it and the purpose for which is was processed are expressed as a
subgraph B3, which is called Reusing Data Subgraph:
Denition 5.27 (Reusing Data Subgraph, B3(GW;Rj)). A Reusing Data Subgraph B3
is a subgraph of a well-formed Processing View Graph GW consisting of results Rj, such
that,
VB3 = fRj;tj;p0
jg
EB3 = f(Rj;tj;wasInitiatedBy);(tj;p0
j;wasGeneratedBy)g
where pj 2 PW;tj 2 TW;Rj 2 RW;
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The general structure of a Reusing Data Subgraph B3(GW;Rj) is presented in Figure
5.11 (inside of the dotted-line rectangle) showing that a result Rj, which was reused in
the multiset of used data DUm as dmj, was generated by a task tj that was initiated by
a purpose p0
j. In this gure, dm1 = dUm1;dm2 = dUm2;:::;dmn = dUmn. Therefore, the
extra data in DUm is dmj.
Similar to Section 5.4.1.2, we derive the following property of well-formedness.
Figure 5.11: Subgraph B3 of GW
Property 8 (Well-formed Multiset of Results). Let R be a multiset of results. R is
well-formed in B3 if for any R 2 B3 Property 2.a holds.
By using Property 8 and Property 3 of B3, it is possible to obtain the task tj 2 B3 that
generated the result we are interested in and the purpose p0
j 2 B3 that initiated this
task. After that, p0
j can be compared to the purposes for which the used data multiset
DU was processed. To obtain the processing purposes related to DU we use Property 3
and 5. In that way, P0 contains the set of processing purposes and P the set of collection
purposes. Therefore, we just need to verify that both sets contain p0
j by using the next
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Property 9 (Purpose Compatibility). Let P0 be a set of Processing Purposes and P
be a set of Collection Purposes. A purpose p0 2 B3 is compatible with P0 2 VB2 and
P 2 VB2 if
p0 2 P0 and p0 2 P
In this case, p0
j is not checked against the Usage Rules Denition Graph because P0 and
P were already checked in the subrequirement Purpose Validation (B2(GW;ti)). Thus,
if p0
j is contained in both sets, it is also contained in the Usage Rules Denition Graph,
therefore, is a valid purpose.
If Property 9 holds in subgraph B3 of GW, we can say that such a subgraph is in
compliance with the Reusing Data subrequirement. The verication process of this
subrequirement is presented in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Reusing Data
Input: G  = fV ;E ;Rel g;B3(GW;Rj) = fVB3;EB3;RelB3g
Output: 1 if B3 was in compliance with The Reusing Data Subrequirement, and -1
otherwise.
P0  G ;P  G ;p 2 VB3
if p 2 P0 and p 2 P then
return 1 . Compatible purpose
else
return -1 . Not compatible purpose
end if
The following example illustrates the verication of the Reusing Data Subrequirement
in the On-line Sales Scenario.
Example 5.3 (Reusing Data Subrequirement Example). To demonstrate how the Re-
using Data Subrequirement can be veried, we extend the initially presented Processing
View (Figure 5.3) by adding the reusing of results by the Human Resources Department.
After Alice's information is processed, the pharmacy decided to share the results of the
manage stock task (a sales report) with this department. When the Human Resources
Department receives the sales report, it performs a search to nd matches between job
applicants' names and customers' names. The result of this search is used to infer in-
formation about job applicants' circumstances that can be costly to the company, such
as chronic diseases or pregnancy. This information can be later used to take decisions
regarding the hiring of applicants. In Alice's case, however, when she disclosed her in-
formation she did it with the purpose of buying her fertility drug on-line, not for it to be
investigated as part of a job application.
To verify this requirement, Figure 5.12 shows subgraph B3(GW;R2) expressing that some
data items contained in the sales report (name and medicine's name) that were generated
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report used data that was collected for the purpose of p1 = on-line sales, as the
corresponding G  indicates. Therefore, reusing this result for the purpose of p2 = job
application is not in compliance with the Reusing Data Subrequirement, since p2 is
neither contained in the collection nor the processing purposes.
Figure 5.12: Reusing Data Example
This concludes the verication of Requirement B. Specically, if all subrequirements
discussed above are satised, we can say that the processing of personal information is
in compliance with Requirement B. Next, we focus on the verication of Requirement
C.
5.4.2 Requirement C: Relevant Information Verication
The Relevant Information Verication Requirement states that all the collected data
should be used in processes initiated by the collection purpose. So, if some data was
collected and not used, it means that more data than was strictly necessary was collected
and, therefore, the process does not satisfy this requirement.
To verify compliance with this requirement, the multisets of used data instances as
well as the multiset of collected data instances should be compared against the Usage
Rules Denition. However, in subrequirement B1 (Used Data Compliance) the used
data multisets are already compared against the Usage Rules Denition. Thus, here we
only compare the multiset of collected data instances against the set of collected data
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To do this, we rst extract from a Processing View Graph the provenance graph of all
multisets of used data that are overlapped with one multiset of collected data, which was
captured from one specic Data Subject. Then, we focus on the elements of collected
data and the used data multisets. For the sake of clarity, we analyse one set of collected
data, however, to verify compliance with this requirements, all sets of collected data
should be checked. The relation between collected data and used data is expressed as a
subgraph C that is called Relevant Information Subgraph and is dened below.
Denition 5.28 (Relevant Information Subgraph, C(GW;DUi)). A Relevant Informa-
tion Subgraph is a subgraph of a well-formed Processing View Graph GW restricted to
a set of used data DUi such that:
VC = fDA;DUig
EC = f(DU1;DA;overlappedWith);(DU2;DA;overlappedWith);:::;
(DUm;DA;overlappedWith)g
where DUi 2 DW;DA 2 DW;EC  EW and 0 < i  m
Hence, we derive the next property from this subgraph:
Figure 5.13: Subgraph C of GW
Property 10 (Well-formed Multiset of Used Data). Let DU be a multiset of used data.
DU is well-formed in C if for any DUi Property 2.c holds.
Then, by using Property 10, we can extract the multisets of collected data instances DA
contained in subgraph C. After that, we compare the class and type of each element of
DA against the data classes that should be collected. These data classes are contained
in G , specically in CQ. This is formalised in the following property.
Property 11 (All Collected Data was Used). Let DA 2 GW be a multiset of collected
data instances and CQ 2 G  a set of collected data classes. For each x 2 DA there exists
one and only one pair (cl;ty) 2 CQ such that class(x) = cl and type(x) = ty.
Therefore, if Property 11 holds in a subgraph C, we can conclude this subgraph is in
compliance with the Relevant Information Verication Requirement. The verication
process of this requirement is formalised in Algorithm 4.Chapter 5 Compliance Framework 123
Algorithm 4 Relevant Information Verication
Input: G  = fV ;E ;Rel g;C(GW;DUi) = fVC;EC;RelCg
Output: 1 if C is in compliance with the Relevant Information Verication Require-
ment, and -1 otherwise.
CQ 2 V ;DA 2 VC
if 8x 2 DA : (class(x);type(x)) 2 CQ then
return 1 . All collected data was used
else
return -1 . Not all collected data was used
end if
The following example illustrates the verication of the Relevant Information Verication
Requirement in the On-line Sales Scenario.
Example 5.4 (Relevant Information Verication Requirement Example). To verify the
Relevant Information Verication Requirement in the on-line sales scenario, we extract
subgraph C(GW;DUi) (where 1  i  2) from the Processing View. This subgraph is
presented in Figure 5.14. According to Algorithm 4, we need to check that the class
and type of each of the elements of DA are contained in the corresponding CQ. Thus,
we extract multisets DA = f\Alice" (name, string), \25 upper st" (address, string),
\clomid" (medicine, string), 1 (quantity, integer)g and CQ = f (name, string), (address,
string), (medicine, string), (quantity, integer)g, in which the class and type of each
element of DA is contained in CQ. To clarity the information that we are analysing,
Figure 5.14 does not show the classes and types of DA. Instead, these can be seen in
the corresponding Processing View (Figure 5.4). Therefore, assuming that all the tasks
from which the pharmacy collected Alice's information were executed, we can conclude
that the collection of information performed by the pharmacy is in compliance with the
Relevant Information Verication requirement.
Figure 5.14: Relevant Information Verication Example 1
To illustrate a case of non-compliance, suppose that the on-line pharmacy also collected
the nationality of Alice. Figure 5.15 shows the subgraph C(GW;DUi) in which the item
``British'' (nationality, string) has been collected from Alice. Considering the
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asks for Alice's nationality. Thus, such an item does not appear in the corresponding
Usage Rules Denition. This problem is exposed when the subgraph C is compared
to this Usage Rules Denition. Therefore, in this specic case, we can conclude that
the collection of information performed by the pharmacy is not in compliance with the
Relevant Information Verication requirement.
Figure 5.15: Relevant Information Verication Example 2
5.4.3 Requirement F: Anonymity Preservation
The Anonymity Preservation Requirement states that information that can be used
to identify a specic individual should not be presented in a result of processing per-
sonal information. As previously discussed, there are dierent approaches to satisfy this
property. Thus, after using an anonymisation technique, processing results contain two
types of information: non-sensitive information and identiers that reference to sensitive
information.
To verify this requirement, we extract from a Processing View Graph a multiset of
results related to one specic task. The class and type of the elements of this result
are compared with the ones contained in the corresponding set of generated data classes
from the Usage Rules Denition Graph. For clarity, we analyse one multiset of results,
however, each multiset of results contained in the Processing View should be checked.
The subgraph F of the Processing View that needs to be considered to verify this
requirement is called the Anonymity Preservation Subgraph and is dened below.
Denition 5.29 (Anonymity Preservation Subgraph, F(GW;Ri)). A Anonymity Preser-
vation Subgraph is a subgraph of a well-formed Processing View Graph GW, which is
focused on a set of results Ri, such that:
VF = fRi;tig
EF = f(Ri;ti;wasGeneratedBy)g
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The general structure of an Anonymity Preservation Subgraph F(GW;Ri) is presented
in Figure 5.16 showing that a result Ri was generated by a task ti. By using Property
8, which holds in F, it is possible to obtain a multiset of results Ri, which is to be
compared with the corresponding set of generated data classes from the Usage Rules
Denition. This comparison is made using the following property:
Figure 5.16: Subgraph F of GW
Property 12 (Results' Anonymisation). Let Ri be a multiset of generated data in-
stances and CGi a set of generated data classes. For each x 2 Ri there exists one and
only one pair (cl;ty) 2 CGi such that class(x) = cl and type(x) = ty.
If Property 12 holds in a subgraph F of GW, we can conclude that this subgraph is in
compliance with the Anonymity Preservation Requirement. The verication process of
this requirement is formalised in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Anonymity Preservation of Results
Input: G  = fV ;E ;Rel g;F(Gw;Ri) = fVF;EF;RelFg
Output: 1 if F is in compliance with the Anonymity Preservation Requirement or -1
otherwise.
CGi 2 V ;Ri 2 VC
if 8x 2 Ri : (class(x);type(x)) 2 CGi then
return 1 . All data was anonymised
else
return -1 . Not all data was anonymised
end if
The following example illustrates the verication of the Anonymity Preservation Re-
quirement in the On-line Sales Scenario.
Example 5.5 (Anonymity Preservation Requirement Example). To verify the Anony-
mity Preservation Requirement, it is necessary to extract two subgraphs, each of which is
related to the two results that were produced in Figure 5.4. Then, to verify the delivery
state result, we extract from the Processing View the subgraph F(G ;R1), which is
presented in Figure 5.17. In this gure, the task deliver medicine produces the result
\Successful delivery". If we compare this subgraph to the Usage Rules Denition, we can
see that the class and type of the elements of R1 match with the ones that appear in CG1.
In that case, we can say that the processing of Alice's information was in compliance
with the Anonymity Preservation Requirement, as the result produced by the deliver
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Figure 5.17: Anonymity Preservation Requirement Example: Result 1
Regarding the second result, we extract the subgraph F(G ;R2) from the Processing
View (see Figure 5.18). In this subgraph, the task manage stock produces a sales report
containing a name, a medicine name and a quantity. If we compare this subgraph to
the Usage Rules Denition, we can see that the class and type of the elements of R2 do
not match with the ones contained in CG2: (name, string) should not have been used.
The reason for this is that an sales report should not contain the name of the customers.
Rather, it only needs the quantity sold of each item. Thus, in this case, we can say
that the processing of Alice's information was not in compliance with the Anonymity
Preservation Requirement, and therefore, such an inventory could be used against her
interest, as shown in Section 5.3.
Figure 5.18: Anonymity Preservation Requirement Example: Result 2
5.4.4 Requirement G: Basic Security Characteristics Verication
The Basic Security Characteristics Verication Requirement states that all the data
transferred between entities should be transmitted over secure communication channels.
As discussed in Section 3.4.9, we focus on the implementation of the condentiality,
integrity and non-repudiation security properties (recall that one of the assumptions
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that this requirement is not expressed in the Usage Rules Denition Graph, since it only
species which operations related to the processing of application data can be performed.
As discussed in Section 4.4.4, the required security properties can be supported by
encryption/decryption and digital signature schemes. The dierence between the prove-
nance DAG presented in Section 4.4.4 and the one we create here is that the applied
security functions can be seen as tasks applied to data following a specic pattern in-
stead of relationships. Since we are concerned about secure transportation, we focus on
the security functions applied to data before it was sent and after it was received. To
do this, we dene a group of tasks indicating the implementation of such schemes.
Figure 5.19: Subgraph G of GW
As discussed in Section 4.1.3, data is encrypted and signed before being sent to an entity.
Hence, a piece of encrypted data along with its corresponding signature is transported.
When this piece of data is received, the data is decrypted and its signature is veri-
ed. The task that encrypts and creates the signature of a piece of data is denoted as
tES = encSign, which is equivalent to the encryptedSigned relationship presented in
Figure 4.11. Similarly, the task that decrypts a piece of data and checks its signature is
denoted as tV D = verDec, which is equivalent to the veriedDecrypted relationship
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To verify this requirement, we extract from a Processing View DAG a subgraph con-
taining a set of data that was transmitted between entities (collected data, used data or
reused data). When in its plain representation, this set is represented as D, and as fDg
when it is encrypted. Finally, SD expresses the signature related to the same piece of
data. This extracted information is expressed as a subgraph G, which is called Security
Subgraph. This subgraph is dened as:
Denition 5.30 (Security Subgraph, G(GW;D)). A Security Subgraph is a subgraph
of a well-formed Processing View Graph GV pertaining to a set of data D such that:
VG = fD;(fDg;SA);tES;tV Dg
EG = f(D;tV D;wasGeneratedBy);(tV D;(fDg;SA);used);
((fDg;SA);tES;wasGeneratedBy);(tES;D;used)g
where D is any data set in DW;fDg is the encrypted version of D;
SA is the signature associated with D;tES = encSign 2 TW;
tV D = verDec 2 TW;VG  VW and EG  EW:
If the tasks tES and tV D are present in the past processing of information, it means that
encryption/decryption and digital signature schemes were used to protect the trans-
ported data. The following property veries that data was protected:
Property 13 (Secured Data). A multiset D 2 G was transported securely if,
Exist tES;tV D 2 G such that,
(D;tV D;wasGeneratedBy) 2 G, (tES;D;used) 2 G;tES = encSign and tV D = verDec
The verication process of this requirement is formalised in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Basic Security Characteristics Verication
Input: G(GW;D) = fVG;EG;RelGg
Output: 1 if G satises the Basic Security Characteristics Verication Requirement,
-1 otherwise.
D 2 GW;tES = encSign;tV D = verDec
if (D;tV D;wasGeneratedBy)  EG and (tES;D;used)  EG then
return 1 . D was securely transported
else
return -1 . D was not securely transported
end if
The following example illustrates the verication of the Basic Security Characteristics
Verication Requirement in the On-line Sales Scenario.
Example 5.6 (Basic Security Characteristics Verication Requirement Example). To
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Processing View the subgraph G(GW;R2), which is presented in Figure 5.20. This graph
shows that after the stock manager executed the manage stock task to obtain sales report
R2, this report was encrypted, signed and sent to the on-line pharmacy. After being
received by the pharmacy, the signature is veried, the data is decrypted, and obtained
in its plain form. By analysing G, we can conclude that the set R2 was transported
in a secure way since the tasks tES = encSign and tV D = verDec are present, which
indicates the implementation of encryption/decryption and digital signature schemes.
Thus, we can say that the R2 was transported in compliance with the Basic Security
Characteristics Verication Requirement.
Figure 5.20: Basic Security Characteristics Verication Example: Result 2130 Chapter 5 Compliance Framework
5.4.5 Requirement H: Information Transferred to a Secure Country
The Information Transferred to a Secure Country states that personal information col-
lected within the UK cannot be transferred to countries that do not implement the DPA
principles explained in Chapter 3. In order to verify this requirement, it is necessary
to include the task of transferring information in the Usage Rules Denition indicat-
ing to which countries personal information is transferred. Then, we make explicit the
task \sentTo" and the country where this data is sent to. For example, if a set of data
was sent to USA, the processing graph contains a task t = sentToUSA. If the data is
transferred within the European Union, the name of the task is sentToEU. If the data
is transferred within UK, the name of the task is simply sent. Note that the inclusion
of this task does not change the structure of the Usage Rules Denition Graph, it just
denes a specic task that should be notied and veried as the rest of the executed
tasks.
To verify this requirement, we extract from the Processing View Graph the tasks related
to the transferring of information to create the set Tsent. The elements of this set
are compared with the ones contained in the Usage Rules Denition Graph. Since in
the verication of this requirement just nodes are extracted, no subgraph is dened or
depicted. The comparison process is explained in the next property.
Property 14 (Information Transferred to a Notied Country). Let Tsent be a set con-
taining all the tasks related to the transferring of information from GW and T  2 G  a
set tasks. For each x 2 Tsent there exists one and only one y 2 T  such that x = y.
If Property 14 holds in a subgraph Tsent of GW, we can say that GW is in compliance
with the Information Transferred to a Secure Country Requirement. The verication
process of this requirement is presented in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 Data Transferred to a Secure Country
Input: Tsent 2 GW;T  2 G 
Output: 1 if the Data Transferred to a Secure Country is satised, -1 otherwise.
if 8x 2 Tsent : x 2 T  then
return 1 . All the data was sent a secure country
else
return -1 . Data sent to an insecure country
end if
The following example illustrates the verication of the Information Transferred to a
Secure Country Requirement in the On-line Sales Scenario.
Example 5.7 (Information Transferred to a Secure Country Requirement Example).
To illustrate how this requirement can be veried in the on-line sales scenario, we extract
from the Processing View the set of all the tasks that involve the transfer of information.
In this case this set of tasks is Tsent = fsentToEUg, which is presented in Figure 5.20.Chapter 5 Compliance Framework 131
This graph shows that after the task manage stock was executed, the result was sent to
a country the EU. Since the task sentToEU is contained in the Usage Rules Denition,
we can conclude that this task was in compliance with this requirement.
Now, consider a dierent example, shown in Figure 5.22, where, instead of sending the
sales report to the EU, it was sent to the United States. In this case, the destination
country is not contained in the Usage Rules Denition, i.e. the task sentToUSA is not
contained in. Thus, we can conclude that this task was not in compliance with Require-
ment H.
Figure 5.21: Information Transferred to a Secure Country Example 1
Figure 5.22: Information Transferred to a Secure Country Example 2
This concludes our discussion of a set of algorithms for verifying the Auditing Rules
(B, C, H, G, F) using the Usage Denition Rules (specifying which operations can be
performed on personal data), and the Processing View (which represents the operations
that were actually performed, and the data instances on which they were performed).
In combination, these algorithms constitute the third and nal component of the Com-
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5.5 Discussion
Recently, a number of researchers have proposed provenance as a means of verifying
compliance of dierent policies related to the use of personal information [66, 55, 119].
Others have proposed dierent technology to support compliance [20, 92, 81].
Hanson et al. [66] present a data-purpose algebra to annotate data with usage re-
strictions. With these restrictions, requirements similar to the ones presented here can
be checked. In their approach, data is annotated after execution, in contrast to our
approach, which creates provenance information at execution time. However, their ap-
proach does not contain any algorithms for performing the actual compliance verication.
Gil et al. [55] argue that computational workow systems can be used to ensure and
enforce the appropriate use of sensitive personal data. These systems provide compli-
ance, transparency and accountability. To this end, they dene a set of requirements
that are similar to the ones we present here. Using a workow system to support process
transparency, the dened requirements can be veried. They also propose the use of this
technology to enforce policies and negotiate these policies between the Data Subject and
Data Controller. In our work, we argue that the openness of the Web makes enforcement
of these policies infeasible. Instead, we propose compliance verication after the fact as
a more viable solution. Moreover, Gil et al. do not oer a formalisation of their solution
as we do here.
Ringelstein and Staab [119] present the PAPEL language (Provenance-aware Policy Def-
inition and Execution Language) to dene policies that control how application data and
provenance information is accessed and processed. They use a modied version of OPM
to express processing execution and an extended version of XACML to represent per-
mission and restriction policies. By modelling execution conditions, proper use of data
can be enforced. In contrast, as mentioned above, we provide accountability, not en-
forcement. Moreover, we do not modify OPM, but instead create a set of a graph-based
rules, against which OPM-based provenance graphs can be easily checked without any
transformations. They also create policies for controlling access and the processing of
provenance information using XACML, while our policies (processing rules) apply to
application data as well, and are represented as a DAG.
In the business processes context, Ly et al. [92] present similar work to verify the
compliance of rules related to the quality of a data product (e.g. a database, a document,
or a single record). They use process-aware information systems and process models to
model the rules. Their requirements are dierent from ours, as they verify only the
order in which processes are executed. Awad et al. [20] check compliance of control ow
and data ow in business process models by using BPMN to express process models and
BPMN-Q to represent policies. They design a set of queries and present how violations
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support the verication of use of data items and are not based on an open model, such
as OPM.
Kang et al. [81] present a similar approach to ours that helps users to conform with
existing policies in a social networks context. This is achieved by making applications
aware of data usage restrictions dened by the users. One drawback of this work is that
they only dene a small set of policies. In contrast, our framework denes a set of usage
rules which can be easily extended and applied to a diversity of contexts.
Finally, there is also work on authorisation and enforcement of rules in databases
[97, 141, 119]. However, given the openness of information on the Web and the possi-
bility of inferring information using previously published information, authorisation and
enforcement are very challenging to implement.
Miklau et al. [97] dene accountability in databases as the ability to analyse past events
to detect breaches, maintain data quality, and audit compliance with policies. In this
way, their work is similar to ours. In order to make database systems accountable, da-
tabases should preserve a historical record of user operations such as creating, updating
or selecting data records (accountability provenance). In contrast to our work, however,
they store provenance with the data itself, which requires modications to existing da-
tabases, and has possible negative repercussions to security. In terms of the provenance
questions, their work only presents the idea of answering enquiries about which actions
were taken when and by whom, but does not formally dene these questions as we do.
Vaughan et al. [141] introduce the notion of evidence-based audits, which relies on a
secure kernel that wraps critical primitives and logs their invocation with a so-called
proof (which is similar to provenance), which acts as evidence that the operation was
allowed. In contrast to our work, which records evidence of execution of application
processes, instead of primitive operations. With respect to the rules that can be veried
in their work, they use the proofs to provide information that enables a system to create
access control policies. In our work, we do not consider access control. Moreover, our
rules are created at design time depending on the necessities of each specic application.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented the Compliance Framework for automatically verifying
that past processing was carried out according to predened processing rules. In this
thesis, these rules are represented by the Auditing Requirements (see Chapter 3).
The rst component of the Compliance Framework, the Usage Denition Rules (URD),
represents these rules as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). This DAG encodes restrictions
on processing of personal data by specifying which classes and types of data can be
used. The second component, the Processing View, represents provenance of data, i.e.134 Chapter 5 Compliance Framework
the actual operations that were performed on data. This Processing View (PV) is based
on the Open Provenance Model (OPM), in which data and operations are represented
as nodes, and edges represent the relations between them.
Using both the URD and the PV, we developed the third and nal component of the
Compliance Framework: a suite of algorithms for automatically verifying the Auditing
Requirements. Since both the URD and PV are DAGs, these algorithms operate by
matching subgraphs of the PV against the URD. Table 5.1 shows the extracted sub-
graphs and the requirements supported for each them. In summary, we have shown
that by representing both past processing and processing rules as DAGs, the verication
of the Auditing Requirements be easily performed and computationally implemented.
Moreover, we believe that the URD can be used to not only represent the DPA re-
quirements but also other processing rules that restrict the operations an application is
allowed to perform. These rules can also be extended to verify proper use of any type
of information as well.
Table 5.1: Requirements supported by provenance DAGs
To ensure that the presented algorithms are practically viable, we developed a working
proof of concept in the form of a library that provides audit functionality. This library
allows for the manual denition of usage rules and can automatically analyse provenance
to verify that data processing was performed in compliance with these rules.
The biggest practical challenge is that provenance and rules need to be expressed in a
standard vocabulary when dening purposes, tasks, collected data and used data (classes
and types). In that way, the auditing library can be used in an application independent
manner. This issue is further discussed in Section 8.2.
Now, the Compliance Framework relies heavily on the correctness of the provenance
DAGs (the Processing View Graphs). Thus, if these graphs are forged or altered, the
result of the analysis can be compromised. Even though we secure the communication
between the entities, the auditor is still able to alter provenance query results. Should
this happen, the result of an audit processing will be based on incorrect provenance
information. Consequently, it is necessary to secure provenance information, and ensure
these types of attacks are eectively thwarted. Against this background, in the next
chapter, we present a set of techniques for securing this provenance information.Chapter 6
Securing the Provenance-based
Auditing Architecture
At this point, we have modelled the complete provenance life cycle. In chapter 4 we
dened the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture, an application architecture for
recording, storing and querying provenance. Using the provenance that this architec-
ture makes available, we also created the Compliance Framework, which contains a
set of algorithms for analysing data processing and verifying that this processing was
performed in accordance with the rules.
While the application data has been secured in Chapter 4, the provenance of this data
that is captured by the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture and analysed by the
Compliance Framework is still vulnerable. This is problematic, because if provenance is
altered or forged by adversaries (including the auditor), audit results may be corrupted.
In more detail, these adversaries can perform attacks in an attempt to break one or
more of the four basic security characteristics: condentiality, integrity, authentication
and non-repudiation [3]. Therefore, it is necessary to be able to detect any modication
of provenance information during its complete life cycle of recording, storing, querying
and analysis. In addition, if attacks were performed by insiders, it is also necessary to
be able to identify this adversary.
To address this vulnerability, in this chapter, we secure the provenance generated by the
Data Request, Task Request and Query Request protocols (see Chapter 4) by creating
a secure communication channel between the actors within the architecture. These
protocols guarantee that the provenance information within the system exhibits the
four basic security characteristics.
Additionally, to secure the analysis stage developed as part of the Compliance Frame-
work (see Chapter 5), we protect the provenance DAGs by applying cryptographic tech-
niques. By doing so, we not only secure the graph as a whole, but also each part
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independently. As a result, the properties of non-repudiation, end-point authentica-
tion and provenance information integrity are guaranteed to hold for the (subgraphs of)
provenance DAGs. Moreover, we can guarantee that none of the actors, not even the
auditor, can change p-assertions after these are recorded in the Provenance Store with-
out being detected. We prove these guarantees using a model checker and verify that
the mentioned security requirements hold during the complete provenance life cycle.
In summary, the contribution of this chapter is the Secure Provenance-based Auditing
Architecture, a novel approach for securing provenance and application data during the
entire provenance life cycle. This architecture contains a set of secure protocols for the
exchange of provenance and a set of cryptographic components for securing provenance
DAGs. Using this architecture, alteration of provenance information during its creation,
storage and analysis can be detected, thereby improving the reliability of audits.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, in Section 6.1, we introduce
the terminology and concepts used throughout this chapter. Then, in Section 6.2, we
secure communication protocols of the recording and storage phases of the provenance
life cycle. Next, in Section 6.3, we secure the querying and analysis stages as well by
developing the Secured Provenance Graph and an algorithm for checking its integrity.
In Section 6.4, we combine these four stages to obtain the Secure Provenance-based Au-
diting Architecture, and formally prove that it exhibits the properties of condentiality,
integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. In Section 6.5 we discuss the contribu-
tions made in this chapter in the context of existing work. Finally, we conclude in
Section 6.6.
6.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we dene the notation that is used throughout the rest of the chapter.
Specically, we discuss how the assertions created by the actors of a provenance-aware
system can be secured. To achieve this, we use a protocol for mutual authentication (a
variant of TLS which we will refer to as the Optimised TLS Handshake Protocol [19]),
and add cryptographic components (elds) to both the messages and the provenance
assertions. These components are later used to verify the security properties during the
storage stage, presented in Section 6.2.
Then, in Sections 6.2.1.2, 6.2.1.3 and 6.3.3, we secure the Data Request, Task Request
and the Query Request communication protocols that were dened in Sections 4.3.2,
4.3.3 and 4.3.4. For this purpose, we rst describe the Optimised TLS protocol and, later,
introduce key concepts that are used to achieve this: key management, cryptographic
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6.1.1 Optimised TLS Handshake Protocol
Recall from Section 2.3.1.3 that the OTLS protocol is a more ecient version of TLS
which allows two actors to mutually authenticate each other in a single execution. Thus,
OTLS ensures two important security properties required in our architecture: mutual
authentication and condentiality (see Section 4.1.3).
Specically, as discussed in Section 2.3.1.3, OTLS is a protocol that enables client-server
applications to negotiate a secure connection using a handshaking procedure, in which
the participants agree on various parameters (such as cipher suites and session keys) to
establish a secure connection. In doing so, entities are mutually authenticated through
certicates and are able to create the session key that is used to encrypt the (sensitive)
data that is contained in messages exchanged between the actors.
Now, in Section 6.2.1.1, we augment the OTLS protocol to capture provenance of its
execution. This provenance is important to verify that the proper security measures
were taken in the processing and transfer of sensitive application data (Requirement G
in Section 3.4).
6.1.2 Key Management
In our architecture, cryptographic keys are used to sign and encrypt the messages that
are exchanged between actors. In what follows, we assume that actors have already
created private keys and exchanged public keys. We also assume that these keys do not
change and are stored in a safe place so they cannot be compromised [94].
The keys related to each actor are presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. These tables contain
all the actors participating in the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture (see Section
5). Hence, DS, DC, DP, AU, PS and CA are instances of the actors Data Subject, Data
Controller, Data Processor, Auditor, Provenance Store and Certified Authori-
ty, respectively. Table 6.1 contains the private and public keys of each actor. Thus,
given an actor A, kA represents its public key and k 1
A its private key. Table 6.2 presents
the session keys created after executing the OTLS protocol between two communicating
actors. Then, a session key k0
x is created, where x denotes the entities that use this
specic key. For example, k0
DS DC is used in the communication established between
the entities DS and DC.
Note that the Certicate Authority is not part of the Architecture. However, we assume
it exists and that it creates valid certi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Entities
Data DS DC DP AU PS CA
Public Key kDS kDC kDP kAU kPS kCA
Private Key k 1
DS k 1
DC k 1
DP k 1
AU k 1
PS k 1
CA
Table 6.1: Public, Private Keys used in Sequence Diagrams
Entities
DS DC DP AU PS
k0
DS DC k0
DS DC k0
DP DC k0
AU PS k0
DS PS
k0
DS PS k0
DP DC k0
DP PS k0
DC PS
k0
DC PS k0
DP PS
k0
AU PS
Table 6.2: Session keys used in Sequence Diagrams
6.1.3 Cryptographic Notation
Before presenting the messages that are used in the sequence diagrams of this section,
we rst introduce the cryptographic notation we use on them.
In the communications protocols that are discussed in Sections 6.2.1.1, 6.2.1.2, 6.2.1.3
and 6.3.3, a hash-value h of a piece of data d is computed by a hash function h, and
represented as h = h(d). The concatenation operation1 is represented by k. The public
and private keys of an actor A used for signing messages are represented by kA and
k 1
A respectively. A signature of a message m is computed by s = Signk 1
A (m) and the
extraction of m by ExtkA(s) = m. Note that, as explained in Section 2.3.2.2 the Sign
function only signs data, and does not hash data rst. Thus, depending on whether it
is used to sign data item m or the hash-value of m, the Ext function can be used to
obtain m (in the clear) or the hash-value of m, respectively. The encryption of a piece
of data d is computed by e = fdgk0 and the decryption by Deck0(e) = d, where k0 is a
symmetric key. This symmetric key is a session key, which is agreed upon during the
execution of a secure protocol and is used to encrypt private information.
6.1.4 Securing Messages
In this section, we secure the messages that are exchanged between the actors in the
communication protocols. The rst set of messages is used in the OTLS protocol [19, 79,
71], which provides mutual entity authentication and allows for the creation of a session
key. The OTLS protocol, which was discussed in Section 6.1.1, will be formalised in
Section 6.2.1.1. These messages are presented by a 5-tuple, a 4-tuple and a 3-tuple in
(6.1), (6.2) and (6.3), respectively:
1Note that this concatenation operation is equivalent to the cons function used in programming
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clientHello(idi;Ni;kC;si;hi) (6.1)
serverHello(idi;ei;si;hi) (6.2)
keyExchange(idi;ei;hi) (6.3)
As can be seen in Table 6.3, and in messages (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3), the client's key
pair is represented by kC and k 1
C and its name is represented by C. Similarly, for the
server, these are kS, k 1
S and S. Messages (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) also contain a unique
identier idi, which is used in the creation of provenance information. Also, message
(6.3) contains the session key k0
C S indicating this key is later used to encrypt data
exchanged between the client (C) and the server (S).
Table 6.3: Message Components and Convenience Functions
Note that in these messages, si represents a signature, ei encrypted data and hi a
hash-value. Then, to access to the individual elements of the messages, we dene a set
of accessors and convenience functions in Table 6.3. It is important to note that the
Sign operation used to construct one or more of the individual elements of these three
messages ((6.1),(6.2) and (6.3)) does not hash data before signing it.
After the last message of the protocol is sent, the actors that executed the protocol
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information. These actors have also created and exchanged their public keys, which are
later used to provide non-repudiation and integrity.
In order to ensure all these security properties hold for sensitive application data, the
Sign operation that is used to construct some of the individual elements in the rest
of the messages is applied in conjuction with the hash operation (h), therefore, data is
hashed before being signed.
Using these symmetric, public and private keys, we dene secureMsg in (6.4). This mes-
sage contains secured information that guarantees the condentiality, non-repudiation
and integrity properties on the original data that is exchanged in our protocols:
secureMsg(ei;si;hi) (6.4)
These messages are symmetrically encrypted and signed. Therefore, they contain en-
crypted data (ei), a signature (si) and a hash-value (hi) related to their corresponding
assertions. The hash-value along with a unique identier idi, which is encrypted on ei,
(See Table 6.3) are used to create the relationship and the hash-value of the next asser-
tions. We also dene a set of accessors and convenience functions that are described in
Table 6.3.
The ipa message in (6.5) contains the same elements of the message dened in (4.2) and
a signature. This signature is used to guarantee the integrity and non-repudiation of
interaction p-assertions related to the messages exchanged between the actors:
ipa(idi;view;si) (6.5)
As previously dened in message (4.2), interaction p-assertions contain the unique iden-
tier idi of the message that the interaction refers to. They also contain a view indicating
whether the entity that creates the interaction was the receiver or sender of the corre-
sponding message. To provide non-repudiation and integrity of the information recorded
in the Provenance Store, the interaction p-assertions' content is now signed using the
sender's key (si). Moreover, a set of accessors and convenience functions related to
message (6.5) is dened in Table 6.3. Note that the information contained in the ipa
message is not encrypted. The reason for this is that this information (idi;view) is not
sensitive. Therefore, it cannot be used to break the security of the protocols.
Finally, messages (6.6) and (6.7) contain secure information that guarantees the rela-
tionship p-assertions that encode the relation between two interaction p-assertions is
secured:
simpleRpa(ei;si;hi) (6.6)
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Recall from message (4.3) that these p-assertions contain a message identier idi that is
a unique identier of the rst interaction p-assertion (called the cause) and idj of second
(called the eect) of a relationships rel in the Provenance Store. To guarantee the four
basic security characteristics, messages (6.6) and (6.7) make the following alterations to
message 4.3:
 Integrity of the information asserted by the actors is guaranteed by introducing
a hash-value hi. This hash-value is created by the sender to protect the content
of the assertion and its relationship with the previous message. For this reason,
this hash-value includes the hash-value of the previous relation p-assertion, which
is identied by its corresponding id.
 To provide non-repudiation, assertions also contain a signature si, which is com-
puted by the sender.
 To provide condentiality, the information transported in this message is encrypted
in ei.
Contrary to the information contained in the ipa messages, rpa messages contain sensitive
information. Even though relationship p-assertions could contain pointers only, these
pointers refer to existing pieces of data, and the fact that a relationship between these
pieces of data exist is sensitive information. Knowledge of the name of the relationship
and the pointers can be used to generate an (anonymous) graph from which information
about the processing of the information might be inferred.
Finally, if an assertion related to the rst message of a protocol is created, a special
relationship p-assertion is created, which does not contain a relationship but a hash-value
(see message (6.6)). As in previous secure messages, a set of accessors and convenience
functions related to messages (6.6) and (6.7) is dened in Table 6.3.
Using the secure messages we created in this section, we can now secure the rst two
stages of the provenance life cycle: recording and storage.
6.2 Securing the Recording and Storage Stage
In this section, we secure the Data Request and Task Request communication protocols
which are part of the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture presented in Chapter 4.
Additionally, we modify the OTLS protocol to record provenance of its execution. By
doing so, evidence is recorded of the fact that proper security measures have been taken,
which is needed to verify compliance of the Security Requirements dened in Chapter
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In what follows, we formalise the modied protocols using an extension of UML called
UMLSec, which oers cryptographic notation for secure systems development [79]. This
formalisation includes one UML sequence diagram for each of the following protocols:
OTLS, Data Request and Task Request. In the remainder of this section, we rst show
how these protocols are secured (Section 6.2.1). Then, in Section 6.2.2, we develop
algorithms for verifying that the protocols were executed correctly by detecting message
tampering or forgery.
6.2.1 Securing Protocols
6.2.1.1 OTLS Protocol
In this section, we modify the OTLS protocol discussed in 6.1.1 to capture and secure
provenance of its execution. To do this, we present a UMLSec sequence diagram used
in the formalisation of the OTLS protocol, which establishes a secure communication
channel between the actors that are part of the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture.
The OTLS protocol allows actors to verify each others' identities and create a session
key used to encrypt/decrypt exchanged messages, i.e. to authenticate themselves. For
that reason, we use this protocol to establish communication between each of the entities
(DS-DC, DP-DC) and between the entities and the Provenance Store2 (DS-PS, DP-PS,
DC-PS and AU-PS). This protocol is modelled in Figure 6.1, which shows the objects
client, server and PS. Both client and server can be instances of any of the actors
presented in the architecture, and PS is an instance of the Provenance Store actor.
The model of this protocol is based on the examples presented in [79].
In order to achieve a clear distinction between protocol messages and provenance-related
messages, we rst explain the protocol messages that are part of the normal (i.e. \prove-
nance unaware") execution of the protocol. Later, all the provenance-related messages
(Interaction and Relationship p-assertions) are explained. Note that the same applies
to the rest of the protocols (Data Request, Task Request and Query Request).
Messages In the OTLS sequence diagram, the messages exchanged between client
and server are denoted as Mi. These messages are dened according to (6.1), (6.2)
and (6.3), which represent the messages described in Section 6.1.1, and are explained in
more detail below.
clientHello The client initiates the protocol by sending the clientHello message (M1).
This message contains a random number Ni and the client's public key kC. It
2Note that in order to protect the Provenance Store only p-assertions from a previously authenticated
entity can be stored. Therefore, when the OTLS protocol is executed between an entity and the Provence
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also contains a message identier idM1 and a hash-value, which are part of the
provenance integrity support that is explained later. The client also includes
its own certicate to authenticate to the server. In practice, this message also
contains a lists of the cryptographic capabilities of the client, such as the version
of the protocol, the cipher suites supported by the client, and the data com-
pression methods supported by the client. In our model, these parameters are
omitted as they do not alter the security of the protocol, which is the main goal of
this formalisation. Below, message M1 is formally described presenting its content
during the execution of the protocol in Figure 6.1.
Let certicateM1 = Signk
 1
CA(CjjkC)
Let integrityHashM1 = h(idM1jjCjjkC)
M1=
clientHello(
idM1, . M1 OTLS message identier
Ni, . random number
kC, . client's public key
certicateM1, . client's certicate
integrityHashM1 . provenance integrity hash-value
)
serverHello The serverHello message (M2) is sent by the server as a response to a
clientHello message. Upon receipt of the clientHello message, the server generates
the pre-master secret k0
C S using a key generation function (kgen) 3 Then, the
pre-master secret is signed along with the client random number4 (Nj) and the
client public key (kC) using the server private key (k 1
S ), and encrypts it using the
public key of the client (kC). By signing the pre-master secret, the client random
number and the client public key together, the server binds the pre-master secret
with the current session and client. Then, the signed and encrypted pre-master
secret is sent to the client along with its certicate (Signk 1
CA(SjjkS)). This message
is presented in (6.2). Again, this message also contains a message identier idM2,
the cryptographic cipher suite and the data compression method selected by the
server. As before, the last two parameters are omitted for the same reasons as
mentioned above. Below, message M2 content is formally described.
3kgen denotes a key generation function used to create strong keys. To prevent related-key attacks
[96], keys need to be generated truly randomly and contain sucient entropy. To support these prop-
erties, keys can be randomly generated using a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) [28] or a
cryptographic hash function along with a pass-phrase [117].
4The random data in the clientHello and serverHello messages is created using a carefully designed
pseudo-random function to be used in the creation of the key. In that way, it is possible to guarantee
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Let signedEncryptedSecretM2 = fSignk
 1
S (k0
C SjjNjjjkC)gkC
Let certicateM2 = Signk
 1
CA(SjjkS)
Let integrityHashM2 = h(idM2jjSjjkS)
M2=
serverHello(
idM2, . M2 OTLS message identier
signedEncryptedSecretM2, . signed and encrypted pre-master secret
certicateM2, .server's certicate
integrityHashM2 . provenance integrity hash-value
)
keyExchange When the client receives the serverhello message, it decrypts the pre-
master secret with its private key and extracts the public key from the certicate.
By extracting the signature on the pre-master secret as well as the server certicate,
the client authenticates the server. Once the client extracts the pre-master secret
and veries the signatures, it sends the keyExchange message (M3). This message
uses the created pre-master secret as symmetric encryption key5 (k0
C S) to encrypt
the name of the server (S). This message is used to verify that both actors know
the agreed upon key and is presented in (6.3). After that, the created symmetric
key can be used to exchange application data in a secure way. Below, message M3
content is formally described.
Let encryptedServerNameM3 = fSgk0
C S
Let integrityHashM3 = h(idM3jjCjjkC)
M3=
keyExchange(
idM3, .M3 OTLS message identier
encryptedServerNameM3, .encrypted server's name
integrityHashM3 .provenance integrity hash-value
)
By exchanging these messages, the client and the server verify each others' identities
and create a symmetric session key k0
C S. When the protocol terminates, the exchange
of encrypted application data can commence using the created session key . The role of
client and server can be represented by any of the entities that communicate in our
model. In this way, entities are mutually authenticated and there is a symmetric key
used by two entities to encrypt the information they want to exchange.
5In practice, the pre-master secret is used to generate a master secret and then the session key used
to encrypt data. As we assume that keys are created using well-designed methods (See Section 7.4), we
do not present this process, which is performed by the server and the client using a public algorithm
de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In the sequence diagrams that follow, we assume that the OTLS protocol has been
previously executed between the main entities of the protocol and between each entity
and the Provenance Store. Thus, the corresponding entities have already been mutually
authenticated and have the created symmetric key, as shown in Table 6.2.
Interaction p-assertions To make the OTLS protocol provenance-aware, actors
should record the interaction p-assertions related to the messages they send, which are
labelled Ii in Figure 6.1 and use the message format from (6.5).
Interaction p-assertions I1, I4 and I5 are recorded by the client in the PS. These
assertions refer to the messages M1 (clientHello), M2 (serverHello) and M3 (keyExchange)
described above. Therefore, they contain the OTLS message identiers of the corre-
sponding messages, i.e. they contain idM1, idM2 and idM3 respectively. Similarly,
interaction p-assertions I2, I3 and I6 refer to the same messages, but now from the
perspective of the server. Below, interaction p-assertions I1, I2, I3, I4, I5 and I6
are formally described.
Message I1
Let signatureWithHashI1 = Signk
 1
C (h(idM1jjsender))
I1=
ipa(
idM1, . M1 OTLS message identier
sender, .view
signatureWithHashI1 .message signature with hash
)
Message I2
Let signatureWithHashI2 = Signk
 1
S (h(idM1jjreceiver))
I2=
ipa(
idM1, .M1 OTLS message identier
receiver, .view
signatureWithHashI2 .message signature with hash
)
Message I3
Let signatureWithHashI3 = Signk
 1
S (h(idM2jjsender))146 Chapter 6 Securing the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture
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I3=
ipa(
idM2, .M2 OTLS message identier
sender, .view
signatureWithHashI3 .message signature with hash
)
Message I4
Let signatureWithHashI4 = Signk
 1
C (h(idM2jjreceiver))
I4=
ipa(
idM2, .M2 OTLS message identier
receiver, .view
signatureWithHashI4 .message signature with hash
)
Message I5
Let signatureWithHashI5 = Signk
 1
C (h(idM3jjsender))
I5=
ipa(
idM3, .M3 OTLS message identier
sender, .view
signatureWithHashI5 .message signature with hash
)
Message I6
Let signatureWithHashI6 = Signk
 1
S (h(idM3jjreceiver))
I6=
ipa(
idM3, .M3 OTLS message identier
receiver, .view
signatureWithHashI6 .message signature with hash
)
Relationship p-assertions As part of a provenance-aware communication protocol,
the actors also need to record the relationship p-assertions related to the interaction
p-assertions they create. These assertions encode the relation between application data
and the message that contains it. In Figure 6.1, these assertions are labelled Ri and use
the message format from (6.6) and (6.7). Next, the relationship p-assertions created in
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 Relationship p-assertion R0 is not related to another message. Thus, since this
message is the rst message of the protocol, the ancestor hash of message M1 is
created using (6.6). Below, relationship p-assertion R0 is formally described.
Let encryptedDataR0 = fidM1jjgetDataItem(M1)gkC PS
Let integrityHashR0 = h(idM1jjgetDataItem(M1))
Let signatureWithHashR0 = Signk
 1
C (h(idM1jjgetDataItem(M1)jjintegrityHashR0))
R0=
simpleRpa(
encryptedDataR0, .encrypted data
signatureWithHashR0, .message signature with hash
integrityHashR0 .provenance integrity hash-value
)
 Message R1 is a relationship p-assertion denoting that the message M2 was sent in
Response To the receipt of the message M1. Relationship R1 is created using (6.7)
and below it is formally described.
Let encryptedDataR1 = fidM1jjgetDataItem(M2)jjinResponseTojjidM2gkS PS
Let integrityHashR1 = h(idM1jjgetDataItem(M2)jjinResponseTojjgetHash(R0))
Let signatureWithHashR1 = Signk
 1
S (h(idM1jjgetDataItem(M2)jjinResponseTojj
idM2jjintegrityHashR1))
R1=
rpa(
encryptedDataR1, . encrypted data
signatureWithHashR1, . message signature with hash
integrityHashR1 . provenance integrity hash-value
)
 Finally, message R2 is a relationship indicating that the message M3 was sent
in Response To the receipt of message M2. Below, relationship p-assertion R2
is formally described.
Let encryptedDataR2 = fidM2jjgetDataItem(M3)jjinResponseTojjidM3gkC PS
Let integrityHashR2 = h(idM2jjgetDataItem(M3)jjinResponseTojjgetHash(R1))
Let signatureWithHashR2 = Signk
 1
C (h(idM2jjgetDataItem(M3)jjinResponseTojj
idM3jjintegrityhashR2))Chapter 6 Securing the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture 149
R2=
rpa(
encryptedDataR2, . encrypted data
signatureWithHashR2, . message signature with hash
integrityHashR2 . provenance integrity hash-value
)
It is important to mention that, as opposed to other relationship p-assertions created
in this formalisation, the ones related to the OTLS protocol just contain the digital
certicates and public keys (instead of application data) of the corresponding messages.
By doing so, we avoid the exposure of private information that could compromise the
security of the protocol, for example by recording the symmetric key in the corresponding
relationship p-assertion.
6.2.1.2 Securing Data Request Protocol
The second protocol we secure is the Data Request Protocol. Recall from Section 4.3.2
that this protocol is used to request personal information by the Data Controller from
a Data Subject. To secure this protocol, we extend the sequence diagram presented in
Figure 4.5. The result is shown in Figure 6.2. Note that the modied protocol uses the
messages dened above. The dierence with Figure 4.5 is that these messages are now
secured (see Section 6.1.4). Furthermore, the modied protocol contains several guards,
which are logical conditions that specify whether the execution of the protocol should
be continued. These guards guarantee that the information and provenance exchanged
between actors is secure. In Section 6.2.2, these guards are explained in further detail.
Messages In the Data Request sequence diagram, the messages exchanged between
DS and DC are denoted as Mi. These messages are created according to (6.4) to provide
condentiality, non-repudiation and integrity. In what follows, we explain each message.
Message M4 contains purpose, which is symmetrically encrypted using the session key
and signed using the private key of DC. With this message DC requests to DS personal
information to be used with the indicated purpose. When M4 is received, it is veried
and decrypted (shown by guardM4). Below, message M4 is formally described.
Let encryptedDataM4 = fidM4jjpurposegk0
DS DC
Let integrityHashM4 = h(idM4jjpurpose)
Let signatureWithHashM4 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM4jjpurposejjintegrityHashM4))150 Chapter 6 Securing the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture
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M4=
secureMsg(
encryptedDataM4, . encrypted data
signatureWithHash, . message signature with hash
integrityHashM4 . provenance integrity hash-value
)
In response, DS sends the encrypted personal data requested (data) in Message M5,
which is also signed by DS. When DC receives M5, the signature is veried and the data
is decrypted, (see guardM5), to later be stored in a local database, which is maintained
by DC. Below, message M5 is formally described.
Let encryptedDataM5 = fidM5jjdatagk0
DS DC
Let integrityHashM5 = h(idM5jjdata)
Let signatureWithHashM5 = Signk
 1
DS(h(idM5jjdatajjintegrityHashM5))
M5=
secureMsg(
encryptedDataM5, . encrypted data
signatureWithHashM5, . message signature with hash
integrityHashM5 . provenance integrity hash-value
)
Then, DC acknowledges the receipt of the data to DS in M6, which is also veried and
decrypted in guardM6. Below, message M6 is formally described.
Let encryptedDataM6 = fidM6jjOKgk0
DS DC
Let integrityHashM6 = h(idM6jjOK)
Let signatureWithHashM6 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM6jjOKjjintegrityHashM6))
M6=
secureMsg(
encryptedDataM6, . encrypted data
signatureWithHashM6, . message signature with hash
integrityHashM6 . provenance integrity hash-value
)
Note that the message numbers continue from the OTLS sequence diagram showing
that the OTLS protocol protocol was successfully completed before this protocol was
executed. The same applies for the messages and protocols that follow.
Interaction p-assertions Interaction p-assertions (Ii) are built according to (6.5)
providing non-repudiation and integrity. Similarly to the sequence diagram of Figure
4.5, in this sequence diagram assertions I7, I10 and I11 denote the act of receiving or
sending messages M4, M5 and M6 by DC in the Provenance Store. Similarly, assertions I8,
I9 and I12 denote the act of sending or receiving the same messages from the perspective
of DS. The dierence with Figure 4.5 is that in this sequence diagram the interaction152 Chapter 6 Securing the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture
p-assertion are signed. Moreover, when interaction p-assertions are received by the PS,
their signatures are checked at its reception. Below, interaction p-assertions I7, I8,
I9, I10, I11 and I12 are formally described.
Message I7
Let signatureWithHashI7 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM4jjsender))
I7=
ipa(
idM4, .M4 Data Request message identier
sender, .view
signatureWithHashI7 .message signature with hash
)
Message I8
Let signatureWithHashI8 = Signk
 1
DS(h(idM4jjreceiver))
I8=
ipa(
idM4, .M4 Data Request message identier
receiver, .view
signatureWithHashI8 .message signature with hash
)
Message I9
Let signatureWithHashI9 = Signk
 1
DS(h(idM5jjsender))
I9=
ipa(
idM5, .M5 Data Request message identier
sender, .view
signatureWithHashI9 .message signature with hash
)
Message I10
Let signatureWithHashI10 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM5jjreceiver))
I10=
ipa(
idM5, .M5 Data Request message identier
receiver, .view
signatureWithHashI10 .message signature with hash
)Chapter 6 Securing the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture 153
Message I11
Let signatureWithHashI11 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM6jjsender))
I11=
ipa(
idM6, .M6 Data Request message identier
sender, .view
signatureWithHashI11 .message signature with hash
)
Message I12
Let signatureWithHashI12 = Signk
 1
DS(h(idM6jjreceiver))
I12=
ipa(
idM6, .M6 Data Request message identier
receiver, .view
signatureWithHashI12 .message signature with hash
)
Relationship p-assertions Relationship p-assertions (Ri) are built according to
(6.6) and (6.7) providing condentiality, non-repudiation and integrity. The relationships
created in this sequence diagram are the same as the ones created in the sequence
diagram of Figure 4.5. The dierences are the inclusion of the corresponding hash-
values, the encryption of data application and the signing of messages. In this diagram,
when a relationship p-assertion is received by the PS, its hash-value and signature are
checked according to the corresponding guard. These guards are explained in detail in
Section 6.2.2. Below, relationship p-assertions R3, R4 and R5 are formally described.
Message R3
Let encryptedDataR3 = fidM3jjgetDataItem(M4)jjinResponseTojjidM4gk0
DC PS
Let integrityHashR3 = h(idM3jjgetDataItem(M4)jjinResponseTojjgetHash(R2))
Let signatureWithHashR3 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM3jjgetDataItem(M4)jjinResponseTojj
idM4jjintegrityHashR3))
R3=
rpa(
encryptedDataR3, .encrypted data
signatureWithHashR3, .message signature with hash
integrityHashR3 .provenance integrity hash-value
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Message R4
Let encryptedDataR4 = fidM4jjgetDataItem(M5)jjwasAcquiredForjjidM5gk0
DS PS
Let integrityHashR4 = h(idM4jjgetDataItem(M5)jjwasAcquiredForjjgetHash(R3))
Let signatureWithHashR4 = Signk
 1
DS(h(idM4jjgetDataItem(M5)jjwasAcquiredForjj
idM5jjintegrityHashR4))
R4=
rpa(
encryptedDataR4, .encrypted data
signatureWithHashR4, .message signature with hash
integrityHashR4 .provenance integrity hash-value
)
Message R5
Let encryptedDataR5 = fidM5jjgetDataItem(M6)jjinAckTojjidM6gk0
DC PS
Let integrityHashR5 = h(idM5jjgetDataItem(M6)jjinResponseTojjgetHash(R4))
Let signatureWithHashR5 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM5jjgetDataItem(M6)jjinAckTojj
idM6jjintegrityHashR5))
R5=
rpa(
encryptedDataR5, .encrypted data
signatureWithHashR5, .message signature with hash
integrityHashR5 .provenance integrity hash-value
)
6.2.1.3 Securing Task Request Protocol
In this section, we secure the Task Request Protocol and record its provenance. Recall
from Section 4.3.3 where this protocol is used to delegate the processing of personal data
by DS to DP. This section presents the sequence diagram of the modied protocol, which
is presented in Figure 6.3. This diagram models the interaction as shown in Figure 4.6,
but instead uses secure message presented in Section 6.1.4.
Messages Similarly to the Data Request sequence diagram, messages are denoted
as Mi and use (6.4) to provide condentiality, non-repudiation and integrity.
Message M10 contains processdata, which is symmetrically encrypted using the session
key and signed using DC's private key. This data is a set of personal information to be
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to process it, as guardM10 shows. After the set of data is decrypted, DP computes it
using the internal function task1 that returns result. Below, message M10 is formally
described.
Let encryptedDataM10 = fidM10jjprocessDatagk0
DP DC
Let integrityHashM10 = h(idM10jjprocessData)
Let signatureWithHashM10 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM10jjprocessDatajjintegrityHashM10))
M10=
secureMsg(
encryptedDataM10, . encrypted data
signatureWithHashM10 . message signature with hash
integrityHashM10 . provenance integrity hash-value
)
Message M11 is signed by DP and contains the encrypted result of the previous process-
ing (result). Thus, when DC receives M11, the signature is veried and the result is
decrypted in guardM11. Below, message M11 is formally described.
Let encryptedDataM11 = fidM11jjresultgk0
DP DC
Let integrityHashM11 = h(idM11jjresult)
Let signatureWithHashM11 = Signk
 1
DP(h(idM11jjresultjjintegrityHashM11))
M11=
secureMsg(
encryptedDataM11, . encrypted data
signatureWithHashM11, . message signature with hash
integrityHashM11 . provenance integrity hash-value
)
Finally, DC sends an acknowledgement to the reception of result to DP in M12, which is
veried and decrypted in guardM12. Below, message M12 is formally described.
Let encryptedDataM12 = fidM12jjOKgk0
DP DC
Let integrityHashM12 = h(idM12jjOK)
Let signatureWithHashM12 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM12jjOKjjintegrityHashM12))
M12=
secureMsg(
encryptedDataM12, . encrypted data
signatureWithHashM12, . message signature with hash
integrityHashM12 . provenance integrity hash-value
)
Interaction p-assertions As in the previous protocol, interaction p-assertions (Ii)
are built according to (6.5) providing non-repudiation and integrity. Similarly to the
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I14, I15, I16, I17 and I18 denote the act of receiving and sending the messages de-
scribed above by DC and DP. Again, interaction p-assertion are signed and their signatures
are veried according to the corresponding guard. Below, interaction p-assertions I13,
I14, I15, I16 and I17 are formally described.
Message I13
Let signatureWithHashI13 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM10jjsender))
I13=
ipa(
idM10, .M10 Task Request message identier
sender, .view
signatureWithHashI13 .message signature with hash
)
Message I14
Let signatureWithHashI14 = Signk
 1
DP(h(idM10jjreceiver))
I14=
ipa(
idM10, .M10 Task Request message identier
receiver, .view
signatureWithHashI14 .message signature with hash
)
Message I15
Let signatureWithHashI15 = Signk
 1
DP(h(idM11jjsender))
I15=
ipa(
idM11, .M11 Task Request message identier
sender, .view
signatureWithHashI15 .message signature with hash
)
Message I16
Let signatureWithHashI16 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM11jjreceiver))
I16=
ipa(
idM11, .M11 Task Request message identier
receiver, .view
signatureWithHashI16 .message signature with hash
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Message I17
Let signatureWithHashI17 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM12jjsender))
I17=
ipa(
idM12, .M12 Task Request message identier
sender, .view
signatureWithHashI17 .message signature with hash
)
Message I18
Let signatureWithHashI18 = Signk
 1
DP(h(idM12jjreceiver))
I18=
ipa(
idM12, .M12 Task Request message identier
receiver, .view
signatureWithHashI18 .message signature with hash
)
Relationship p-assertions Here, relationship p-assertions (Ri) are also built ac-
cording to (6.6) and (6.7) providing condentiality, non-repudiation and integrity. The
created relationships as the same as the ones created in the sequence diagram of Figure
4.6. However, this sequence diagram includes hash-values, encryption of data applica-
tion and signing of messages. Then, when the relationships R8, R9, R10, R11, R12 and
R13 are received by the PS, application data is decrypted, and their hash-values and sig-
natures are veried, as guardR8, guardR9, guardR10 guardR11 guardR12 and guardR13
respectively show. Below, relationship p-assertions R8, R9, R10, R11, R12 and R13
are formally described.
Message R8
Let encryptedDataR8 = fidM10jjgetDataItem(M10)jjinResponseTojjidM9gk0
DC PS
Let integrityHashR8 = h(idM10jjgetDataItem(M10)jjinResponseTojjgetHash(R7))
Let signatureWithHashR8 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM10jjgetDataItem(M10)jjinResponseTojj
idM9jjintegrityHashR8))
R8=
rpa(
encryptedDataR8, .encrypted data
signatureWithHashR8, .message signature with hash
integrityHashR8, .provenance integrity hash-value
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Message R9
Let encryptedDataR9 = fidT1jjgetDataItem(T1)jjwasInitiatedByjjidM4gk0
DP PS
Let integrityHashR9 = h(idT1jjgetDataItem(T1)jjwasInitiatedByjjgetHash(R8))
Let signatureWithHashR9 = Signk
 1
DP(h(idT1jjgetDataItem(T1)jjwasInitiatedByjj
idM4jjintegrityHashR9))
R9=
rpa(
encryptedDataR9, .encrypted data
signatureWithHashR9), . message signature with hash
integrityHashR9 .provenance integrity hash-value
)
Message R10
Let encryptedDataR10 = fidM10jjgetDataItem(M10)jjoverlappedWithjjidM5gk0
DC PS
Let integrityHashR10 = h(idM10jjgetDataItem(M10)jjoverlappedWithjjgetHash(R9))
Let signatureWithHashR10 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM10jjgetDataItem(M10)jjoverlappedWithjj
idM5jjintegrityHashR10))
R10=
rpa(
encryptedDataR10, .encrypted data
signatureWithHashR10), .message signature with hash
integrityHashR10 .provenance integrity hash-value
)
Message R11
Let encryptedDataR11 = fidT1jjgetDataItem(T1)jjusedjjidM10gk0
DP PS
Let integrityHashR11 = h(idT1jjgetDataItem(T1)jjusedjjgetHash(R10))
Let signatureWithHashR11 = Signk
 1
DP(h(idT1jjgetDataItem(T1)jjusedjj
idM10jjintegrityHashR11))
R11=
rpa(
encryptedDataR11, .encrypted data
signatureWithHashR11, .message signature with hash
integrityHashR11 .provenance integrity hash-value
)
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Let encryptedDataR12 = fidM11jjgetDataItem(M11)jjwasGeneratedByjjidT1gk0
DP PS
Let integrityHashR12 = h(idM11jjgetDataItem(M11)jjwasGeneratedByjjgetHash(R11))
Let signatureWithHashR12 = Signk
 1
DP(h(idM11jjgetDataItem(M11)jjwasGeneratedByjj
idT1jjintegrityHashR12))
R12=
rpa(
encryptedDataR12, .encrypted data
signatureWithHashR12, .message signature with hash
integrityHashR12 .provenance integrity hash-value
)
Message R13
Let encryptedDataR13 = fidM12jjgetDataItem(M12)jjinAckTojjidM11gk0
DC PS
Let integrityHashR13 = h(idM12jjgetDataItem(M12)jjinAckTojjgetHash(R12))
Let signatureWithHashR13 = Signk
 1
DC(h(idM12jjgetDataItem(M12)jjinAckTojj
idM11jjintegrityHashR13))
R13=
rpa(
encryptedDataR13, .encrypted data
signatureWithHashR13, .message signature with hash
integrityHashR13 .provenance integrity hash-value
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Figure 6.3: Task Request UMLSec Sequence Diagram FormalisationChapter 6 Securing the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture 161
6.2.2 Verifying the Execution of the Protocols
Now that the OTLS, Data Request and Task Request protocols have been secured,
we can verify the integrity, condentiality and non-repudiation of the messages and p-
assertions exchanged between the actors. Thus, before assertions are recorded in the
Provenance Store, they need to be checked. In the diagrams 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, these
checks are represented by guards, which are processes carried out by the actors after
messages have been received.
Algorithm 8 Signature Message Checking
Input: Mi : message, k0 : sessionKey, kA : publicKey
Output: true if the signature of Mi is correct or false if it is not.
1: procedure signCheck(Mi : message, k0 : sessionKey, kA : publicKey)
2: if ExtkA(getSign(Mi)) = h(Deck0(getEncData(Mi))) then
3: return true . Signature is correct
4: else
5: return false . Signature is incorrect
6: end if
7: end procedure
Guards are shown in the sequence diagrams in rounded blue rectangles and are identied
by the names guardMi, guardIi and guardRi, which are used to verify the content of
messages Mi, interaction p-assertion Ii and relationship p-assertion Ri, respectively.
These guards use Algorithm 8 to check the message signatures and Algorithm 9 to verify
the hash-values that are included in the messages to guarantee their integrity. In the
following sections, we discuss in further detail how the correct execution of the protocols
described in Section 6.2 (OTLS, Data Request and Task Request) can be veried.
Algorithm 9 Hash-value Message Checking
Input: Ri : message and Ri-1 : message
Output: true if the hash-value of Ri is correct or false if it is not.
1: procedure hashCheck(Ri : message, Ri-1 : message)
2: if getHash(Ri) = h(getDataItem(Ri) k getRel(Ri) k getHash(Ri-1)) then
3: return true . Hash-value is correct
4: else
5: return false . Hash-value is incorrect
6: end if
7: end procedure
6.2.2.1 Verifying the Execution of OTLS
In this section, we only explain the guards related to the execution of the OTLS protocol;
the explanation of the guards related to the assertions generated by these messages is
very similar to the ones in the Data Request and Task Request protocols, and are
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After receiving M1, guardM1 is performed by the server to check the client's certicate.
In this guard, the signature is veried by extracting the client's public key k0
C and the
name C from the certicate (which is essentially the public key and the client name
signed with the Certicate Authority private key) and comparing it to the plain copy of
both. If this verication is successful, the server sends message M2. When the client
receives M2 the guardM2 is veried. In this guard, the server's certicate is veried in
the same way as in the previous message. Then, the random number (Nj), the client's
public key (kC) and the pre-master secret (k0) are extracted from the signature. The
latter is used to create the next message. After that, message M3 is sent with the server's
name encrypted with the session key. In guardM3, this key is used to decrypt it and
verify that both, the server and the client, posses the generated key. At this stage the
session key is already agreed upon and it is renamed to k0
C S.
6.2.2.2 Verifying the Execution of Data Request
The verication process for the Data Request protocol is divided in three parts: checking
messages, checking interaction p-assertions and checking relationship p-assertions.
The guards related to the checking of messages Mi are very similar. When messages
M4, M5 and M6 are received, the corresponding data is decrypted and the signature is
veried using Algorithm 8. For example, guardM4 represents the process that veries
the signature and decrypts the data contained in message M4, which in this case is the
purpose. Thus, this guard rst checks that the signature is valid and then decrypts
purpose. The remaining guards (guardM5, guardM6) are interpreted similarly.
The second set of guards is related to the interaction p-assertions that are about to be
stored in the Provenance Store. In this sequence diagram, we only present guardI7,
which represents the verication process of the interaction p-assertion I7. This p-
assertion contains information about M4 and it is recorded by DC. Then, this guard
checks that the signature contained in I7 is valid before recording its content in the
Provenance Store using Algorithm 8. The guards related to the remaining interaction
p-assertions are created and interpreted similarly.
Turning to relationship p-assertions, when R3, R4, R5 are received by PS, their hash-
values6 and signatures are checked using Algorithm 8 and 9. These verications are
represented as guards guardR3, guardR4, guardR5.
6As hash-values depend on hash-values contained in previous messages, the Provenance Store should
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6.2.2.3 Verifying the Execution of Task Request
The interpretation of guards related to the checking of messages Mi in the Task Request
protocol is very similar to the ones previously explained. Upon receipt of messages M10,
M11 and M12, their corresponding data is decrypted and the signature is veried using
Algorithm 8.
The interpretation of interaction p-assertions' guards is the same as the ones explained
in previous diagrams. As a consequence, these guards are not present in this protocol.
Turning to the guards that are related to the relationship p-assertions, the explanation
of guardR8, guardR9, guardR10, guardR11, guardR12 and guardR13 is the same as the
the previous guards related to relationship p-assertions: the signature and the hash-
value are veried using Algorithm 8 and 9, respectively. After each guard is successfully
checked, the corresponding assertion is stored in the Provenance Store. In that way, we
guarantee that that the integrity of each assertion was not compromised.
6.2.2.4 Verifying Assertions during Storage Stage
After the successful execution of the protocols discussed above, the corresponding as-
sertions are stored in the Provenance Store. It is important to note that assertions are
decrypted and veried before being stored. Thus, in order to protect condentiality dur-
ing storage, assertions should be encrypted by the Provenance Store using a specially
created key or can be protected by implementing access control techniques (See Section
2.4).
At any point it is possible to check the integrity of the entire content of the Provenance
Store by verifying the hash-values and signatures of the assertions. This guarantees
that the assertions were not modied during exchange or storage. This check can be
performed periodically to verify the integrity of the Provenance Store, and to take the
necessary measures if a problem is found. This mechanism can also be used to detect
internal attacks, such as attacks from the Provenance Store administrator who attempts
to maliciously modify the stored assertions. To be able to perform these checks, the
secure storage of the entities' keys (public and private) is crucial. This needs to be
done to avoid problems checking signatures created by entities whose public key have
changed. In contrast, session keys do not need to be stored, since, as mentioned before,
after decrypting the information it can be re-encrypted using a specic key for protecting
condentiality during storage.
Another important issue is the malicious insertion of assertions. This can occur in three
dierent ways: (1) inserting messages in the communication channel between two ac-
tors, which leads to the creation of malicious assertions, (2) the insertion of a malicious
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and (3) the direct insertion of malicious assertions into Provenance Store. The rst
attack is prevented by the OTLS protocol, which creates a secure communication chan-
nel. This prevents the insertion of malicious messages, and consequently, the creation of
assertions related to them. To prevent the second attack, we assume that all actors that
record assertions are properly authenticated to the Provenance Store, so we can trust
the assertions created by them. To prevent the third one, we rely on the secure storage
of the private keys of the actors, which are required to create properly signed asser-
tions. Finally, as Assumption 1 explains (see Section 3.6), we assume that provenance
information cannot be partially or totally deleted.
So far, we have secured individual assertions created by individual actors in our archi-
tecture. However, a provenance DAG returned in response to a query to the Provenance
Store using only these secure assertions is still vulnerable. To illustrate this, consider
the following scenario. Suppose that a piece of data d1 is used by a process p1 executed
by actor A. After that, the same piece of data is used by a process p2 executed by actor
B. These operations lead to the creation of two (partially overlapping) fragments of the
provenance graph: one containing d1 and p1, and a relation R1 indicating that p1 used
d1, and a fragment containing d1 and p2, and a relation R2 indicating that p2 used d1.
Now, when these fragments are merged into a single provenance DAG and returned as
a query result, it has two vulnerabilities. The rst is that actor A can change relation
R1, because it possesses the keys used to sign this relation. For example, A can make it
point to a dierent process or change its relationship name. The same applies to actor
B and relation R2. The second vulnerability is that any actor can delete any node or
relation of the DAG as well as add new ones. This is because nodes do not secure infor-
mation about the relationships they participate in. For example, any actor can delete
p1 and R1, because d1 does not have information about the fact that it participates in
R1. Consequently, we need a dierent mechanism to protect the integrity of provenance
graphs. This mechanism is presented in the next section.
6.3 Securing the Querying and Analysis Stage
At this point, we can guarantee that the assertions generated by actors and stored in the
Provenance Store have not been maliciously altered during the recording and storage
stages. Thus, when the processing of information has nished, assertions can be queried
to obtain provenance DAGs containing the provenance of a particular piece of data.
To maintain the integrity and non-repudiation of these provenance DAGs during the
querying stage, the Provenance Store inserts new cryptographic components. Then,
after a provenance DAG has been created, it can be securely transported. To achieve
this, we develop the Secured Provenance Graph, a data structure that is included in each
node of a provenance DAG during its creation and is later used to verify its integrity.
By including this structure, we can protect the provenance DAGs from any maliciousChapter 6 Securing the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture 165
alteration performed by an attacker (who may even be an auditor). At the same time,
the identity of the actor who created a provenance DAG becomes veriable.
First, in Section 6.3.1, we present the Secured Provenance Graph. Then, in Section 6.3.2
we present the algorithm to verify the integrity of a Secured Provenance Graph. Finally,
we secure the Query Protocol dened in Section 6.3.3, and show where in the protocol
this graph is created.
6.3.1 Secured Provenance Graph
Let us consider a set of node identiers Id, a set of data D, a set of hash-values H, and
a set of relationships' names R. A Secured Provenance Graph G = (V;E;Node;Edge)
is a directed acyclic graph, where V = Id, E  IdId, Node : Id ! DH is the node
labelling function, and edges are labelled using the function Edge : E ! R.
Furthermore, given a Secured Provenance Graph G, we include a reference to a piece
of data and a hash-value into each node. Then, given a node id 2 V , we obtain its
corresponding data by the accessor dataG(id) and its corresponding hash-value by the
accessor hashG(id). We also create a lexicographically ordered list (the reason for doing
this will be discussed later) of ancestors' identiers by the accessor ancestorG(id). The
hash-value contained in each node is then computed as:
compHashG(id) = h
0
@dataG(id)
n
idi2ancestorG(id)
edge(id;idi) k hashG(idi)
1
A(6.8)
Equation (6.8) creates a hash-value that is used to verify not only the integrity of the
data and the relationships related to id but also the integrity of the past (origin) of
the data. This is achieved by including the hash-values of the ancestors of id, which
creates an unforgeable reference to its past. The complete Secured Provenance Graph is
protected by the signature of the Provenance Store, so it is not possible for another entity
to reproduce it without being noticed. We compute this signature S = Signk 1
PS(G),
which is attached to the corresponding provenance graph after the provenance graph is
constructed. We also dene the accessor signG(G) to obtain the signature related to
the graph G.
Figure 6.4 presents an example of a Secured Provenance Graph, in which nodes are rep-
resented by circles containing data di, the directed edges are labelled with relationships
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We assume that a simple provenance graph is created by a querying service. After that,
Equation (6.8) is used in each of the nodes of the simple provenance graph to create a
Secured Provenance Graph.
Note that instead of data, nodes can contain references to data. If that is the case, the
necessary credentials to access to the original piece of data and a hash-value of such a
piece of data should be included, in addition to the reference itself. In that way, after
the original data is retrieved using the corresponding credentials, its integrity can be
checked using the included hash-value.
Figure 6.4: An example of a Secured Provenance Graph
It is important to note that the order of the relationships and the hash-values in each
node is a very important issue. In graphs, the outgoing edges of a node are not ordered.
However, if we want to create and later verify the hash-values contained in such a
node, it is necessary to preserve certain order in the checking process. For example,
the hash-value of node d3, which is presented in Figure 6.4, can be created in two
dierent ways. If we take r5 in rst place, we obtain the hash-value h3 = h(d3r5h6r6h7).
But, if we take r6 in rst place, its hash-value is h3 = h(d3r6h7r5h6). Both hash-
values represent the same node in the provenance graph. Nevertheless, if we do not
know the order in which the hash-value was created, its checking will be incorrect as
h(d3r5h6r6h7) is dierent from h(d3r6h7r5h6). In our case, the list of ancestors' identiers
is lexicographically ordered according to the relationship's names. Then, the correct
hash-value is h3 = h(d3r5h6r6h7). Therefore, choosing and dening an order technique
that all the principals know beforehand and maintain during the creation, recording and
querying processes is decisive in the integrity checking of provenance graphs. If such an
ordering technique is not used in all the mentioned processes, we are not able to check
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Note that a provenance graph can contain nodes with no relationships. This does not
mean that such nodes do not have a \past". Instead, however, it means that the prove-
nance graph does not contain the past of such nodes because it is not relevant for the
analysis stage7. If for some reason, a problem is found in these nodes without explicit
past, the auditor can request a provenance graph showing their past from the Provenance
Store. Later, this new provenance graph can be checked.
6.3.2 Verifying a Secured Provenance Graph
During the querying stage, an auditor sends a provenance query to the Provenance Store
which returns a provenance graph in response. If this provenance graph is a Secured
Provenance Graph, its integrity should be checked before commencing a compliance
analysis (see Chapter 5). By doing so, any tampering or forgery of the elements of the
provenance graph can be detected, and the perpetrators can be identied. If the graph
is valid, the compliance analysis is allowed to begin.
Algorithm 10 The Integrity Checking Algorithm
Input: G = (V;E;Node;Edge) a Secured Provenance Graph and kPS the Public Key
of PS.
Output: 1 if the integrity of G is not compromised or 0, -1 otherwise.
1: procedure integrityCheck(G : Secured Provenance Graph, kPS : publicKey)
2: id : node identier 2 V
3: if ExtkPS(signG(G)) 6= h(G) then
4: return 0 . signature is incorrect
5: end if
6: for each id 2 V do
7: if hashG(id) 6= (compHashG(id)) then
8: return -1 . integrity is compromised in id
9: end if
10: end for
11: return 1 . Success
12: end procedure
In order to perform an integrity check of a Secured Provenance Graph, we introduce
the integrityCheck algorithm (see Algorithm 10). This algorithm rst veries the
signature associated with the graph using the public key of the Provenance Store kPS.
This signature is used to check whether the content of any part of the complete graph
was altered. If this signature cannot be veried, there is no reason to continue with the
rest of the process, and the algorithm returns 0.
If the signature is found to be correct, the algorithm proceeds to verify the hash-value
of each node in the graph. This is achieved by visiting each node in the graph, and
computing a hash-value by calling the compHashG function (see Equation 6.8) for each
7The relevance of the information is dened by the provenance queries, such as the ones presented in
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of these nodes. This new hash-value depends on the ancestors' hashes, which in turn
depend on the hash-values of their ancestors, etcetera. This computed hash-value is
compared against the hash-value contained in the node. If they are found to be dierent,
the integrity of this node has been compromised. If, after visiting all the nodes, no
problems are found, we can conclude that the integrity of all nodes is intact.
Now, if the integrity of any of the provenance graph nodes was found to be compromised,
the algorithm indicates which one was altered by outputting its corresponding id. The
auditor can access the information stored in the Provenance Store related this id in
order to check whether it was altered since the recording stage (see Section 6.2.2.4). If,
however, the integrity of the provenance DAG is intact, the audit process is allowed to
begin. In this way, we can guarantee that the results derived from the analysis of a
secured provenance graph are based on information that was not maliciously altered.
In this thesis, we assume that deletion of provenance information is not allowed since all
assertions that our model records to be able to perform a successful audit are required
(see Assumption 1 in Section 3.6). Moreover, if one or more assertions are deleted, Algo-
rithm 10 will nd an integrity problem, because the hash-values are incorrect. However,
it is impossible to determine whether this is caused by the deletion of assertions, or by the
fact that some assertions have been (maliciously) altered. To avoid this from happening,
provenance repositories should implement appropriate access control techniques.
6.3.3 Securing the Query Request Protocol
To have a completely secured querying stage, the communication between auditors and
Provenance Store also needs to be secured to avoid that a provenance graph is forged
during this transmission. Thus, in this section we secure the Query Request protocol
(see Section 4.3.4).
The process that models the Query Request protocol (Figure 6.5) is similar to the one
explained in Section 4.3.4, but the former uses the secure messages dened in Section
6.1.4. The Auditor initiates the protocol by requesting the provenance of a certain data
item (item) under certain scope (scope) in message Q1. Below, message Q1 is formally
described.
Let encryptedDataQ1 = fidQ1jjitemjjscopegk0
AU PS
Let integrityHashQ1 = h(idQ1jjitemjjscope)
Let signatureWithHashQ1 = Signk
 1
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Q1=
secureMsg(
encryptedDataQ1, . encrypted data
signatureWithHashQ1, . message signature with hash
integrityHashQ1 . provenance integrity hash-value
)
The PS resolves the query and returns the result qresult to Auditor in message Q2. The
dierence from the unsecured protocol from Section 4.3.4 is that here, the query result
is represented as a Secured Provenance Graph which is created by the Provenance Store.
Then, after the provenance query result is obtained, Equation (6.8) is used in each of
the nodes of such result to create a Secured Provenance Graph and sent to Auditor.
Below, message Q2 is formally described.
Let encryptedDataQ2 = fidQ2jjqresultgk0
AU PS
Let integrityHashQ2 = h(idQ2jjqresult)
Let signatureWithHashQ2 = Signk
 1
PS(h(idQ2jjqresultjjintegrityHashQ2))
Q2=
secureMsg(
encryptedDataQ2, . encrypted data
signatureWithHashQ2, . message signature with hash
integrityHashQ2 . provenance integrity hash-value
)
When the Secured Provenance Graph is received by Auditor, its integrity is checked by
calling the integrityCheck procedure in Algorithm 10. In this model, this procedure
is represented as part of the guard that is executed after the provenance query result
is received. If the integrity of the provenance graph has not been compromised, an
acknowledgement is sent to PS in message Q3 and the compliance verication process is
allowed to begin. If not, the protocol terminates and indicates to the PS which node is
incorrect. Below, message Q3 is formally described.
Let encryptedDataQ3 = fidQ3jjOKgk0
AU PS
Let integrityHashQ3 = h(fidQ3jjOK)
Let signatureWithHashQ3 = Signk
 1
AU(h(fidQ3jjOKjjintegrityHashQ3))
Q3=
secureMsg(
encryptedDataQ3, . encrypted data
signatureWithHashQ3, . message signature with hash
integrityHashQ3 . provenance integrity hash-value
)
As in previous diagrams, we formally describe the interaction p-assertions (IQ1, IQ2 and
IQ3 and relationship p-assertions (RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3) created during the execution of
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Message IQ1
Let signatureWithHashIQ1 = Signk
 1
AU(h(idQ1jjsender))
IQ1=
ipa(
idQ1, . Q1 Query Request message identier
sender, .view
signatureWithHashIQ1 .message signature with hash
)
Message IQ2
Let signatureWithHashIQ2 = Signk
 1
AU(h(idQ2jjreceiver))
IQ2=
ipa(
idQ2, .Q2 Query Request message identier
receiver, .view
signatureWithHashIQ2 .message signature with hash
)
Message IQ3
Let signatureWithHashIQ3 = Signk
 1
AU(h(idQ3jjsender))
IQ3=
ipa(
idQ3, .Q3 Query Request message identier
sender, .view
signatureWithHashIQ3 .message signature with hash
)
Message RQ1
Let encryptedDataRQ1 = fidQ1jjgetDataItem(Q1)jjinResponseTojjidM3gk0
AU PS
Let integrityHashRQ1 = h(idQ1jjgetDataItem(Q1)jjinResponseTojjgetHash(R2))
Let signatureWithHashRQ1 = Signk
 1
AU(h(idQ1jjgetDataItem(Q1)jjinResponseTojj
idM3jjintegrityHashRQ1))
RQ1=
rpa(
encryptedDataRQ1, .encrypted data
signatureWithHashRQ1, .message signature with hash
integrityHashRQ1 .provenance integrity hash-value
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Message RQ2
Let encryptedDataRQ2 = fidQ2jjgetDataItem(Q2)jjqueryResultOfjjidQ1gk0
AU PS
Let integrityHashRQ2 = h(idQ2jjgetDataItem(Q2)jjqueryResultOfjjgetHash(Q1))
Let signatureWithHashRQ2 = Signk
 1
AU(h(idQ2jjgetDataItem(Q2)jjqueryResultOfjj
idQ1jintegrityHashRQ2))
RQ2=
rpa(
encryptedDataRQ2, .encrypted data
signatureWithHashRQ2, .message signature with hash
integrityHashRQ2 .provenance integrity hash-value
)
Message RQ3
Let encryptedDataRQ3 = fidQ3jjgetDataItem(Q3)jjinAckTojjidQ2gk0
AU PS
Let integrityHashRQ3 = h(idQ3jjgetDataItem(Q3)jjinAckTojjgetHash(Q2))
Let signatureWithHashRQ3 = Signk
 1
AU(h(idQ3jjgetDataItem(Q3)jjinAckTojj
idQ2jjintegrityHashRQ3))
RQ3=
rpa(
encryptedDataRQ3, .encrypted data
signatureWithHashRQ3), .message signature with hash
integrityHashRQ3 .provenance integrity hash-value
)
Figure 6.5: Query Request UMLSec Sequence Diagram172 Chapter 6 Securing the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture
6.3.3.1 Verifying the Execution of Query Request
To verify the correct execution of the Query Request protocol, it contains several guards.
These verify the integrity of the messages contained in this diagram, and are very similar
to the guards explained in previous diagrams: each message signature and hash-values
are veried and the content is decrypted to be later processed using Algorithms 8 and
9.
The only dierence is in guardQ2, which after verifying the signature of the message and
decrypting it, it invokes the integrityCheck procedure that veries the integrity of
the query results. If any problems are found, the compliance checking is not allowed to
start according to the framework presented in Chapter 5.
6.4 Verifying the Secure Provenance-based Auditing Ar-
chitecture
In the previous sections, we secured the entire provenance life cycle consisting of the
recording, storage, querying and analysis stages. Taken together, these stages form
the Secure Provenance-based Auditing Architecture that exhibits the four basic security
characteristics (condentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation) that we
set out to establish at the beginning of this thesis.
To verify that these characteristics indeed hold, in this section we perform several types
of attacks on this architecture, and demonstrate that these attacks fail.
To do this, we rst discuss the Viki model checker we used to verify the architecture
and give an example of its execution in Section 6.4.1.2 Then, in Section 6.4.2, we use
the Viki model checker to verify that several known attacks are successfully thwarted
by our architecture.
6.4.1 The Viki Model Checker
As mentioned in Section 2.3.2.3, the Viki model checker [80] can be used to verify that
the security requirements expressed in UMLSec are maintained during the execution
of the protocols presented in the previous sections. With that purpose, Viki takes as
input a UMLSec sequence diagram and its associated adversary model, and returns the
possible attacks that can be performed by the given attacker in the modelled protocol.
Viki obtains the security requirements from the UMLSec elements and the predened
values used in sequence diagrams. These requirements are formalised in First-Order
Logic and analysed with automatic theorem provers (Viki uses e-SETHEO [131] and
SPASS [145]) to nd aws. If a 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the attack trace, which can provide a system designer with valuable insights on how to
solve it.
The set of protocols presented in the previous sections are used as the input of the Viki
tool to automatically generate attacks. In that way, we can ensure that these attacks
are unsuccessful in our protocols. Since, in this context, a successful attack means that
the system does not exhibit one of the security properties [125], Viki enables us to verify
system security.
Before presenting the security verication process of our architecture, we rst explain
how Viki works. With that purpose, in the next section, we describe how to create the
adversary model that is later used by Viki in the verication process.
6.4.1.1 The Adversary Model
To verify that the four security characteristics hold for the data exchanged in our se-
quence diagrams, we use UMLSec to dene the information an adversary can get access
to. This is achieved by the creation of an adversary model. The adversary model we
use here represents an attacker that can eavesdrop, modify or insert messages into the
communication channel with malicious intentions. This adversary model is based on
an extended Dolev-Yao adversary model [50], in which an adversary is able to read all
messages exchanged by the participants of a protocol to obtain sensitive information.
In the verication process that follows, we associate an adversary object with each
sequence diagram to determine whether the modelled protocol indeed has the aforemen-
tioned security properties. To this end, the adversary is modelled by three set of values
called secret, initial knowledge and guard. The values associated with secret are
the data items that should be protected from the attacker. The values contained in
the initial knowledge denote the information known by the attacker beforehand (e.g.
public keys). Finally, the set guard contains the checks that are performed by the re-
ceiver of a message. These were dened in Section 6.2.2. Table 6.4 shows the secret
and initial knowledge of the adversary models for each protocol.
Protocol secret initial knowledge
OTLS k0
C S kC, kS, kCA
Data Request purpose, data and OK kDC, kDS
Task Request processData, result and OK kDC, kDP
Query Request item, scope, qresult and OK kAU, kPS
Table 6.4: The secret and initial knowledge of the adversary objects used to
verify our protocols
In what follows, we explain how Viki veries the sequence diagrams with the correspond-
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6.4.1.2 An Example of the Viki Verication Process
In order to show how the Viki model checker can be used to verify a protocol modelled
in UMLSec, we present an example taken from [79, 71]. In this example, which is shown
in Figure 6.6, a awed version of the OTLS protocol is used [19]. In this protocol, it is
possible to perform a man-in-the-middle attack [139] by impersonating the client.
This UMLSec diagram is created using the notation described in Section 2.3.2.2 and acts
as the input of the Viki model checker. As Figure 6.7 shows, Viki outputs the result
\Proof Found", meaning that an attack was found. Put dierently, the information
contained in the secret set can become known by the attacker. This result is supported
by the creation of a Thousands of Problems for Theorem Provers (TPTP) le 8, which
shows how a man-in-the-middle attack can be performed. Thus, the attacker is able to
obtain the secret data, which in this case is the symmetric session key.
Figure 6.6: A version of OTLS with a security aw
In more detail, Figure 6.8 depicts in the form of a sequence diagram the content of the
corresponding TPTP le. This diagram shows how an attacker can perform the man-in-
the-middle attack by impersonating the client and establishing communication with
the server, while the server believes it is establishing communication with the client.
As presented in [71], this vulnerability can be removed by including the client's public
key (kC) in the second message of the protocol. By including this parameter, a man-
in-the-middle attack can be prevented and, as a result, an attacker will not be able to
obtain the created secret key. Figure 6.9 presents the repaired version of the protocol.
If we check this sequence diagram using Viki, we obtain the result \Completion Found"
(See Figure 6.10). This means that the attacker cannot obtain the secret parameter (the
symmetric session key) during the execution of this protocol.
8A TPTP le is produced by the TPTP library [132]. This library supports the testing and evalua-
tion of Automated Theorem Proving(ATP) systems by dening general evaluation guidelines and using
standard formats for inputs and outputs. Viki uses this library to analyse the possible attacks to the
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Figure 6.7: Viki verication result for the protocol in Figure 6.6
Figure 6.8: A Man-in-the-middle Attack on the OTLS Protocol with a security aw
Figure 6.9: The OTLS protocol after repairing the security aw present in Figure 6.6
(public key kC is added to the second message)
In what follows, we verify the presented sequence diagrams using the Viki tool. This
means that we evaluate the simultaneous execution of the adversary model and the176 Chapter 6 Securing the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture
Figure 6.10: Viki verication result for the protocol in Figure 6.9
sequence diagram to identify whether attacks to the four basic security characteristics
can be successfully performed.
6.4.2 Verication
To verify that the integrity property is maintained during the execution of the protocols,
we use the Viki model checker discussed in the previous section. Using Viki, each
sequence diagram and its corresponding adversary model are executed simultaneously
to determine whether the adversary's attack was successful. In this context, a successful
attack means that one of the basic security properties does not hold [125]. These attacks
are dened as follows:
Denition 6.1 (Successful Condentiality Attack). A sequence of protocol transitions
that lead to a piece of data contained in the secret set to be in the possession of the
attacker.
Denition 6.2 (Successful Integrity Attack). A sequence of protocol transitions that
lead to a piece of data contained in the secret set to be modied without being noticed.
Denition 6.3 (Successful Non-Repudiation Attack). A sequence of protocol transi-
tions that lead to the possibility of denying sending of a piece of data contained in the
secret set.
Denition 6.4 (Successful Authentication Attack). A sequence of protocol transitions
that lead to a piece of data contained in the secret set being sent in a message whose
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In what follows, we derive the set of properties that we will verify using Viki. If Viki nds
no successful attacks, we can deduce that our protocols indeed exhibit these properties
hold. If not, Viki gives the sequence of protocol transitions that invalidates the particular
property.
Lemma 6.5 (Condentiality Property). No successful condentiality attack is possible
for OTLS, Data Request, Task Request and Query Request Protocols.
Lemma 6.5 states that an adversary is unable to obtain elements from the secret set
during the execution of the OTLS, Data Request, Task Request and Query Request
Protocols. This lemma is based on the fact that a piece of data contained in the set of
secret values cannot be deduced by an adversary during the execution of the protocol.
We veried these protocols using Viki, and we found that this lemma holds.
Lemma 6.6 (Integrity Property). No successful integrity attack is possible for OTLS,
Data Request, Task Request and Query Request Protocols.
Lemma 6.6 states that an adversary cannot modify a piece of data marked as secret
during the execution of the OTLS, Data Request, Task Request and Query Request
Protocols. This lemma is based on the collision resistant nature of the used cryptographic
hash function, which guarantees that an adversary cannot alter the integrity of a piece of
data (i.e. messages or assertions) without having a visible eect in the output. Moreover,
an adversary can not insert a new piece of data without being detected. Using Viki,
we veried these protocols and found that this lemma holds under the assumption that
collision resistant hash functions are used.
Lemma 6.7 (Non-Repudiation Property). No successful non-repudiation attack is pos-
sible for OTLS, Data Request, Task Request and Query Request Protocols.
Lemma 6.7 states that an adversary cannot deny having sent a message. This lemma
relies on the trapdoor one-way function used in the signing algorithm and the collision
resistant nature of the used hash function [96]. Both properties guarantee that an at-
tacker cannot reproduce a signature of a message, if it does not possess the corresponding
private key. Thus, assuming that the private key of the sender remains secret, we can
guarantee that only the entity that owns the private key is able to sign a message. Using
Viki, we veried that the modelled protocols are impervious to a non-repudiation attack.
Therefore, this lemma holds.
Lemma 6.8 (Authentication Property). No successful authentication attack is possible
for OTLS, Data Request, Task Request and Query Request Protocols.
Lemma 6.8 states that an adversary cannot participate in the architecture without rst
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authentication protocol, which in this case is OTLS. OTLS provide a multitude of se-
curity measures, such as, nonce numbers to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks, the im-
plementation of a hand shake protocol to create symmetric session keys and the use of
certicates issued by certied authorities [27]. By again using Viki, we found that an
authentication attack on the protocols is not possible, thereby proving this lemma.
6.4.3 Securing Provenance
Now that we have proved that all protocols in the Provenance Based-Auditing Architec-
ture are secure, we can show that the architecture itself is also secure. As we explained
in Section 6.4.2, the Data Request, Task Request and Query Request protocols (Section
6.2.1) are secure, since they exhibit the properties of integrity, condentiality, non-
repudiation and authentication. Thus, based on this, we can derive the next theorem:
Theorem 6.9 (Secure Provenance Based-Auditing Architecture). A Provenance Based-
Auditing Architecture is secure, since the properties of condentiality, integrity, non-
repudiation and authentication hold.
Theorem 6.9 relies on the property lemmas derived from each of the protocols of the
architecture, which were dened in the previous section. If each of the properties hold
in all protocols of our architecture, we have a Secure Provenance Based-Auditing Archi-
tecture.
Since Theorem 6.9 holds for the Secured Provenance-based Auditing Architecture, we
can conclude that, under the given assumptions, the architecture is secure and, therefore,
the provenance information created by it is secure as well. Thus, the results derived from
the analysis of this secured provenance data are based on correct information.
6.5 Discussion
Securing provenance is critical for making systems accountable and for measuring qual-
ity and trust in systems [103]. For that reason, researchers have developed dierent
techniques to prevent (malicious) alteration of provenance while it is created, trans-
ported, recorded and queried. In doing so, trust in the result derived from its analysis
can be signicantly increased. Hence, researchers have sought to address the challenge
of securing provenance information [135, 67, 31, 148, 68].
Tan et al. [135] expose and discuss the problem of securing provenance in a SOA-
based provenance system. To ensure accountability, liability and integrity of provenance
assertions, they use digital signatures providing non-repudiation. They discuss basic
security issues within provenance systems and mention access control as a possible so-
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proposed solution does not provide all four basic security characteristics; they guarantee
non-repudiation and integrity, but not condentiality and authentication.
Hasan et al. [67] argue that the importance of securing provenance has not been su-
ciently acknowledged within the elds of digital forensics, law, and regulatory compli-
ance. They identify integrity, availability and condentiality as the main properties that
a provenance-aware system should exhibit to provide trustworthy provenance. They
propose a provenance model [68], in which provenance is dened as the record of actions
taken on a particular document over its lifetime. Here, a document can be a le, a
database tuple or a network packet. In this approach, the provenance of a document is
represented by a \provenance chain", which is a linear time-ordered sequence of prove-
nance records pertaining to a specic version of the document. Because of this, in con-
trast to our DAG representation, non-linear relations are not expressible in their model.
Moreover, since their approach attaches provenance to a document itself, relations that
may exist with other documents are not recorded. Their method of guaranteeing the
integrity of the provenance of a document is similar to ours, i.e. relations between sub-
sequent versions of a document are secured by including hashes of the ancestors into the
document. The dierence is that, in our approach, only the hashes of the predecessors
are considered, instead of all ancestors of a node. By doing so, our method is more
scalable, since only references to the previous operations performed on a piece of data
are stored, instead of references to its entire history.
Braun et al. [31] also discuss the problem of securing provenance. In their work, they
use a similar model to PASOA [64], the model used in this thesis, in which provenance is
represented as a graph. They argue provenance information diers from traditional data
and, therefore, the existing security models used to protect \traditional information" do
not apply to graphs and are therefore not easy to extend. Consequently, they present
the challenge of constructing a security model for provenance graphs. This model should
secure data and relationships in the graph, as the approach presented here. In contrast
to our work, however, they only focus on how to represent dierent levels of access
control on the elements of a provenance graph. In our approach this is addressed by
limiting access to the information contained in the provenance DAG to the auditor, who
is a trustworthy actor. However, users can decide to record references to the original
data in the provenance assertions, restricting access to the information contained on
the DAG. In that way, just the actors who have the right credentials can access this
information.
Xu et al. [148] discuss the problem of managing provenance systems. They dene
several desirable requirements that secure provenance-aware systems should exhibit: ac-
cess control, integrity, accountability and privacy protection. In order to satisfy these
requirements they propose a framework which contains a layer that maintains the in-
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As in our solution, they argue that integrity of both data and provenance information
is important. However, no concrete solution to this problem is presented.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we secured the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture by providing
the properties of condentiality, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation to the en-
tire provenance life cycle of recording, storage, querying and analysis. To do this, we
applied cryptographic techniques to the provenance-aware protocols of Data Request,
Task Request and Query Request that we developed in Chapter 4, and showed how these
techniques can be used to verify the correct execution of these protocols, i.e. that all four
aforementioned properties hold. Furthermore, to ensure that provenance DAGs cannot
be maliciously altered during the analysis stage, we developed the Secured Provenance
Graph. This graph contains specially designed hash-values in each of its nodes along
with a signature from the Provenance Store, which makes possible to detected malicious
alterations. Using the Integrity Checking Algorithm, we demonstrated that the integrity
of this graph can be easily veried.
We extensively and methodically analysed each protocol individually, and proved that
the presented techniques indeed support the four security requirements by conducting an
automatic verication of the presented protocols. Specically, using the Viki automatic
model checker, we veried that these properties hold during the execution of the proto-
cols. Moreover, we demonstrated that we can verify that the provenance information,
which is recorded in and queried from the Provenance Store, has not been tampered
with. By oering these security properties, we can guarantee query results obtained
from the Provenance Store are correct. Consequently, the analysis performed by the
verication algorithms of the Compliance Framework developed in Chapter 5 is based
on secure and correct DAGs.
From a more practical point of view, the method presented in this chapter can be easily
implemented by adding the corresponding security functions to the library that provides
provenance functionality. Indeed, to demonstrate that our methods are practically vi-
able, we developed a working proof of concept by augmenting the PReServ library [62]
(which allows developers to make applications provenance aware) with the algorithms
described in this chapter.
In more detail, we implemented a Java program that simulates the scenario in Sec-
tion 3.1, involving four actors: two data subjects that communicate with a single data
controller, which, in turn, communicates with a data processor. The program runs a
single process (i.e. it is not distributed), in which messages are (locally) exchanged using
TCP/IP. Public-private key pairs were created for each actor before the execution of
the scenario, which are stored on the local 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keys were created during the execution of the OTLS protocol and used to encrypt data
sent over the communication channels, and decrypt data when it is received. Since key
management and access control are outside the scope of this thesis, these aspects were
not implemented in the prototype.
To test the correctness of our protocols, we performed a number of tests, in which
various messages were altered during transmission or after storage in the provenance
store. After the termination of each test, we ran Algorithm 9 from Section 6.2.2 on the
assertions created in the provenance store in order to detect possible anomalies. The
tests we performed involved the following:
 No (malicious) alterations
 An alteration of a piece of application data (e.g. the date of birth)
 An alteration in the name of a relationship between data (e.g. wasGeneratedBy)
 An alteration of the endpoints of a relationship (e.g. result wasGeneratedBy t2,
instead of result wasGeneratedBy t1)
In all tests, the algorithms performed correctly: in the rst case, no anomalies were de-
tected (as expected), while in the second, third and forth cases, Algorithm 9 terminated
with the error message \hash value is incorrect".
We also executed several types of provenance queries (as in Section 4.4), and veried that
the result of these queries was not (maliciously) altered after creation. In more detail,
we performed the same four tests as mentioned above. Here, again, our algorithms
performed as expected. In the rst case, no anomalies were detected, while in the
second, third and forth cases, Algorithm 10 terminated with the error message \integrity
is compromised in id", where id is the identier of the specic element that was altered.
Needless to say, in its current form, our prototype has a number of limitations that
restrict its application in the real world. First, the system should be made distributed,
such that the various actors can run on dierent computers. This enables us to as-
certain how well the system scales under conditions where information and actors are
(physically) distributed. Second, access control to the provenance store needs to be im-
plemented to prevent unauthorised access to the provenance assertions, because these
contain (references to) private information. Third, keys should be properly managed
(which involves creation, safe storage, distribution and revocation) by all actors.
Of these limitations, key management is perhaps the most critical one, since all required
security properties of condentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation can-
not be maintained without it. In light of this, we briey discuss the challenges of key
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In more detail, there are three types of keys that are used in our proposed system that
need to be taken in to consideration when implementing key management: session keys
(such as k0
C S in Figure 6.1), private keys and public keys (such as k 1
C and kC in
Figure 6.1). Session keys should be treated dierently from private and public keys.
Specically, since session keys are used only once during the execution of a protocol
between two actors, they do not need to be stored after the protocol has terminated. In
more detail, the life time of a session key is the time it takes to execute a protocol. It
is created at the start of the protocol using OTLS, and is used to encrypt information
sent over the insecure channel, and decrypted immediately on receipt by the receiving
actor. To protect this information after it is stored in the provenance store, it should
be encrypted (using a dierent key than the session key) and access control should be
implemented to prevent unauthorised access.
Compared to session keys, private and public keys have a much longer life. As a result,
they need to be carefully stored over a longer period of time. Depending on the length
of this period, two possibilities exist: actors generate a single private-public key pair
which is used permanently, or they periodically discard their keys and generate new
ones. In both cases, public keys of all actors can be stored in our Provenance Store,
which is a central system that all actors have access to. Private keys need to be securely
stored by the actors themselves. However, since absolute security does not exist, there
is always a risk of a private key becoming compromised. As a result, the solution of
permanently using a single key pair is more vulnerable than periodically generating new
keys. However, the latter solution introduces a number of challenges, each of which
needs to be addressed carefully and securely:
Key revocation When a new key pair is generated, all actors should be made aware
that the key pair is no longer valid; accepting a signature made by a key that has
been revoked is a security risk.
Key distribution Up-to-date public keys should be accessible by all actors at all times.
These keys should also be veried and signed by a trusted third party to cre-
ate a digital certicate, so that actors cannot deny having sent a message (non-
repudiation).
Maintaining key history A history of public keys needs to be kept in order to ensure
that signatures made using expired keys can still be veried, and to ensure the
non-repudiation of all provenance information collected over time.
The most common way to address these challenges is the use of a Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI) [17]. The responsibility of a PKI is the secure creation, management,
distribution, usage, storage, and revocation of public-private pairs and their correspond-
ing digital certi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used and proven system. In addition, it addresses the third challenge by maintaining a
complete key history. It is therefore a strong candidate for managing keys in a proto-
type or deployed version of our system. However, as mentioned earlier, we consider this
outside the scope of this thesis and part of future work.
Thus far, we have given formal proofs of the correctness of the individual protocols.
There are several underlying assumptions that allow us to derive these proofs. However,
in practise, some of these assumptions might not hold. For example, one of the assump-
tions we made in this chapter is that provenance information is always available to be
used in the compliance analysis. In the next chapter, we discuss what happens when
this assumption (and others) are dropped. More specically, we present an analysis of
the attacks that a Provenance-based Auditing System can be subjected to, explaining
which of them are thwarted by the techniques developed in this thesis, and which of
them need additional measures to avoid.Chapter 7
System Evaluation
In the previous three chapters, we developed the three main contributions of this thesis:
the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture (Chapter 4) for capturing provenance of
processing of personal information, the Compliance Framework (Chapter 5) for verifying
that personal information was processed in compliance with a set of processing rules,
and the Secure Provenance-based Auditing Architecture (Chapter 6) that secures the
entire provenance life cycle of recording, storage, querying and analysis. Taken together,
these contributions ensure trustworthy audits of personal data processing.
However, until now, we have considered fairly idealised conditions under which a system
that implements these three contributions (i.e. build according to the Secure Provenance-
based Auditing Architecture) operates. In practise, these systems do not operate in
isolation. Rather they interact with each other, have multiple actors, and are distributed.
Therefore, it is necessary to identify the strengths and weaknesses of such systems under
more practical and realistic conditions.
To do this, we explore the eect of the most common (and known) attacks on our
system in an attempt to break the four basic security properties, and an additional one
(for reasons that will become clear later on): condentiality, integrity, authentication,
non-repudiation, and availability. To facilitate this evaluation, we employ Attack Trees
[123], a technique that is specically designed to evaluate the security of an information
system. In so doing, we determine whether our contributions are capable of protecting
both application data and provenance. Moreover, if they fall short in this respect, we
identify what is required to mitigate these new risks.
The main contribution of this chapter is to show that the Secured Provenance-based
Architecture is resistant to a set of important attacks on the basic security properties
under the assumption that vulnerabilities in the underlying operating system and attacks
from malware are addressed elsewhere.
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This chapter is organised as follows. First, in Section 7.1 we give an overview of Attack
Trees and their underlying methodology. Next, in Section 7.2, we dene the system that
we analyse in this chapter, which is based on the architecture described in Chapter 4.
Then, in Section 7.3, we give a summary of known attacks grouped by the aforementioned
security properties they aim to break. Given these attacks, in Section 7.4, we present
ve attack trees and their corresponding analysis. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.5.
7.1 Attack Trees
Attack Trees provide a formal, methodical way of testing the security of systems, using
a variety of attacks [123]. These attacks are represented as a tree structure in which
the root node is the goal of the attack, and the leafs are the ways in which the goal can
be achieved. Each node is a subgoal of its parent, and, in turn, its children are ways
to achieve that subgoal. Attack trees have two types of nodes, AND and OR. The rst
type, AND nodes, are used to represent all steps that need to succeed to achieving a
goal, whereas the second type, OR nodes, are used to represent alternatives. Thus, an
OR node succeeds if one of its children succeeds, while an AND node succeeds if all of
its children succeed.
Each node can also contain additional information about the goal it represents. Ex-
amples of additional information include whether the goal is possible or not (given the
current conguration of the system), the cost of achieving the goal, and whether the
attacker needs special resources to achieve it. Additionally, in our case, this information
also includes whether the attack is prevented by one of the techniques developed in the
previous chapters, or be detected by one of our assumptions from Section 3.6.
The aim of using Attack Trees is to understand all dierent ways in which a system can
be attacked and to design countermeasures to prevent such attacks. Attack Trees also
allow us to understand who the attackers are, and what their abilities, motivations, and
goals are.
Now, in order to create Attack Trees to test the security of a system, Schneier [123]
proposes a systematic methodology, which is presented below.
1. Identify all possible attack goals (threats) by considering the weaknesses of each
component, property, layer, etc. of the system. Each attack goal is the root of a
tree, and trees can share subtrees and nodes. Thus, the number of trees is equal
to the number of attack goals.
2. Create attack trees by enumerating all possible ways in which the attack goals
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possible ways are described. If the system changes, attacks can be added (based
on its new weaknesses) or removed (depending on whether they still apply).
3. For each possible attack goal, analyse the circumstances under which each leaf of
the corresponding tree can be reached by creating scenarios for successful achieve-
ment of the goal. To do this, prerequisites, assumptions and the attacker capa-
bilities should be included in these scenarios. Then, we decide how feasible each
attack goal is and what could happen if the conditions in the scenario change.
4. After identifying all feasible attacks, we identify the means by which all these
attacks can be prevented in a given scenario.
Using this methodology, we can dene the security assumptions of a system and deter-
mine if a system is vulnerable to a particular type of attack. For that reason, Attack
Trees are especially useful to perform architecture risk analysis.
A very useful characteristic of the attack trees is that they capture knowledge in a
scalable and reusable form. The trees can be modied at the same time as systems
change, and also can be reused by systems that have similar characteristics. However,
one drawback of this technique is that there is no guarantee of completeness. Thus, a
collection of attack trees does not necessarily represent all possible attacks. However, by
regularly evaluating the system, unrepresented attacks may be found. In sum, Attack
Trees help to conduct a high level analysis of security risks in a system to make the right
choices to mitigate or avoid such risks.
In Section 7.3 we perform steps 1 and 2 of the methodology described above. Then, in
Section 7.4, we perform steps 3 and 4. First, however, we describe the system we subject
to analysis using the Attack Tree technique.
7.2 System Denition
The systems we analyse in this chapter are based on the Secure Provenance-based Audit-
ing Architecture dened in Chapters 4 and 6. Each system consists of one or more Data
Subjects and one or more Data Processors, and interacts with other systems with the
same properties and structure. This leads to the interaction of various Data Controllers.
As mentioned in the initial assumptions (see Section 3.6), all entities record provenance
truthfully. To enforce this, these entities can, for example, record provenance automat-
ically using a library which can not be (maliciously) altered by its users.
A system with these characteristics presents a variety of security risks, which are mainly
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storage of information. These risks are analysed in our attack trees to show how the
secure architecture mitigates them.
It is important to mention that this analysis focuses on the technical security risks
that our system is exposed to. All the security issues related to the end-user, such as
lost passwords or keys, creation of weak passwords or physical security, are outside the
scope of this analysis. However, needless to say, administrators should implement the
necessary measures to prevent and avoid these issues that could impact the security of
the system.
7.3 System Attacks Analysis
Now that we have dened the system that can be subject to various attacks, we now
describe the actual attacks that can be performed against our architecture, which would
compromise the security of the audit process. By doing so, we cover steps 1 and 2 of
the Attack Tree Methodology.
As mentioned in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, we wish to guarantee four security properties:
integrity, condentiality, authentication and non-repudiation. In this section, we add a
fth property: availability, which guarantees information is available when needed. Even
though this property is out of the scope of this thesis, it is important because the lack of
availability can have a detrimental impact on the execution of our system. For example,
if for some reason the Provenance Store is not available due to an attack, the system will
be not able to record provenance, resulting in either an incomplete record of provenance
information, or a severe delay the execution of the application protocols (Data Request
and Task Request). Therefore, the attacks that we dene in the remainder of this section
focus on breaking each of these ve properties.
In the next sections, we describe what an attack on each property entails, and enumerate
the possible attacks that can compromise these properties. These attacks are used later
on to create the Attacks Trees, which are presented in Section 7.4.
7.3.1 Condentiality Attacks
A successful attack on the condentiality property means that information regarded as
\condential" is accessed by an attacker. Since all information in our system is encrypted
before being transported, to breach condentiality, an attacker needs to obtain (one or
more) private keys to decrypt previously stolen information or needs to obtain (on or
more) passwords to access a storage component containing condential information. In
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Related-key Attacks In this attack, an adversary uses cryptanalysis techniques to
observe the operation of a cipher to determine which keys were used or recently
created. Examples of this are known-key attacks and compromised-key attacks
[96]. These attacks can usually be performed on badly designed encryption algo-
rithms. In such cases, keys can be guessed if the key generation algorithm creates
weak keys or uses weak random number generators. One of our assumptions is
that only well-designed encryption algorithms are used.
Password-based Attacks This attack takes place when an adversary obtains a valid
password of a valid user, thereby gaining the rights of this a user, including those
that allow access to condential information. Examples of these attacks are pass-
word guessing attack, dictionary attack and brute force attack. The best way to
avoid these attacks is implementing precomputation techniques (such as hashing
passwords), salting techniques and requiring strong passwords [96]. Another im-
portant issue is the proper protection of passwords by users, such that they can not
be easily stolen. In this case, we work under the assumption that user passwords
are suciently strong and properly protected.
Snier Attack A snier or packet analyser is computer hardware or software that can
intercept and log trac passing through a network. These can be used to eavesdrop
on the communication channel, for example to perform related-key attacks or
attacks to break encryption algorithms. Once the attacker gets a valid key, all
encrypted trac can be decrypted. Here, we assume all the necessary physical
measures to avoid this type of attack are taken.
Data Driven Attacks In this attack, malicious code is embedded in innocuous-looking
data in an attempt to attack the system in dierent ways. Normally, this code is
not recognised by rewalls so it is easily introduced into the system. We assume
that our system is well protected against this type of attacks. Examples of these
attacks are:
(a) Trojans: These are pieces of software that give unauthorised access to an
adversary. In the case of breaking condentiality, they are used to conduct
password or key theft by unauthorised installation of software, unauthorised
downloading and uploading les, key stroke logging (record what is typed by
the user), etc.
(b) Trapdoors: These are weaknesses in software that is running on the system
that allows someone with knowledge of these weaknesses to gain unauthorised
access to condential data. These trapdoors are used by programmers for
security purposes to debug and test programs, but are not properly protected
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7.3.2 Integrity Attacks
A successful integrity attack means that information that has been transported or stored
has been (maliciously) altered. To break the integrity property, an attacker needs to
change the content of a sent message or the information stored in a persistent storage.
The attacks that can be conducted to compromise information integrity are enumerated
below:
Unauthorised Data Message Modication Attack In this attack, an adversary
modies the data contained in a message without being noticed. This directly
aects the integrity of the information transported in a communication channel.
To preserve the data integrity, it is important to use hash algorithms in messages
(for example, as we did in Chapter 6). Moreover, it is important that the chosen
hash algorithm is well designed to avoid hash attacks, which are described below.
Hash Attacks This type of attacks can take place if the implemented hash function is
badly designed. In such cases, attacks such as Birthday Attack, Yuval's Birthday
Attack, Pseudo-collision Attack or Chaining Attacks [96] can take place and com-
promise the integrity of data. One of the assumptions of our work is the use of a
strong, well-designed hash function.
Password-based Attacks / Trojans / Trapdoors These attacks, which were ex-
plained above, can also be used by an attacker to modify or delete les, thereby
aecting their integrity. Again, we assume that our system is well protected against
these.
7.3.3 Authentication Attacks
A successful attack on the authentication property means that an attacker gains the
ability to impersonate a valid user. To do this, the attacker needs to acquire some form of
identication that belongs to such valid user, such as a private key or a password. In more
detail, the attacks that can be conducted by an attacker to compromise authentication
are as follows:
Impersonation In this type of attacks, an adversary assumes the identity of one of the
legitimates parties in a system. These attacks include:
(a) Man in the middle (MITM): This is an attack in which a third person im-
personates one of the parties involved in a communication protocol. To avoid
this, is necessary to create a secure communication channel and freshly cre-
ated nonces, which is done in most of authentication protocols. It is important
to mention that the system is veried to be resistant to this attack by the
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(b) Interleaving attack, Reection Attack, Misplaced trust in a server, Replay
attack [96]: These attacks are a consequence of badly designed authentication
protocols. As such, they are not discussed here, since one of our assumptions
is the use of well designed protocols, such as TLS, OTLS or SSL, which have
been widely analysed and used. Moreover, the protocols presented in Chapter
6 were veried by Viki and found to be resistant to this type of attack.
(c) Obtain keys of a valid user: When keys are used as a proof of identity, an
attack can focus on acquiring such keys. To do this, an attacker can use
various techniques, such as data driven attacks (trojans, viruses, etc), related
key attacks or use password-based attacks, which were explained in Section
7.3.1.
Transitive Trust In this attack, an adversary obtains a user account using some of
the means already described. This account is then used to get more or higher-
level privileges or to create new accounts with administrator's privileges. This
attack compromises access control to resources (information, equipment, identities)
and, thereby, the integrity and condentiality of information. The identity of the
authorised user is also compromised. We assume that all the necessary access
control techniques are implemented to protect the resources of our system (see
Section 3.6).
7.3.4 Non-Repudiation Attacks
A successful attack on the non-repudiation property means that an attacker can modify
the evidence of the sending and receipt of a message in order to deny having sent or
received this message. To do this, the attacker needs to obtain the identity of a valid
actor using any of the attacks presented in the previous section, or steal the private keys
of a valid user to sign messages in his or her name. The attacks that can be conducted
by an attacker to compromise non-repudiation are listed below:
Impersonation This attack involves an attacker assuming the identity of a valid actor,
to be able to sign and send messages on its behalf.
Data driven attacks This attack involves an attacker stealing private keys or certi-
cates of a valid actor in order to obtain its identity.
7.3.5 Availability Attacks
A successful attack on the availability of a system means that an attacker is able to
prevent authorised users to access a system resource. To do this, the attacker saturates
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expend signicant computation or bandwidth. This way, the component can no longer
serve its intended purpose. These attacks also obstruct the communication between the
intended users and the component such that adequate communication becomes impos-
sible. In more detail, the following are common availability attacks:
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) These at-
tacks compromise the availability of information or services in a system or network
resource, and is a well-investigated issue [39, 96, 15]. One of our assumptions is
that all the necessary prevention measures have been implemented to avoid these
kind of attacks [39]. These include implementing route lters, disabling unused
network services, using redundant and fault tolerant network conguration, etc.
Trojans These attacks were previously explained as a means to break condentiality.
However, they can also be used to conduct DDoS attacks by using infected com-
puters to simultaneously launch a DoS attack on a predened target. As previously
stated, we assume the system is protected against these attacks.
Now that we have dened all possible attacks, and have identied the assumptions under
which the security analysis of our system will be performed, we can now formalise these
using Attack Trees.
7.4 Attack Trees Analysis
In this section, we create and analyse the Attack Trees using the previously presented
attack analysis. Thus, in this section we cover steps 3 and 4 of the Attack Trees Method-
ology discussed in Section 7.1.
Corresponding to each of the ve security properties discussed in the previous section,
we create ve attack trees with the following attack goals: disclosure of condential
information, compromise data integrity, compromise authentication, compromise non-
repudiation, and compromise system availability.
Before presenting the analysis of our Attack Trees, we present a set of security assump-
tions under which this analysis is made. To dierentiate these assumptions from the
ones dened in Section 3.6, the security assumptions are labelled with the letter S.
S1 All cryptographic algorithms and protocols used in the architecture are well de-
signed and cannot be forged. This includes encryption, digital signature and hash
algorithms, as well as authentication protocols.
S2 Access Control measures are implemented in all system resources, including data-
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S3 All information related to keys, certicates and passwords is securely stored and
protected. Also, keys, certicates and passwords are created using well-designed
methods.
S4 All necessary prevention measures to avoid \Snier Attacks", \Data Driven At-
tacks", \DoS" and \DDoS" have been implemented.
S5 We assume that all the actors use a library that allow them to automatically record
the provenance information we identied in Section 4.2. This library cannot be
deleted or accessed by attackers to intentionally modify its behaviour. The same
applies to the Usage Rules Denition (see Section 5.2), which cannot be deleted
or modied without previous authorisation of the administrator in charge.
Now, in the attack trees presented in this section, each node is given a colour. The
blue nodes are attacks that are not addressed in this thesis, and considered outside the
scope of our work. These attacks mainly relate to availability and authentication. The
red nodes are attacks that can be prevented by the assumptions listed above. These
nodes contain the labels of the corresponding assumptions. Finally, the green nodes
are the attacks are within the scope of our work, i.e. those that are addressed by the
contributions presented in this thesis. In these nodes, we include the corresponding
Lemma from Section 6.4 that addresses the corresponding attack.
In the upcoming subsections, we present the Attack Trees corresponding to the attacks
identied in the previous section.
7.4.1 Information Condentiality Attack Tree
The Information Condentiality Attack Tree is presented in Figure 7.1. This tree shows
attacks that can lead to the disclosure of condential information.
In this gure, the nodes labelled a, b and c represent attacks that are prevented by
the previously dened security assumptions: \Unauthorised access to data stored in
the Provenance Store", \Unauthorised access to data stored in the Local Database" and
\Unauthorised access to data usage rules". These three attacks are related to the Access
Control of the databases in our architecture. We assume these databases implement the
techniques discussed in 3.4.9 to prevent these attacks (Assumption S2).
The nodes labelled d and e, which are within the scope of our work, dierentiate between
the disclosure of data in the provenance assertions and the disclosure of data during
communication.
The attack corresponding to node d, \Disclosure of data in the assertions", is addressed
by Lemma 6.5. The goal of d can be accomplished by two dierent attacks: \Cross-
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an attacker, who can see the provenance that dierent entities are recording, combines
information from dierent sources to obtain private information that was not present in
the sources individually. In the \Inference" attack, an intruder uses this information to
infer new private information. To see why these attacks fail in our system, recall that
the information contained in provenance assertions can either be a copy of application
data or a reference to it. Now, if only references are maintained in these assertions, only
the auditor should have access to the original information. Thus, in this approach, both
attacks (cross-referencing and inference), can be prevented since attackers only have
access to references, which they can not resolve as they do not have the credentials to
access the original information.
The attack corresponding to node e, \Disclosure of data in the communication", has
three ways of succeeding: e:1 \Impersonation", e:2 \Snier Attack" and e:3 \Data
driven attacks". As mentioned in Assumption S4, we assume the necessary measures
have been taken to avoid the latter two attacks (e:2 and e:3) are successful.
To prevent attack e:1, \Impersonation", we rst need to ensure that all the keys and
password are created using well-designed cryptographic algorithms and are stored in a
secure place. This is guaranteed by Assumption S3. Furthermore, we need to guarantee
that our communication protocol cannot be attacked. This was veried in Chapter 6 by
formalising the protocol and the communication in the architecture (Lemma 6.5).
Therefore, following the analysis of this tree, we can ensure that condentiality attacks
are unsuccessful under the given security assumptions.
7.4.2 Information Integrity Attack Tree
The Information Integrity Attack Tree is presented in Figure 7.2, and shows the possible
attacks that compromise the integrity of information.
In Figure 7.2, there are two nodes, b and c, that are prevented by the assumptions:
\Unauthorised manipulation of data stored in the local databases" and \Unauthorised
manipulation of data usage rules". As previously mentioned, these attacks are related
to Access Control of the databases, for which we assume the necessary techniques have
been implemented (Assumption S2). Moreover, Assumption S5 makes tampering with
the data usage rules not possible, and ensures that provenance is securely recorded.
The remaining nodes are within the scope of our work: a \Unauthorised manipulation
of data stored in the PS", d \Unauthorised manipulation of assertions" and e \Unau-
thorised manipulation of data in the communication". These nodes represent attacks
that compromise the integrity of data contained in the Provenance Store, data contained
in assertions and data contained in the messages, respectively. These attacks are ad-
dressed in Lemma 6.6, which was presented in Chapter 6. More speci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associated to node a, d and e cannot be accomplished because the cryptographically
protected p-assertions (see Section 6.2.1) make malicious alteration of the information
stored in the Provenance Store not possible. However, cryptographic protection is based
on several additional assumptions. For node a, these are the same as for node c, which
was previously discussed.
Node d contains three dierent attacks. The rst, d:1, \Replicate plain data", is ad-
dressed by the Secure Provenance Graph (Section 6.3.1), which prevents corruption of
the integrity of the information and relations contained in this graph. The second, d:2,
\Impersonation", is addressed in the formalisation and verication our communication
protocol (as discussed in Section 7.4.1). The last one, d:3 \Hash-attacks" is prevented
by Assumption S1.
In node e, \Unauthorised manipulation of data in the communication", we guarantee the
integrity of data by implementing the OTLS protocol, which creates a secure communi-
cation channel. Since we assume that the encryption algorithms and hash functions used
within this protocol are well-designed (Assumption S1 and S2), the nodes e:1 \Encryp-
tion Attacks" and e:2 \Hash-attacks" are coloured red. Finally, the attack corresponding
to node e:3, \Impersonation", was addressed in Section 7.4.1.
Since all ve nodes represent unsuccessful attacks, we can ensure that, under the given
assumptions, the integrity of information is maintained.
7.4.3 Authentication Attack Tree
The Information Authentication Attack Tree is depicted in Figure 7.3, showing attacks
to compromise authentication in the system.
Analysing this tree, we initially have nodes a, \Compromise assertions end-point au-
thentication", b, \Compromise entities mutual authentication", and c, \Multiple user or
system identities". Nodes a and b are related to the dierent properties that authentica-
tion protocols and algorithms can provide to the information: end-point authentication
and mutual authentication.
In node a, end-point authentication is used to identify which entity sends a message.
In the attack associated with this node, we only need to prevent the \Impersonation"
attack (which was discussed in Section 7.4.1), assuming that the used hash techniques
are well-designed (Assumption S1) and that the necessary measures to avoid data driven
attacks have been implemented (Assumption S4).
In node b, mutual authentication veries the identity of two or more users that estab-
lished communication. This is addressed by the implementation of the OTLS protocol,
which was formalised in Chapter 6, specically in Lemma 6.8.Chapter 7 System Evaluation 197
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In both cases, the strength and secure storage of private keys and certicates is an im-
portant issue, which is addressed by Assumption S3. The remaining issues related to the
design of a secure protocol and a hash algorithm that can guarantee end-point authen-
tication and mutual authentication were explained and were solved by the formalisation
presented in Chapter 6.
Finally, node c, is an attack that involves the abuse of multiple identities. For example,
turning to our running example of the On-line Sales Scenario, a manager that plays
both the role of stock manager and HR manager is able to manually cross-reference or-
ders with job applications, which is in non-compliance with the Auditing Requirements.
This problem is the focus of the Identity Management research area [49, 83] that deals
with identifying individuals in a system to control the access to resources by placing
restrictions on the established identities. One of the challenges within this area is the
management of multiple identities that refer to the same individual or system. To avoid
these challenges, we assume that in our architecture each user has only one identity.
DiMicco and Millen, and Koch and Moslein [49, 83] discuss the possible solutions to this
problems and its future developments.
Thus, after analysing this tree, we can conclude that under the given assumptions the
aforementioned authentication attacks can be prevented.
7.4.4 Non-Repudiation Attack Tree
The Non-Repudiation Attack Tree presented in Figure 7.4 contains all possible attacks
related to the non-repudiation property. In this tree, the attack goal is \Compromise
Non-repudiation", which is divided in two subgoals.
Node a, the rst subgoal, represents the attack \Compromise non-repudiation of mes-
sages", which is related to the messages sent between the entities in our architecture.
Here, the most important issue is the creation and storage of keys and certicates (As-
sumption S3), since all non-repudiation techniques require entities to have a secure way
of identication.
The same applies to the attack in node b, the second subgoal, which is called \Compro-
mise non-repudiation of assertions". Here, we use digital signatures to check the identity
of the actors that are recording provenance information. These issues were addressed by
Lemma 6.7, which states that non-repudiation holds in the protocols of Data Request,
Task Request and Query Request.
Therefore, we can guarantee that under these assumptions, these non-repudiation attacks
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7.4.5 Information Availability Attack Tree
The Information Availability Attack Tree is presented in Figure 7.5. As mentioned in
Section 7.3, this attack is outside the scope of this work. However, it is important to
mention the measures that should be taken to avoid this attack takes place in our system.
As Figure 7.5 shows, there are three main attacks that could aect the availability of a
resource: a \Databases Attacks", b \Network Attacks" and c \Client Attacks".
Node a contains three subgoals (children). To prevent attacks a:1 \Physical Attacks"
and a:2 \Data Driven Attacks", all necessary physical and technical measures should be
implemented in the system (Assumption S4) [15]. Attack a:3 \Crash Databases", has200 Chapter 7 System Evaluation
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been the focus of much investigation, which aims to enable databases to recover from
a crash without losing data [89]. Thus, to prevent these attacks, we assume that these
measures have been implemented in the local databases of our system (Assumption S2).
In the case of Provenance Store failures, measures such as the ones presented by Chen
and Moreau [38] should be taken into consideration when systems' provenance stores
are designed and deployed.
Node b, \Network Attacks", can be carried out by implementing b:1 \Data Driven At-
tacks" or b:2 \Physical Attacks". To thwart these attacks, dierent preventive and
corrective measures should be followed. Examples of these measures are the correct im-
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description of these measures can be found in [76]. We assume that all of them are
implemented in our system.
The attack associated with node c, \Client Attacks", can be carried out by achieving
one of its four subgoals. The rst one, c:1, \Hack recording querying audit software",
is prevented by Assumptions S5, which states that the necessary measures have been
taken to protect the library used by entities to record provenance. The second and third
subgoals c:2 \Delete Data Descriptions" and c:3 \Delete Usage Rules", represent attacks
against one of the basic components of our architecture (i.e. provenance information and
processing rules, respectively ). For this reason, these should be protected and securely
stored by implementing proper access control restrictions. Finally, the fourth subgoal,
c:4 \OS Attacks", raises another issue that is out of the scope of this work. However,
it should be taken into account in the maintenance of our system by ensuring that the
operating system is regularly updated.
This concludes our description and analysis of the Attack Trees. Using these trees, we
have successfully shown that the attacks dened in Section 7.3 can be prevented, either
by the contributions proposed in this thesis, or the assumptions we made at the start of
section.
7.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we completed the security analysis of a system designed according to the
Secure Provenance-based Auditing Architecture. This analysis was made using Attack
Trees, which is formal and methodical way of describing the security attacks systems
can be subjected to.
The presented analysis focused on the four security properties that we have addressed in
this thesis: condentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. We also added
availability as an important property. Even though this property was not addressed in
this thesis, we present some preventive actions that need to be taken in order to guarantee
the proper execution of a system.
First, we thoroughly enumerated the possible attacks on each of the components of
the architecture in an attempt to break the aforementioned security properties. Then,
we created and analysed ve Attack Trees that formalise the attacks identied in the
previous step, and discussed which of these attacks are addressed by the contributions
of this thesis, and which are prevented by the security assumptions derived from the
assumptions in Section 7.3. If neither, we discussed which further measures should be
implemented.202 Chapter 7 System Evaluation
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After this methodical security analysis, we can conclude that under the given assump-
tions and by implementing the explaining measures, a system that is designed according
to our architecture is secure and none of the mentioned attacks can be performed without
being detected or solved. Thus, taken together, our contributions ensure that provenance
is securely recorded, stored, queried, and analysed.Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
In recent years, an increasing number of on-line services have started to oer personalised
services that require users to disclose personal information. By disclosing personal infor-
mation, users get access to a wide range of new functionality, such as recommendations
or customisation. However, this disclosure also creates a risk that personal information
is misused, resulting in harm to its owner.
Within this context, it becomes necessary to be able to verify whether personal informa-
tion was processed in the correct way, i.e. according to the corresponding data protection
legislation. In order to achieve this, information processing should be made transpar-
ent so it can later be determined whether the use of such information was appropriate.
Specically, if information processing is transparent, auditors can analyse the way in
which information was processed and make organisations responsible for any misuse
(information accountability). This analysis procedure is called audit.
Against this background, this thesis has proposed a solution to the problem of how
to automatically conduct audits, i.e. to verify that personal information has been used
according to the Data Protection Act. We have proposed that provenance is an eective
means of providing process transparency. When it is used for this purpose, provenance
can be seen as electronic evidence of past processing. This provenance can later be
automatically analysed (by means of an automatic audit) to decide whether processing
was performed in compliance with the data protection legislation.
However, due to the open and distributed nature of current systems, the use of prove-
nance can involve communication between multiple components over potentially unse-
cured networks. Moreover, even after being securely stored, provenance can still be
tampered with by the auditor who conducts the analysis. Consequently, without ad-
ditional means of protection, there are multiple ways in which provenance might be
altered, tampered with, or fall in the hands of untrusted parties. In such cases, the
integrity of the obtained audits results cannot be ensured.
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Thus, we identied the need for securing provenance. To address this problem, we
developed the Secure Provenance-based Architecture that protects not only provenance
but also the related application data during its collection, storage, communication, query
and analysis. By securing the complete life cycle of provenance and application data, this
architecture ensures the correctness of the audit results derived from this information.
In addition, using the provenance captured by this secure architecture, we developed
the Compliance Framework for automatically verifying the compliance of data process-
ing against a set of Auditing Requirements derived from the DPA. To perform this
automatic verication, it needs both provenance and the processing rules in machine-
readable format. To do this, the former is represented as a Provenance Graph using
the Open Provenance Model, which captures the causal dependencies between data and
processes. The latter is also represented as a graph, called a Usage Rules Denition
graph, which captures the relations between the data classes that can be used, and the
allowable operations that can be performed on that data. Thus, processing rules form
patterns that provenance must contain to be in compliance.
8.1 Contributions
We now revisit the main contributions made in this thesis in more detail.
8.1.1 Provenance-based Auditing Architecture
First, we derived a set of requirements from a case study of the Data Protection Act.
These requirements were divided into two groups, Auditing Requirements and Security
Requirements. These groups show that both security and auditing functionalities are
necessary to create systems that successfully and securely audit the use of personal infor-
mation. Consequently, we argued that any system architecture for processing personal
information should support both.
To address the Auditing Requirements, the rst group of requirements, we developed
the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture, which consists of a set of three protocols
designed to enable existing systems to capture provenance at execution time, i.e. make
them provenance-aware. These three protocols, Data Request, Task Request and Query
Request, represent the recording, storing and querying of provenance (the nal stage,
analysis, is addressed by the Compliance Framework). The architecture and its as-
sociated protocols were developed using the PrIMe methodology, which allowed us to
identify which provenance should be gathered in order to verify compliance with the
Auditing Requirements.
Finally, we demonstrated that, using the provenance collected by the architecture, we
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of past processing. As a proof of concept, we presented a manual analysis of the prove-
nance to verify if personal information was processed in accordance with to the Auditing
Requirements.
8.1.2 Compliance Framework
Second, we developed the Compliance Framework, a provenance-based auditing frame-
work for automatically auditing the use of personal information by analysing the prove-
nance collected by the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture. Thus, this framework
allows for the automatic verication of the Auditing Requirements, and, as such, whether
processing of personal information was performed in compliance with the Data Protec-
tion Act.
The Compliance Framework consists of three components. The rst component, the
Processing View, represents provenance as a DAG, showing the relation between data
and the processes that act upon it. Put dierently, the Processing View captures how
personal information was used. The second component, the Usage Rules Denition,
encodes the Auditing Requirements using a graph-based rule representation. The third
component is a set of algorithms for automatically verifying whether personal informa-
tion was processed according to the derived requirements. To do so, these algorithms
compare the Processing View against the Usage Rules Denition to detect and report
any violations of the rules. In summary, the Compliance Framework demonstrates that
through the automatic comparison of provenance against processing rules, we can sup-
port information accountability.
8.1.3 Secure Provenance-based Auditing Architecture
Third, we developed the Secure Provenance-based Auditing Architecture, to guarantee
provenance nor application data can be tampered with during its life cycle of recording,
storage, querying and analysis. To do this, it secures the main components of the
Provenance-based Auditing Architecture: the Data Request, Task Request and Query
Request protocols, as well as the provenance graphs. By securing the former, we ensure
that provenance is securely created and transmitted and stored in unsecured networks.
By securing the latter, we can guarantee provenance cannot be maliciously altered during
storage and analysis stage. By doing so, even the auditor is unable to modify the
electronic evidence of the processing of personal information.
We formalised the security of the architecture by modelling its protocols using UMLsec.
This allowed us to automatically and conclusively verify that the architecture exhibits
the essential security properties of condentiality, integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation. By using the Viki model checker, we showed that these properties indeed208 Chapter 8 Conclusion and Future Work
hold. As a result, we can guarantee the correctness of audits based on the provenance
collected by the Secure Provenance-based Auditing Architecture.
Taken together, these contributions represent a signicant advance in the use of prove-
nance for achieving information accountability. However, there are still a few more open
questions that need to be addressed.
8.2 Future Work
Specically, we identify three directions for future work that are aimed to broaden the
scope and improve the practical applicability of our research.
As discussed in assumption 7 (See Chapter 3), we assume that there exists a well-
dened ontology that denes personal information and the processes that act upon it.
This assumption is vital in the creation of the Processing View and the Usage Rules
Denition, as well as in the correct execution of the algorithms that are part of the
Compliance Framework, because in order to analyse provenance against processing rules,
both need to be described using the same concepts and language. Thus, we believe that
further research should be conducted in order to create a standard vocabulary that
denes processing of personal information.
A second important issue is the protection of privacy in provenance. This issue has
already been raised by the research community. In this work, we discuss the impor-
tance of anonymity of users as a mean to protect privacy of individuals (see Anonymity
Preservation Requirement, Section 3.4). However, this requirement is only veried in
the use of data application. Since provenance itself also contains personal information
(in the form of a reference or an actual copy), without proper protection, the disclosure
of provenance can lead to the disclosure of personal information. Thus, there exists a
sensitive trade o between the desire to protect privacy of individuals and to achieve
information transparency. Consequently, further investigation should be carry out to
develop privacy protecting provenance frameworks.
Finally, one of the main motivations of our work is the Data Protection Act. As discussed
in Chapter 3, the Data Protection Act states the possibility of auditing organisations to
verify that their data processing is in compliance. We believe that the work presented
here can be used as a mean to automatically conduct these audits. However, in order to
make the results of these automatic audits admissible as legal evidence, further research
is needed into the legal aspects of this electronic evidence, and the necessary protocols
that should be followed.
In the next sections, these directions of future work are discussed in further detail.Chapter 8 Conclusion and Future Work 209
8.2.1 Dening a Standard Vocabulary
As we explained in Chapter 5, where we discussed the Compliance Framework, in order
to successfully verify that personal information was processed according to a set of
processing rules, it is necessary to have a standard vocabulary. This vocabulary should
be used in the provenance representation (Processing View) and in the processing rules
(Usage Rules Denition). This vocabulary should allow us to correctly describe the
main components of the processing of personal information: purposes, tasks, collect
data and used data (classes and types). Even though the ICO's Register attempts to
dene these components, we demonstrated that for achieving processing transparency
it is incomplete. Moreover, it does not dene a proper language that can be reused
in a computational system. For example, an organisation can dene \on-line sales" as
purpose to indicate that they will collect information from users to sale products using
an on-line application. Another organisation can dene \e-sales" as purpose to indicate
the same activity.
By developing a standard vocabulary for processing personal information, the set of
algorithms for automatic analysis of personal data processing can be applied anywhere
personal information is processed, instead of having to develop domain-specic instanti-
ations of the algorithms for each separate organisation. We believe that it is important
that this vocabulary is implemented using Semantic Web Technologies, i.e. as a standard
ontology that can be (re)used by any organisation that is managing personal informa-
tion. Thus, the algorithms presented in Chapter 5 can be implemented using RDF. In
that way, the Compliance Framework can be widely used to verify the compliance with
the Data Protection Act.
8.2.2 Privacy protecting provenance
As we argued in the introduction, processing transparency is a key issue in ensuring
information accountability. By supporting processing transparency, auditors are able
to analyse how data was processed and which data was used. However, processing
transparency should also protect privacy of individuals. This way, if provenance contains
sensitive information about a user, the identity of this user should be protected. In that
sense, there exists a trade-o between process transparency and privacy protection.
How much personal information should be disclosed on provenance to ensure process
transparency without breaking privacy of the involved individuals?
Even though, there are other research areas (such as databases) in which this issue has
been investigated, little research has focussed on this issue in the provenance community
[45] Therefore, we believe that it is necessary to develop new techniques that nd a
balance between process transparency and privacy protection, i.e. create a privacy-aware
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8.2.3 Provenance as legal evidence
Our Secure Provenance-based Auditing Architecture creates unforgeable evidence about
the processing of information. This information is later used to decide whether DPA
principles where correctly followed during this processing. If a principle was violated,
the Compliance Framework can detect who was responsible, and how and where this
violation occurred. Hence, from a legal point of view, the provenance obtained and anal-
ysed by our architecture can be seen as \digital evidence". Digital evidence or electronic
evidence is \any probative information stored or transmitted in digital form that a party
to a court case may use at trial" [36]. For that reason, we believe we have provided all
the necessary means to ensure that the evidence created by the Secure Provenance-based
Auditing Architecture can be used in a court as evidence of misuse of information. Con-
sequently, it is important to explore the more practical issues involved in achieving this,
such as the protocols involved in handling evidence, and the necessary properties that
need to hold to make electronic evidence admissible. To achieve this, computer scientists
should work in close collaboration with experts in the eld of (Internet) law.
Addressing these open questions combined with the contributions of this thesis is a clear
step forward in mitigating the risks of disclosing personal information, making organi-
sations accountable for the way in which they manage this information, and increasing
the trustworthiness of on-line services.Appendix A
ArgoUML UMLsec Diagrams
In Chapter 6, we presented the set of UMLsec sequence diagrams that were used to
verify that the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture exhibits security properties of
authentication, condentiality, integrity and non-repudiation. For reasons of clarity
and consistency, these sequence diagrams are a graphic representation of the original
diagrams that were veried with the Viki tool. In the interest of completeness, however,
the original UMLsec diagrams are presented in this appendix.
The original diagrams were created using ArgoUML version 0.32.3, a visual editor de-
veloped to create UML diagrams. This editor generates UML models that follow Viki
requirements and, therefore, can be directly used as input to Viki.
Unfortunately, ArgoUML does not visualise the contents of the messages or tag values
within the UML diagrams. Hence, in this Chapter we not only present the original
UMLsec diagram of each protocol of the Secure Provenance-based Auditing Architecture
but also the Graphical User Interface elements showing the contents of each message and
the contents of the adversary entity, which includes three set of tag values called secret,
initial knowledge and guard.
This appendix is organised as follows. First, in Section A.1 we present the UMLsec dia-
gram of the OTLS protocol including the message contents and the tag values. Similarly,
we present the diagram of the Data Request protocol in Section A.2 and the diagram of
the Task Request protocol in Section A.3. Finally, the results of the verication process
are presented in Section A.4.
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A.1 OTLS UMLsec Sequence Diagram
This section presents the ArgoUML UMLsec sequence diagram of the OTLS protocol
created in ArgoUML (Figure A.1) along with the content of the messages of this protocol
(Figure A.2) and the tag values contained in the attacker entity (Figure A.3) 1
These diagrams are a dierent representation of the sequence diagram presented in
Figure 6.1. In Figure A.1 the entities S, C, PS and A are instances of the Server,
Client, ProvenanceStore and Adversary actors, respectively. The messages presented
in Figure A.2 are equivalent to the messages in Figure 6.1. However, these messages use
a dierent notation, which is equivalent to the notation presented in Equations (2.2) to
(2.8). This notation is used by Viki and presented in Table A.1 [78].
Operation Notation
A concatenated with B A :: B
A equal to B A = B
Logical conjunction &
Head of A head(A)
Tail of A tail(A)
Private key k inv(k)
A symmetrically encrypted using the key k symenc(A;k)
A symmetrically decrypted using the key k dec(A;k)
A asymmetrically encrypted using the key k enc(A;k)
A symmetrically decrypted using the key k dec(A;k)
A signed using the key k sign(A;k)
A extracted using the key k ext(A;k)
Hash of A hash(A)
Key generation function kgen()
Extract the ith element from message M M i
Table A.1: Viki Notation
The last operation M i in Table A.1 provides a way to access individual elements of each
message. For example, if we have a message M containing three elements M(e1;e2;e3),
M 1 retrieves the rst element of M, which in this case is e1. Similarly, M 2 and M 3
retrieve e2 and e3, respectively. Note that, in Viki variables do not need to be explicitly
declared, instead they are implicitly declared on rst use.
Finally, the tag values presented in Figure A.3 are the same as the ones presented as
blue ovals in Figure 6.1 along with the ones presented in Table 6.4.
1The original OTLS UMLsec Diagram can be found in http://tinyurl.com/6uoend6 This diagram
is contained in a zargo le that can be opened in the visual editor ArgoUML.Appendix A ArgoUML UMLsec Diagrams 213
Figure A.1: OTLS UMLSec Sequence Diagram
Figure A.2: OTLS UMLSec Sequence Diagram Message Content
Figure A.3: OTLS UMLSec Sequence Diagram Adversary Content
A.2 Data Request UMLsec Sequence Diagram
This section presents the ArgoUML UMLsec sequence diagram of the Data Request pro-
tocol related to the sequence diagram presented in Figure 6.2. In Figure A.4 the entities214 Appendix A ArgoUML UMLsec Diagrams
DS, DC, PS and A are instances of the DataSubject, DataController, ProvenanceStore
and Adversary actors, respectively 2.
As in Section A.1, the messages presented in Figure A.5 are the same ones presented
in Figure 6.2 but use the notation presented in Table A.1. The tag values presented in
Figure A.6 are also the same as the ones presented as blue ovals in Figure 6.2 and the
ones presented in Table 6.4.
Figure A.4: Data Request UMLSec Sequence Diagram
Figure A.5: Data Request UMLSec Sequence Diagram Message Content
A.3 Task Request UMLsec Sequence Diagram
This section presents the ArgoUML UMLsec sequence diagram of the Task Request pro-
tocol related to the sequence diagram presented in Figure 6.3. Therefore, in Figure A.7
2The original Data Request UMLsec Diagram can be found in http://tinyurl.com/7aamyoa. Again,
this diagram is contained in a zargo le that can be opened in the visual editor ArgoUMLAppendix A ArgoUML UMLsec Diagrams 215
Figure A.6: Data Request UMLSec Sequence Diagram Adversary Content
the entities DP, DC, PS and A are instances of the DataProcessor, DataController,
ProvenanceStore and Adversary actors, respectively 3.
As in previous diagrams, the messages presented in Figure A.8 and the tag values pre-
sented in Figure A.6 are the same ones presented in Figure 6.2.
Figure A.7: Task Request UMLSec Sequence Diagram
A.4 Viki Results
The UMLSec diagrams presented in the previous sections are created using the notation
described in Table A.1 and act as input to the Viki model checker. In this section, we
present the results obtained after verifying these diagrams with Viki. As the results for
each of the above diagrams are the same, we only show a single gure representing the
output of the verication process of all the diagrams.
3The original Task Request UMLsec Diagram can be found in http://tinyurl.com/74hzubt. Again,
this diagram is contained in a zargo le that can be opened in the visual editor ArgoUML216 Appendix A ArgoUML UMLsec Diagrams
Figure A.8: Task Request UMLSec Sequence Diagram Message Content
Figure A.9: Task Request UMLSec Sequence Diagram Adversary Content
As Figure A.10 shows, Viki outputs the result \Completion Found", meaning that during
the execution of the corresponding sequence diagram, the attacker cannot obtain any of
the parameters designated as \secret" in the tag values.Appendix A ArgoUML UMLsec Diagrams 217
Figure A.10: Viki Result of the UMLSec Sequence DiagramBibliography
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